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Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-90-211
Wednesday
31 October 1990

Daily Report
East Europe

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Pact Disarmament Commission Begins Prague Talks

LD2610130190 Prague CTK in English 1128 GMT 26 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 26 (CTK)—The fourth session of the special Warsaw Pact commission on disarmament began here today to make the last attempt to share out the number of tanks between the member states.

"If we fail to reach agreement...the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states will have to meet before the Paris summit" of the conference on European Security and Cooperation next month, Svatopluk Buchlovsky of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry told CTK before the meeting today. The present meeting is taking place at the level of deputy foreign ministers.

It is to try to distribute quotas from the 20,000 tanks which the Warsaw Pact is to have in line with the Vienna conference on conventional disarmament. Although the Pact's members can share out between them also the quota earmarked for the former GDR, the demands exceed the ceilings by 450 tanks.

Agreements on the numbers of combat planes, helicopters and vehicles have been reached at the previous three meetings.

A treaty which is to wind up the long-lasting Vienna negotiations on conventional weapons should be signed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact participants at the summit in Paris.

Agrees on Tank Ceiling

LD2710211390 Prague CTK in English 1808 GMT 27 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 27 (CTK)—Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers agreed today on the number of tanks each of the member states will have under an accord with NATO on conventional weapons ceilings, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Harencar told journalists after the meeting here today.

The agreement is to be signed by the six states' foreign ministers in Budapest on November 3.

This was their fourth attempt to remove the last stumbling block to their agreement how they will share out the contingent of 20,000 tanks and artillery pieces fixed at the Vienna talks on conventional disarmament. Harencar said that the Soviet Union offered to reduce its demand by 150 tanks and thus made it possible to reach agreement on the 490 tanks by which the member states demands exceeded the ceiling. The Soviet Union will have 13,150 tanks.

He noted that "the maximum limits of weapons and hardware that each Warsaw Pact state is allowed have now been fixed". The states had agreed on their shares of 2,000 combat helicopters and 30,000 combat vehicles at the previous meetings.

"Today's results will be of crucial importance for the session in Paris", Harencar said referring to the planned signing of the agreement between the Warsaw treaty and NATO at the Conference on Security and Cooperation [in Europe] summit on November 18.

Harencar confirmed that the weapons ceilings are to remain in force also after the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact.

Hungary's Army Not Part of Warsaw Pact as of Dec

LD2410224390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2200 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] As of December the Hungarian Army will no longer be subordinate to the chief command of the Warsaw Pact. Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Hungarian delegation, said this at the Vienna armed forces reduction talks. According to Gyarmati, this arrangement is already in practice. At the same time, the Soviet chief of general staff, Moiseyev, said that the Warsaw Pact, in effect, no longer exists as a military organization. Moiseyev said that disarmament must be turned into an irreversible process, and that it is necessary to develop new European security structures that differ from the previous ones.

Hungarian Delegate to Vienna Talks on Warsaw Pact

AU2410112090 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 24 Oct 90 p 4

[Interview with Istvan Gyarmati, Hungarian chief delegate at the Vienna disarmament talks, by Burkhard Bischof in Vienna; date not given: "Our Goal Is a Cooperative Security System in Europe"]

[Text] [Bischof] Mr. Ambassador, despite several attempts, the Warsaw Pact members have not yet been able to agree on the national quotas for tanks and artillery which will be due to them in line with the reductions agreed on in the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe: What is the problem?

[Gyarmati] I would not dramatize this matter. Six weeks ago we began with the discussion about the distribution of the national quotas; in NATO such a discussion normally takes six months. It is a process which needs time, because it involves real and hypothetical security interests of individual states.

Second, the agreement in New York between Foreign Ministers Baker and Shevardnadze set down figures too high for the Soviet Union. The issue is a few hundred tanks and artillery pieces, which are perhaps not particularly important for all of NATO and the Soviet Union, but which mean very much to the smaller Warsaw Pact countries. We assume that it cannot be a big problem for the Soviet Union if it gets 300 fewer tanks: If it can defend itself with 13,300 tanks, it can also do so with 13,000.

Third, in our alliance we are not yet skilled in solving problems democratically and as equal partners. Discussion often means just the repetition of well-known positions, and some delegations are not able to negotiate properly. They can only find out positions and then they have to get new instructions from their capital cities.

[Bischof] There are already agreements on national quotas within the Eastern alliance concerning combat planes, combat helicopters, and infantry combat vehicles. It has not yet been officially announced how many combat planes the Soviet Union will be permitted to keep in the end.

[Gyarmati] We assume that the upper limit for planes for one alliance will be about 6,800; of these the Soviet Union will be permitted to keep 5,150.

[Bischof] Is the quarrel about tank quotas the last major problem within the Warsaw Pact or are there still other unsolved questions?

[Gyarmati] We still have to find a regulation, within or outside the treaty on conventional disarmament, on how one distributes the active inspection quotas—that is, how many inspections one individual state is permitted to make in the other 21 states. Furthermore, a mechanism for cooperation among the six states for implementing the treaty must be found. We assume that this cooperation will not take place within the Warsaw Pact, but within the group of states that has been founded for the purpose of the treaty.

[Bischof] When do you expect the still-unanswered questions to be resolved? Will the heads of state and government have to deal with these questions themselves at the summit that has been planned for Budapest at the beginning of November?

[Gyarmati] On Friday and Saturday [26-27 October] another meeting is scheduled in Prague, which will deal with solving the still open questions. I am moderately optimistic that an agreement will be possible. The planned summit of the heads of state and government of the Warsaw Pact will not deal with the agreement on conventional armed forces but with the transformation of the alliance

[Bischof] What does Hungary expect from this summit? There is the proposal by CSFR President Havel to dissolve the Pact's supreme command within six months. Does this also correspond with your ideas?

[Gyarmati] We expect that the military structures—not only the Supreme Command—will be dissolved by the end of 1991 at the latest. The Hungarian Armed Forces, however, will already no longer be subordinate to the Warsaw Pact Supreme Command as of 1 December 1990—de facto, this is already the case. Our Armed Forces are now integrated in the military structures only to a very limited extent. Even though we still have some representatives in Moscow, we no longer participate in military exercises.

At the same time, we have always stressed that we do not want to leave the alliance alone. We would prefer a joint decision for dissolution by the member states. We hope that the establishment of new security structures in Europe over the next months or years will also make it possible for the Soviet Union to do without the Warsaw Pact.

[Bischof] Can you describe how the working atmosphere within the Eastern group has changed for you as the representative of Hungary since the beginning of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE]?

[Gyarmati] During the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, and at the beginning of the CFE, Hungary was isolated within the group of Eastern states. We were convinced, however, that our path pointed in the right direction, even though we were subjected to strong political and psychological pressure at that time. Now this is totally different and we are no longer alone. Now we are trying to prevent the Soviet Union from being isolated.

There are also hardly any joint Eastern proposals anymore. Most proposals are introduced in the negotiations on a national basis. The differences in opinion and interests within the Warsaw Pact today are probably greater than in NATO. Certainly, we also have fewer possibilities to influence the Soviet Union than the European NATO allies have to influence the United States.

[Gyarmati] What exactly will the first treaty on conventional disarmament bring to Hungary?

[Gyarmati] With this we take the first step toward establishing a new cooperative security system in Europe. If such a system is not established in the near future, we will not be able to limit our defense efforts to the extent that we want because, if our membership in the Warsaw Pact then ends simultaneously, we could find ourselves in a security policy vacuum. We want to avoid this. Our goal is a cooperative security system in Europe, and the conclusion of a treaty on conventional disarmament is the basis for this.

Second, we believe that after the agreement is signed, we will have a better chance of reaching a consensus on the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Third, we believe that this treaty not only changes the relations of power on the continent, but will also normalize the relations of power in Central and Eastern Europe. Fourth, the treaty will allow us to maintain an army which can be financed in the end. Fifth, we think that the effects of the treaty go far beyond the military dimension: The exchange of information and the regulations on verification, which are set down in the treaty, are new approaches to forming cooperative security structures.

CSFR General Outlines Armament Reductions

LD2910222990 Prague CTK in English 2037 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 29 (CTK)—Czechoslovakia will reduce the number of its tanks and artillery pieces by two thousand each after the Warsaw Pact countries agreed here at the weekend on how they would share out the 20,000 quota for this weaponry agreed with NATO.

Major-General Jiri Jindra, chief of foreign relations at the Defence Ministry, told CTK that the Czechoslovak Army will have 1,435 tanks and 1,150 artillery, 2,050 armoured vehicles (3,000 less), 345 combat aircraft (60 less) and 75 helicopters (30 less than at present). The Warsaw Pact totals are 20,000 tanks and artillery pieces each, 30,000 combat vehicles and 2,000 helicopters.

General Jindra commended the Soviet Union which offered at the last round of the talks on Saturday to reduce its tank quota by 150 although it had agreed on 13,300 tanks with the United States. He said that Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia had agreed soon on their limits and had been an example to negotiations on "the south wing"—Bulgaria and Romania.

Asked if the Czechoslovak Army will remain capable of defence General Jindra confirmed it will, naturally in harmony with Czechoslovakia's new military defence-based doctrine. He said that the 30 helicopters for instance would be disarmed and turned over to the air ambulance service and other hardware will be converted for humanitarian purposes or melted to be used as high-quality material.

Draft Law on Elections Published

AU3010124190 Tirana ZERI I RINISE in Albanian 24 Oct 90 pp 2-3

["Draft Law on Elections to the People's Assembly"]

[Text]**We publish the draft law which the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania will submit for the consideration and approval of the People's Assembly at its regular session on 12 November 1990**

In accordance with Article 67 of the Constitution, the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania decrees:

Chapter One—General Provisions

Article 1

Elections take place on the basis of electoral registers, by universal suffrage, by equal, direct, and secret ballot on the basis of voters' free choice.

Any individual who by any use of compulsion prevents the free expression of citizens' will in the exercise of their electoral rights is liable to punishment under the legal provisions in force.

Article 2

Albanian citizens who have reached their 18th birthday on the date of the elections have the right to participate in elections and to elect deputies to the People's Assembly.

Electoral rights are denied only to those citizens who have been deprived of their electoral rights by a verdict of the courts because they have committed a crime, who are mentally incapacitated and have been pronounced as such by the courts, who are serving prison sentences, or have been arrested by a decision of the courts or the approval of the prosecutor.

Chapter Two—Electoral Registers

Article 3

Elections are held on the basis of electoral registers.

All citizens who enjoy the right to vote and who live (permanently or temporarily) on the territory of a people's council are enrolled on electoral registers.

Each citizen may be enrolled on only one electoral register.

Article 4

Electoral registers are compiled for every polling station in the prescribed manner. In towns, they are compiled by the executive committees of the people's councils of the towns, or by the people councils of those towns without executive committees. In towns divided into precincts, they are compiled by the precincts' people's councils, and in villages by village people's councils.

Article 5

Registers of electors who serve and are resident in military units are compiled and published by their commanders. All other members of the Armed Forces are enrolled on the electoral registers of their places of residence, compiled by the relevant executive committees or people's councils.

Article 6

When an elector changes his place of residence after the publication of the electoral register and before election day, he may request the executive committee or people's council which has published the register to issue a "certificate of the right to vote," while the word "relocated" is noted on the register.

An elector is enrolled on the electoral register of his new place of residence (permanent or temporary) on the presentation of a "certificate of the right to vote" with his identity card or other document in its place.

At each polling station, no more than one-fifteenth of the total number of registered electors may vote with a certificate of the right to vote.

Electoral registers for Albanian citizens abroad are compiled in the prescribed manner by the Central Electoral Commission.

Article 7

The organ that has published the electoral register has the authority to decide to change this register even on election day, but only before voting begins, when a citizen has died, is registered twice, does not appear on the register, does not enjoy electoral rights, or is not on the territory of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

Article 8

Every citizen has the right to apply for the correction of such mistakes and defects in the electoral registers as omission from the register, removal from the register, changes of first name or surname, the enrollment of persons who have lost their electoral rights, etc. Applications are made to the organ that has published the register, that is obliged to consider such an application within two days and to make the appropriate decision.

Appeals against this decision may be filed with the district court, which will, in the presence of the petitioner and a representative of the organ publishing the list, consider the petition at an open court session within three days, and make the appropriate decision. The court's decision is final.

Chapter Three—Constituencies and Polling Stations

Article 9

Two hundred and fifty constituencies with approximately equal numbers of inhabitants are created for elections to the People's Assembly.

The constituencies are defined and announced by the Presidium of the People's Assembly no later that 30 days prior to election day.

Article 10

Every town, town precinct, and village is divided into areas for polling stations.

A polling station is provided for every 100-600 electors.

If a workplace is more than three km from the nearest polling station, a special polling station is provided if there are at least 50 electors.

Article 11

Polling stations are arranged by a decision no later than 20 days before election day. In towns, they are arranged by the executive committees of the people's councils of the towns or the people's councils of those towns without executive committees. In towns divided into precincts, they are arranged by the precincts' people's councils and in villages by village people's councils.

Article 12

Special polling stations are provided in military units for every 20-600 electors. These polling stations are included in the electoral district in which the military unit is situated.

Polling stations in military units are provided by decision of the executive committees of the people's councils, or by the people's councils where there is no executive committee on the territory where the military unit is situated. Electors and candidates are made aware of them.

Article 13

Special polling stations are provided in diplomatic representations abroad where there are no fewer than five electors, and are included in one of the constituencies of the city of Tirana.

Special polling stations are provided on ships which are at sea on election day, if there are no fewer than seven electors. These polling stations are included in the constituencies of the places where the ships are registered.

Article 14

Special polling stations are provided in hospitals, maternity clinics, and similar institutions if more than 15 electors are present.

Special polling stations may be provided in each ward of hospitals with many wards, if each ward has more than 15 electors.

Chapter Four—Electoral Commissions

Article 15

The following commissions are to be created for the supervision of elections to the People's Assembly: the Central Electoral Commission, constituency electoral commissions, and polling station commissions.

The electoral commissions consist of representatives of political and social organizations, representatives of various associations, and distinguished personalities in science and culture.

The deputy chairmen and secretaries of the Central Electoral Commission and of the constituency electoral commissions must be lawyers.

Article 16

The Central Electoral Commission consists of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and 10 members. The commission is approved by the Presidium of the People's Assembly no later than 30 days before the elections.

The Central Electoral Commission carries out the following special duties:
a) It ensures the careful enforcement of the law on elections for the People's Assembly during the course of the elections throughout the territory of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.
b) It registers deputies elected to the People's Assembly.
c) It considers complaints against irregular practices on the part of the constituency electoral commissions and issues final decisions concerning them.
c1) It submits the documentation on the elections to the Mandate Commission of the People's Assembly.

Article 17

In every constituency, a constituency electoral commission is created, consisting of a chairman, a secretary, and three members. The commission is approved by a decision of the executive committee of the district people's council no later than 25 days before the election day.

The constituency electoral commission carries out the following tasks:
a) It ensures the punctilious enforcement of the law on elections to the People's Assembly during the course of the elections throughout the constituency's territory.
b) It registers and announces candidates for deputies who are nominated under this law.
c) It counts the votes on the basis of the reports from the polling stations and announces the results of the elections in the constituency.
c1) It considers complaints against irregular practices on the part of polling station commissions.
d) It issues elected deputies with certificates of election.

e) It sends documentation on the elections to the Central Electoral Commission.

Article 18

A polling station commission is created in every polling station, consisting of a chairman, a secretary, and three members. The commissions are approved no later than 20 days before election day. In towns, they are approved by the executive committees of the people's councils of the towns or by the people's councils of those towns without executive committees. In towns which are divided into precincts, they are approved by the precincts' people's councils, and in villages by village people's councils.

The polling station commission carries out the following tasks:
a) It directs and supervises the enforcement of the election law in polling stations.
b) It counts the votes cast for every candidate for the post of deputy.
c) It compiles a report on all complaints, demands, comments, and proposals of electors or candidates, considers them and makes appropriate decisions.
c1) It submits a report on the voting to the constituency electoral commission.
d) It sends documentation on the election to the executive committee of the people's council of the district or town for safekeeping.

Article 19

Candidates for deputies cannot be members of the constituency electoral commission or of the polling station commissions in the constituency where they are running.

Article 20

Members of the electoral or polling station commissions may be relieved of their duties on these commissions by the organ approving the composition of the commission at the request of the members themselves or at the proposal of social organizations or associations.

Article 21

Managers of enterprises, institutions, and social or economic organizations are required to release from work, without loss of pay, the chairmen and secretaries the constituency electoral commissions three days before and two days after the election, and chairmen and secretaries of the polling station commissions three days before and one day after the elections.

Chapter Five—Nomination of Candidates

Article 22

Not less that two candidates for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly must be nominated in every constituency. A person may be a candidate for the post of deputy in only one constituency.

Article 23

The following political and social organizations have the right to nominate candidates for deputies to the People's Assembly: The Albanian Workers Party, the Democratic Front, the Trade Unions, The Women's Union, the National War Veterans Committee, the Writers and Artists League, and all other organizations or associations recognized by law.

Article 24

Each political and social organization or association has the right to nominate no more than one candidate for each constituency.

Social organizations and associations may also nominate joint candidates.

Article 25

Any citizen has the right to submit his candidacy to be elected as a deputy to the People's Assembly, having secured the approval of no less than 300 electors in the relevant constituency.

Article 26

According to the tradition of the line of the masses, the views of the people concerning candidates proposed by social organizations and associations are voiced at open meetings organized in the relevant constituency for this purpose, before the candidates are registered.

At these meetings, electors have the right to propose to social organizations and associations the removal of any candidate whom they criticize.

Electors who take part in these meetings for the preliminary discussion of candidates also have the right to propose candidates for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly directly from these meetings.

Proposals for the removal or nomination of a candidate for the post of deputy are approved by a majority of the participants at meetings of electors, in an open vote.

Article 27

The leading organs of the social organizations or associations, after hearing the observations or proposals at the preliminary meetings of electors, compile separately or together the final list of candidates for the post of deputy who will stand in the relevant constituency.

When a common list is announced by the Democratic Front, the list also mentions the nominating organization or association to which the nominated candidate belongs.

Article 28

Candidates for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly must be registered with the constituency electoral commissions no later than 15 days prior to election day. To accomplish this registration, they must submit the following documents:

a) A written application from the relevant organization or association, requesting the registration of the nominated candidate for the post of deputy. The application must mention the candidate's name, father's name, surname, and age.

When a candidate nominates himself, an application is submitted with the relevant signatures of electors. The commission has the right to verify the authenticity of the electors' signatures.

b) A statement by the candidate accepting his nomination in this constituency.

Article 29

When they have met the conditions of this law, the constituency electoral commissions are obliged to register all the candidates for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly and to announce their names no later than 10 days prior to election day, also announcing the name of the social organization which has nominated them.

Article 30

The constituency electoral commission compiles a registration report in the prescribed manner for every candidate for the post of deputy. One copy of this report is sent immediately to the Central Electoral Commission together with the candidate's statement accepting his nomination in that constituency.

Article 31

Appeals against the decisions of constituency electoral commissions not to accept the registration of a candidate for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly may be made to the Central Electoral Commission within two days.

Article 32

An appeal against the decision of the Central Electoral Commission may be made to the Supreme Court. The latter, after summoning the candidate and a representative of the organ which has registered him, considers the appeal and gives a final decision within three days, which is announced immediately.

Article 33

When a candidate for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly is withdrawn by his nominators, withdraws his own candidacy, or dies after having been registered by the electoral commission, the relevant social organization or association may register another candidate, but no later than seven days prior to election day.

Article 34

When a candidate for the post of deputy is withdrawn by his proposers, withdraws his own candidacy, dies, or commits a visibly serious crime during the seven days prior to the election, and when no more than two candidates are standing in that constituency, the organ that has registered him removes his name from the announced list or the ballot papers, and the election in that constituency is held on another day—no later than two weeks after the date of the general election.

Chapter Six—The Rights and Duties of Candidates During the Election Campaign

Article 35

Social organizations or associations which have nominated candidates and all independent candidates must present their program in public, in writing, or orally.

Presented programs must not include fascist, racist, or terrorist ideas, or ideas inspired by or borrowed from the treacherous organizations created during the National Liberation War.

Article 36

Every organization, association, or individual has an equal right to disseminate propaganda for a registered candidate at meetings, in the press, on the radio and television, and in other ways.

Article 37

It is forbidden for candidates for the post of deputy to use the information media of foreign countries for propaganda during the election campaign.

Article 38

Institutions, enterprises, and organizations are obliged to help to create the necessary conditions for the normal conduct of propaganda, to enable all candidates to hold meetings with electors, and to place at their disposal the necessary materials for an awareness of the situation.

Article 39

During the election campaign, organs of the state and the state administration are not allowed to spread any propaganda for candidates nominated for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly.

Article 40

The state gives the necessary help to candidates or organizations which do not possess sufficient material resources and financial income to cope with the election campaign.

The sources for the financing of the election campaign are controlled by the state.

Article 41

During the election campaign it is forbidden for candidates for the post of deputy to receive help, gifts, or financial aid from foreign states or physically or legally foreign persons, to buy electors' votes, or to spread false information about the other candidates.

Article 42

For violating the rules laid down in Articles 35, 37, 38, and 39 of this law, the candidate for the post of deputy is struck from the list of candidates by the commission which has registered him, and when this violation constitutes a criminal act, he is held responsible according to the provisions of the Penal Code.

Article 43

Candidates for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly keep their jobs and receive their full salaries while performing their duties as candidates during the election campaign.

Article 44

Candidates for the post of deputy to the People's Assembly cannot be held criminally responsible, arrested, or detained without the approval of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, except in cases in which they commit a visibly serious crime.

Chapter Seven—Voting

Article 45

The People's Assembly elections are held on a non-working day throughout the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

The election date is decided by the Presidium of the People's Assembly no later that two months before the election day.

Article 46

Voting takes place on the appointed day between 0600 and 2000.

Article 47

Before 0600 on election day, the chairman of the polling station commission, in the presence of the members of this commission, checks the ballot boxes and the electoral register, and, finding them in order, closes and seals the ballot boxes and invites electors to begin casting their votes.

The chairman of the polling station commissions is responsible for maintaining order and peace at the polling station. His orders apply to everybody.

Article 48

No propaganda for candidates is permitted on the election day.

Article 49

Secret rooms or booths are provided at all polling stations. The presence of any person, including members of the polling station commission, is forbidden in these places.

Article 50

Every elector votes in person, at the polling station, and is obliged to use the secret room or booth.
The elector has the right to vote for the candidate he wishes.
Votes are cast by placing the ballot paper in the ballot box.

Article 51

An elector who, because of sickness or any other reason, is unable to go to the polling station himself, has the right to ask the polling station commission to send to him the second ballot box which is in every polling station, accompanied by a member of the commission.

Article 52

Illiterate or physically handicapped electors have the right to call any other elector to help them in the secret room or booth.

Article 53

Ballot papers are printed according to the model prescribed by the Presidium of the People's Assembly.

Article 54

Persons who come to vote with certificates of the right to vote issued under this law are registered at the end of the electoral register by the polling station commission.

Chapter Eight—Verification of Election Results

Article 55

At 2000 on the election day, the chairman of the polling station commission declares the polls closed and the commission compiles a report on the number of ballot papers which remain unused. The ballot box is then opened.

Article 56

Representatives of the social organizations or associations specifically appointed for this purpose by their organs, and representatives of independent candidates, the press, radio and television, and the news agency have the right to be present while the polling station commission and the electoral commission count the votes.

Article 57

The polling station commission compares the number of ballots cast with the number of electors who have made use of ballots on the basis of the electoral register, and counts the votes for each candidate. It records the results in the voting report.

The chairman of the polling station commission announces the results of the voting for each candidate in the presence of all members of the commission.

Article 58

Ballot papers are invalid
a) When the ballot paper is not of the authorized kind.
b) When the names of more than one candidate are left on the ballot paper.
c) When the names of candidates are crossed out and others are inserted in their place, but without noting their fathers' names. [as published]
c1) When the name of the candidate is crossed out and that of another person who does not have the right to vote, is underage, dead, etc. is inserted in its place.
d) When the ballot paper is so soiled as to be illegible.

Article 59

The polling station commission compiles a report on the voting in the prescribed manner, which is signed by the chairman and secretary of the commission and immediately sent to the constituency electoral commission.

The village polling station commission sends the other electoral documents to the executive committee of the district people's council for safekeeping, while the precinct polling station commission sends them to the people's council of the town for safekeeping, its executive committee, or the executive committee of the people's council of the region.

Article 60

The constituency electoral commission counts the votes on the basis of the voting reports sent by the polling station commissions and verifies the number of votes cast for each candidate for the post of deputy.

Article 61

The constituency electoral commission compiles a report in two copies which is signed by the chairman and secretary of the commission.

One copy of the report is sent immediately to the Central Electoral Commission. The second copy of the report, together with the other documentation on the election, is sent to the executive committee of the people's council of the town or district for safekeeping.

Article 62

After the votes are counted and the report is signed, the chairman of the constituency electoral commission declares the election concluded at a meeting of the commission.

Article 63

The chairman of the constituency electoral commission issues to the elected candidate a certificate of election as a deputy to the People's Assembly.

Article 64

A candidate who gains more than one-half of all valid votes (an absolute majority) in a constituency is considered elected as a deputy to the People's Assembly.

Article 65

When two or more candidates are registered in a constituency and none of them gains an absolute majority of votes in the first round, the electoral commission records this in its report and at the same time orders a second round of elections to take place no later than one week after the first round.

Article 66

When there are more than two candidates on the list, the two candidates who have gained the most votes proceed to the second round, while when there are only two candidates on the list, both proceed to the second round. In both cases, a candidate must have gained more than 25 percent of valid votes cast in the ballot box to proceed to the second round.

At the conclusion of the second round, the candidate who has gained more valid votes than the other (a relative majority) is elected.

Candidates are registered within four days of the conclusion of the first round.

Article 67

Other elections with new candidates are held:
1. When no nominated candidate gains more than 25 percent of the valid votes cast in the first round.
2. When only one nominated candidate gains more than 25 percent of the valid votes cast in the first round. This candidate proceeds to the next elections.

Elections with new candidates are held no later that two weeks after the conclusion of the first elections.

Article 68

If the number of votes cast in a constituency is less than one-half of the number of eligible electors in that constituency, the constituency electoral commission records this in its report and orders a repetition of the elections no later than two weeks after the first elections.

The new elections are held on the basis of the electoral registers compiled for the first elections and in conformity with the provisions of this law.

Article 69

Appeals against the decisions of the Central Electoral Commission regarding election results may be lodged by interested candidates at the Supreme Court. The court considers the appeal and issues a final decision within three days. The Mandate Commission of the People's Assembly is informed of the decision.

Article 70

If the place of a deputy of the People's Assembly becomes vacant, the Presidium of the People's Assembly announces elections for a new deputy in the relevant constituency.

Chapter Nine—Final Provisions

Article 71

Law No. 4121 dated 17 March 1966, "On Elections to the People's Assembly" is annulled.

Article 72

This law comes into effect immediately.

Food Industry Minister Bufi Interviewed

AU2610212990 Tirana ZERI I RINISE in Albanian 6 Oct 90

[Interview with Food Industry Minister Ylli Bufi by Ilir Kadia; place and date not given: "You Cannot Explain Yourself or Be Understood 'Ex Cathedra'"]

[Text] [Kadia] Your appointment as minister aroused interest among the public, at least among young people. A minister while still young.

[Bufi] I am not all that young. I am in my forties, like my ministerial colleagues in education and light industry.

[Kadia] There is still interest in learning something about your life. Readers generally know little about the lives of ministers.

[Bufi] I do not think this is the fault of the ministries. Nevertheless, I doubt that a minister's life arouses the same interest as that of an artist, writer, or sportsman. Readers do not know much about them either. It is also a little difficult, because when you start to talk about your own life you immediately think of Belui. [a personal name, relevance in this context unknown]

[Kadia] Then I shall say a few words to readers about your life. You graduated from the University in industrial chemistry, and first worked as a shift engineer at the Fier food enterprise. Your career has always been in this sphere, up to your present post. Ah yes, you have also been a member of the Albanian Union of Working Youth Central Committee. Do you see points in common between social activity and the work of a state official?

[Bufi] I will answer with an example. The Tirana Party Committee engaged many cadres to organize meetings with young people. I was assigned to the youth conference of the Ali Kelmendi Food Combine. I had the district youth secretary at my side. We began to talk to the young people. We seemed rather "ex cathedra" to ourselves. The young people presented the problems of the new economic mechanism very practically, insofar as they understood it. Their uncertainties indicated that we—I am thinking of state officials from enterprises and ministries—are talking to them more or less theoretically. Another thing: The young people, as members of the organization, seemed to reflect many shortcomings in the organization's internal life, yet the district youth secretary insisted that they make a decision on dividing into sections! From meeting with workers of various ages and living alongside their worries and problems—in other words, at the main point of contact between social activity and the work of a state official—I have the impression that a certain distance has grown up between us, which is unpleasant for both sides.

To continue with what I was saying about the new economic mechanism, young people put forward the problem that, for instance, the ministry's plan for orangeade production is too high and must be lowered. All right, I said to them, that is what we will do; we will reduce the plan. Is the Tirana market full of orangeade or thirsty for it? Thirsty, they said. Well then?! If we lower the plan, some of your workmates will necessarily become redundant, and will have to be laid off because they are not justified by production. Right? They were silent. No one, now or ever, can accept such a thing. What was I trying to put across? I was trying to say that in the new economic mechanism, we will not change the factory signs, we will not simply change economic and financial targets. Seen in this way, we already have a kind of self-financing. We aim to change the economic thinking of everybody, starting with the worker, the basic factor in the success of this mechanism. A young worker at the brewery, for example, should know that saving one quintal of malt will have such-and-such an effect on his wages or on the profit of his brigade. This is where self-financing must start. There was pressure to change the wage per work norm, and this was, in fact, done. There is no evident pressure on oneself to change the part of the wage which is tied to profit, because this is tied to the sweat and brain of the worker and the economist in the enterprise.

[Kadia] Perhaps routine becomes an obstacle here.

[Bufi] It becomes a big one. Presently, economic thinking has become routine. Solutions are sought and provided which retain a great deal from earlier solutions. Old ways of organization and administration have hardly been abandoned. Of course, it is not easy. We must realize that many things have conceptually changed. For example, a large enterprise with a large general industrial production and many workers is no longer appreciated. An enterprise with a smaller production and fewer workers, but with a higher level of profitability, can be considered to be of greater value. The new economic mechanism includes the potential for change at all times, and the initiative for such change. For example, the Lushnje meat and milk enterprise went over to the new economic mechanism on 1 July. In the three months of its existence, it has been observed not to be doing well. On 1 October, it divided, and two separate enterprises were created next to each other. They pretend that they will do better that way.

[Kadia] The view exists that a portion of the "praise" for the food industry belongs to agriculture.

[Bufi] Throughout the world, the food industry has a markedly local character. Its raw materials and consumers are nearby. Its aim is to add value, in two principal ways, to mainly agricultural products. As to your question, there are two relevant facts: first, the low profitability of our food industry of two to three percent (which is much higher for our other industries), and second, the budget's financing of agriculture from the financial resources of the food industry to cover the differences in purchase prices of agricultural products, which amounts to 450 million new leks. The government has recently done a great deal to regulate relations between agriculture and industry.

[Kadia] As a customer and a consumer, I have noticed that there are occasional shortages on the market even of goods which were never in doubt before, such as oil, sugar, rice, and flour.

[Bufi] The drought has had a great effect. We carry out our trade with other countries in these articles under more unfavorable conditions than before, yet these are not the reasons for the shortages. The government has taken every measure to ensure that the people do not experience such shortages. It is a fact that the stores and warehouses are full. It is the retail sector which is not functioning properly. For example, these shortages can be noticed on the boulevards of Tirana, although the storehouses are in a satisfactory state, as workers' control groups have proved.

[Kadia] Has perhaps the emergence of new purchasers, producers, and private traders who at present purchase directly from the stores upset the equilibrium?

[Bufi] No doubt it has. The financial inspectorate must provide a solution for these and other worries and problems connected with private producers.

Hoxha Family Rumored Missing for 3-4 Days

AU3010142290 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo Croatian 27 Oct 90 p 1

["R.C."-signed report: "What Is Happening With the Hoxha Family?"]

[Text] As we have unofficially learned, the members of the late Enver Hoxha's family have not been seen in the public for already three or four days. The widow of Enver Hoxha, Nexhmije, is unofficially rumored to be in Durres "where she is resting." She is president of the People's Democratic Front of Albania, but has also been, along with President of the State, Ramiz Alia, one of the key persons in Albanian politics; however, since the death of Enver Hoxha she has mainly been active in the background.

Enver Hoxha's three children are not involved in politics. Sokol is the director of the Albanian Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Ilir is an architect, and the daughter Pranvera (married name Kolaneci) is one of the four designers of the Enver Hoxha Museum. It is rumored that Sokol has been absent from work for three days and that the other members of his family are "ill."

Rights, Freedoms Delegates Boycott Assembly

Demand Human Rights Guarantees

AU3010162890 Sofia BTA in English 1558 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 29 Oct (BTA)—Between 3 and 5:30 pm today the parliamentary faction of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) stayed away from the sitting of the Grand National Assembly in protest over the failure of the government and of parliament to do anything to guarantee human rights so far. Mr. Ahmed Dogan, the DPS leader, told the BTA minutes before the boycott was declared to the M.P.'s that the government programme does not contain human rights guarantees, either.

Mr. Dogan singled out as particularly alarming the housing crisis in the forthcoming harsh winter: People are living in garages, crowding ten to fifteen in a room or two, they cannot afford to buy fuel for the winter. This does not apply to members and supporters of the DPS alone, its leader emphasized.

Some Bulgarian Turks who emigrated last year and then repatriated are in particularly dire straits, he pointed out. Many of them found their homes appropriated by other people. Their housing problem has not been solved to date. "The Presidency, too, has not taken a stand on the matter," Mr. Dogan claimed.

Mounting political tensions give the DPS M.P.'s another motive to boycott parliament. No one has yet claimed responsibility for the bombing attack in Shumen last week.

According to Mr. Dogan, there can be talk of a beginning of interethnic strife in Bulgaria, and there are forces which would like to use it to their own ends. Mr. Dogan, however, did not specify the forces he had in mind.

"The DPS does not want Bulgaria to become a Balkan Lebanon," the leader of the movement stressed at the end of his statement.

He accused parliament and the government of deliberately stalling in order to stir up social and political tensions.

Mr. Yanko Yankov, the only M.P. for the Social Democratic Party (Non-Marxists), joined the DPS boycott. He demonstratively walked out of the chamber.

The DPS M.P.'s may go on with their boycott tomorrow.

Issue Statement on Protest, Boycott

AU3010202090 Sofia BTA in English 1907 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 30 Oct (BTA)—"There is no dialogue in parliament as a condition to coordinate the actions of the parliamentary parties, which creates prerequisites for a cabinet crisis threatening to grow into a parliamentary crisis," says a declaration of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) read in parliament this evening. In it the movement's MP's motivated their boycott of today's plenary sitting.

According to the DPS the three months during which parliament has been in session have not resulted in a solution to problems of vital significance for the country. Worse yet, political extremism with neo-fascist characteristics has manifested itself, and its actions undermine the radical reform process which should be extended to the Bulgarian citizens' rights and freedoms as well, the declaration reads.

An opposition MP took the floor and spoke in support of the DPS declaration. He emphasized that there are no objective obstacles whatsoever to solving the question of the names of the Bulgarian Turks who were forced to change them in Zhivkov's assimilation campaign. "I can't see why a party should be able to change its name when it wishes to while people should not be allowed to bear the names they were given at birth," he said, alluding to the Bulgarian Socialist (formerly Communist) Party.

BSP's Political Declaration Read to Assembly

AU3010095590 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 27 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

[Political declaration of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) parliamentary group read at the Grand National Assembly Session in Sofia on 26 October: "No One Ever Promised an Easy and Painless Change"]

[Text] Bulgaria is involved in a decisive stage of its development. Our country and people are facing the hard trials of transition to the market economy. Our country is confronted with the further crucial problems related to the development of political democracy.

How should we overcome the difficulties involved—are we supposed to distribute them among people on an equal basis, or should we prefer chaotic conditions to civic peace? Should we meet the social trials of the transition period together, or should we precipitate our people into an even more dangerous polarization? All this depends on all of us who were chosen by fate to become members of the Grand National Assembly.

The BSP expresses its support for Andrey Lukanov's government program on the further democratization of society and on accelerating the transition to a market economy. We think that this program contains the essential prerequisites for the establishment of a democratic economic system. As early as in its election platform the BSP declared itself in favor of freedom of ownership and in favor of "an accelerated transition to a market economy and in favor of speeding up the establishment and development of its three basic components—the commodity market, the capital market, and the labor market."

We declared as early as in our election platform: "We promise neither an easy, nor a painless change. However, we promise a just distribution of the burden of the crisis and we promise to alleviate the sacrifices of the common working people, the pensioners, the students, and the children to the greatest extent possible."

For precisely this reason, we are convinced that the normal and comprehensive development of the market economy is unthinkable without the further renewal of our society's political life, without the solution of all crucial problems of political democracy, without reciprocating the people's trust. As a party and as a parliamentary group the BSP is ready to pursue its efforts aimed at changing the political system and at creating a developed pluralistic society, a modern parliamentary democracy.

There is no sensible alternative to political and economic pluralism, to democracy, both in the political and economic spheres. Even if the relevant changes should closely affect our party's interests, we are ready to act for the progress of the democratic process. For precisely this reason, we agreed to support the election of a president from the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]. For this reason we also agreed to establish provisional local administrations, likely to guarantee equal rights for all, prior to the elections for local government authorities. For this reason we voted for the Law on Depoliticization, expressing our gratification at the fact that the law should also apply to the president's office.

Along with this, we shall always oppose all efforts aimed to channel the development of a democratic rule-of-law state so that it favors certain political forces to the detriment of others. Only equality before the law and free political competition, only mutual respect and tolerance are likely to guarantee democracy in Bulgaria.

Our party on several occasions expressed its official concern about the work of the Grand National Assembly. It still lacks the sound parliamentary atmosphere and the polite manners which characterize human relations in the parliaments of other civilized countries. A highly emotional tone, distrust, political confrontation, and intolerance prevail in our parliament instead. Our parliamentary group is not responsible for the slow and inefficient work of the Grand National Assembly. We are not those who walk out on every other occasion. We are not those who conduct endless disputes. We did not delay the nomination of the cabinet, nor did we constantly change our own views on participating in it.

We do not deny the SDS's right to exist, but the opposition denies ours. We are tolerant toward the opposition, even when it transgresses the limits of common sense. Realizing that people very often accuse us of making too many concessions we, nevertheless, are convinced that the survival and the very existence of this parliament are invaluable assets of democracy.

We are convinced that parliamentary work could be accelerated and improved, as long as an atmosphere of mutual respect exists among the different parliamentary factions, as long as their attention is focused on the laws that are being discussed, and as long as the work in the commissions is improving.

We are doing and shall do everything within our power for contributing to a desirable working atmosphere in our Grand National Assembly.

The BSP has a vital interest in solving the question of the responsibility and punishment of the culprits responsible for our society's current socioeconomic and moral crisis. At our 39th BSP Congress we declared ourselves to be the legitimate heirs of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] which ruled the country over four decades and we assumed political responsibility for the state of our society.

At the same time, however, we categorically reject all efforts of shift the guilt for the crisis from the real culprits to our entire party.

This demand is justified, considering that our party made no less important sacrifices during the period of the totalitarian regime than any other party in our country.

It is justified, because while some members of our party played the role of jailers, others were martyrs.

Our demand is also justified because it was within our party's ranks that substantial resistance against the totalitarian regime emerged and because numerous leaders of the present opposition parties and groups developed in our party.

This is the tragic implication of the past regime. It set examples of heroic deeds of labor while at the same time it was setting up forced labor camps, it inspired faith, but also created many delusions and deceits. For this reason, precisely, we should learn the lesson of the past regime and try not to repeat the mistakes of the totalitarian system—namely to deny the past totally and to claim the right of monopoly over the past, the present and the future.

Our party is genuinely interested in the prompt settlement of the question about the specific responsibility of those who are guilty of the current crisis. We intend to publicly express our specific and comprehensive political views on this issue within the forthcoming weeks.

At the same time we would like to declare that our party has no intention of staging a trial and acting as a court of justice. We are not and we cannot claim to be a judicial organ. However, we are ready to declare in public and to our whole society that we shall submit all data and documents available to us whenever we are requested to do so, according to the rules.

Nevertheless, we would like to stress that the SDS Political Declaration has the nature of a court verdict. It is the verdict of an incompetent court at that. An unmistakable objective transpires from it, namely the wish that the BSP should be removed from the country's political life, not through elections based on democratic rules, but through the total denouncement of the entire party. With this declaration the SDS claims the right to solve problems which are by no means within the competence of individual political forces in the country; they are the prerogative of our public as a whole. There is something even more important worth pointing out in this connection, namely, that in publishing such a declaration,the SDS turns the wheel of our political life back to the era of 40 years ago, when an incorrect policy eliminated several important political forces from the country's political life.

The BSP has drawn the necessary historical conclusions from that era. However, the SDS does not seem to have done so, or to put it more precisely, those who are still suffering from the infantile disease of every revolutionary change have not done so. The SDS, with its aforementioned declaration, seriously tried to repeat certain historical mistakes, even if they were committed by different people. The BSP declares: It is our common duty not to tolerate new distortions and crimes. It is our common obligation to understand once and for all that we cannot eliminate forces which are profoundly rooted in Bulgaria's existence and political history from our public life.

We shall not permit any other political force to usurp the right of jurisdiction according to its political interests. Legal courts of justice exist in Bulgaria and we should grant them the prerogative of deciding upon such cases, we should create favorable working conditions for them. Let us, as soon as possible, halt the process of their disintegration and restore the self-confidence of the Bulgarian judicial organs.

THe BSP declares that, even if it is not requested to do so, it will adopt the initiative of insisting on legal investigations against individuals who are reported to have violated the country's laws and whose offenses are proved by legal evidence. We no longer accept any delay in holding such people responsible.

Nevertheless, we are convinced that the problems of responsibility and of the culprits cannot be resolved by wishful thinking. It is necessary to speed up the work of the special Grand National Assembly commissions appointed for this purpose and to intensify the activities of all state organs in this respect. We can no longer accept that the entire responsibility for the ineffective solution of such problems should be shifted to the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which is precisely what the SDS Declaration does. The opposition is already participating in the country's administration through its own representatives, who should also assume responsibility. There is no reason whatsoever that the BSP should be the sole target of criticism for the country's current situation.

We declare that no sphere of activity, or individuals in our party are beyond public criticism. If there is evidence that any member of our party, or parliamentary group, whoever he may be, has violated the country's laws, he should bear all the responsibility and the law should be applied to him in all its severity. If there is evidence that any member of our party or parliamentary group, whoever he may be, has deliberately failed to disclose data or facts related to criminal offenses, he should be held responsible. At the same time, however, we will apply this requirement of the legal and moral codes to all political forces.

We would like to declare, along with this, that we will never tolerate any premeditated or intentional general accusations against innocent people and we will not tolerate that the investigation and judicial organs should become instruments of political persecution or that the dispensing of the law should be abused for political goals.

The BSP thinks that the question of the parties' property, our party's property included, is one of the problems that require an urgent settlement. This issue calls for further work on certain new laws, the Law on Political Parties included.

The BSP already submitted a detailed accountability report on the party's property to the Grand National Assembly on 1 October 1990. The SDS, which has so far not done so, should be requested to do the same. It is necessary that the Grand National Assembly Commission on Control Over the Incomes, Expenditures, and Properties of Political Parties should more promptly examine the accountability reports of political parties, coalitions, and public organizations.

We categorically oppose all efforts of certain officials, especially in the economic sphere, to abuse their social standing in order to transfer state property into private property. However, we also refuse to accept that our party and the government should be held responsible for such acts. This is all the more inconsistent, taking into consideration the fact that the National Assembly deputies are expected to deal with the relevant legal acts.

The BSP is striving for social justice and will continue to do so. We support the request that all incomes and properties acquired during the totalitarian regime and to date should be declared.

We support the adoption of a law on one-time taxation of private real estate properties exceeding the legal norms. The high taxation on large properties will make it possible to collect financial resources for a special fund to assist the unemployed, to create new jobs, and introduce retraining programs.

The question of confidence was recently raised by the opposition as a prerequisite for reaching agreement on the government program. This question also concerns the BSP. We cannot ignore the trend pursued by the SDS in its policy since the very beginning of the roundtable negotiations. The SDS was and is still trying to obstruct, or postpone solving the country's economic problems by imposing various political conditions.

We cannot overlook the fact that during the consultations for the establishment of a coalition government, certain SDS leaders raised hopes by hinting that they might participate in such a government, but refused to join at the last moment. We cannot fail to point out that they also rejected even the president of the republic's proposal about the establishment of a government program which was in the country's interest.

The question emerges: Why is it that the opposition tries to impose political conditions whenever there is a question of adopting specific economic measures? Is it not more than evident that the SDS is irritated by the fact that it is precisely the Socialists, who are engaged in implementing Lukanov's economic program, rather than by the program itself, which is accepted by the majority of Bulgarian and foreign economic experts.

The program of the present Socialist Government has the support of the majority of SDS economic experts, of numerous Grand National Assembly commissions and of the president of the Republic, but is also approved by distinguished representatives of the international economic and financial community. Under such circumstances, by refusing to support the program submitted by Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov, certain SDS members are assuming great responsibility for the country's future. This would mean that the SDS is placing its narrow-minded party interests above Bulgaria's interests at this crucial moment in our country's destiny.

We are aware that the time of endless praise and boasting at our achievements and successes is over. This is good. However, we can never accept the argument that nothing has been accomplished in our country over the last decades, that only failures and disasters characterized that era. We cannot accept this fact because it is simply untrue. It is justified to say that more and better things could have been accomplished. There have been great achievements, nevertheless. Only a consciousness dimmed by hatred, malice, and negation could claim the opposite. Only a policy which places its narrow-minded interests over nationwide interests could claim the opposite. Only a party or organization which prefers untruth to truth could claim the opposite.

We are seeking the truth, the whole truth. Our party does not deny other people's right to pursue their quest for the truth. Let us pursue it together for Bulgaria's sake.

Lilov, Beron, Vulkov on Depoliticization Law

AU3010130290 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 25 Oct 90 p 1

[Statements by Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, Petur Beron, chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces, and Viktor Vulkov, chairman of the Permanent Board of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, on the Law on Amendments and Addenda to the Law on Political Parties and the guarantees to its implementation; place and date not given: "What the General Political Assessment Is"]

[Text] Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]:

"We already have an advanced democracy in Bulgaria, but we must assess the law we adopted today as undemocratic, because it is the undeniable right of every citizen to be a member of any party which suits his conviction, and be active in its ranks. However, our country is in a very early stage of its democratic development, and I think that this law was necessary to strengthen the democratic development of society.

"Of course, our party is losing a great deal of its members, who are among the most convinced champions of the socialist idea. I believe that by temporarily interrupting their membership, they will not betray the ideas and values of socialism.

"As far as the guarantees are concerned, I believe that we must have firm and inviolable principles. If somebody in our country begins to persecute and fire people because they have been BSP members, it first of all means that he is not a democrat, and second, that such a person is violating not only the laws of political democracy but also the laws of the country. Such people should be dealt with harshly by the law."

Petur Beron, chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces:

"I assess the draft law that was adopted as something normal, something that should have happened, and something which is in the interest of the entire society. A normal act was implemented. It facilitates the further development of the Grand National Assembly itself and the adoption of other, much more important laws. In addition, we crossed one of the barriers which obstructed our work, because it was known to all that the parliamentary groups disagree on this matter. I think that the adoption of the law represents a removal of totalitarian remnants that hindered our progress.

"I think that the issue of the guarantees has been resolved by the Constitution. Nobody can be persecuted because of his political beliefs. There are legal guarantees, and one must observe in practice whether those guarantees are applied and whether people really are persecuted because of their political beliefs. This does not mean that a party member who has been fired for other reasons, should complain and invoke political reasons for this step. There must be no speculation in this area. It must carefully be assessed who was fired and why. One should not abuse the guarantees.

"In this context I think that the draft law on amendments and addenda to the Penal Code, proposed by people's representative Sonya Mladenova, is a normal act in guaranteeing the Bulgarian citizens' political rights."

Viktor Vulkov, chairman of the Permanent Board of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union:

"The depoliticization law is a very powerful and impressive legal act, without precedent in our legislature. I do not want to call it an historic act, but for me it is the beginning of a process. The law, as a law, cannot change the scope of the problem or eliminate it, but it is a beginning. The people's convictions remain. The fact that they will sign declarations will not eliminate their convictions, and nobody can convince me that those convictions will not influence their decisions under various circumstances. Thus, the law is a law, and it will give us the opportunity to clarify to people who, in the future, will occupy positions in the departments mentioned by the law, that they must be above politics. As a single act the law is the beginning of a process from which the entire country will benefit. We shall need capable and professional people, who will serve the government elected by the people, rather than personalities or parties.

"We all understand that guarantees are needed for preventing persecution on a political basis. This is not a process which starts today and ends tomorrow. Now there is a high level of politicization, but after a while things will settle, and I suppose that they will develop as in any other country with an advanced democracy."

Technical Error in Zhelev Depoliticization Speech

AU3010213090 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 2030 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] The spokesman of the president of the Republic has given BTA an explanation in connection with the declaration of the independent trade union of the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 29th October.

The presumption of that independent trade union is correct that in the text of the Address of the President of the Republic to the Employees of the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecution Service, National Intelligence Service, and the National Service for Protection of the Constitution, the omission of the independent trade union of the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is due to a technical error.

This question was clarified in a telephone conversation with a representative of the trade union, and the explanation was repeated at the regular briefing held in the Presidency in Sofia on 26 October.

Because the independent trade union of the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insists on a further explanation to be issued through BTA, we are doing this, despite the fact that the tone of the address of the president of the Republic makes it clear that there can be no question of a special attitude toward the employees of any of the depoliticized government departments.

We repeat once again that a technical error was made.

Socialist Party Establishes Guilt Commission

AU3010160090 Sofia BTA in English 1445 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 30 Oct (BTA)—A political document on the guilt of the Bulgarian Communist (now Socialist) Party as an institution can be expected any time now, says Mr. Ventsel Raychev, member of the commission on the guilt and the culprits for the crisis which has been recently established by the leadership of the Socialist Party, in today's "SVOBODEN NAROD."

Mr. Ventsel Raychev, who represents the radical tendency in the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], explains that radicals predominate in the 15-member panel. They are decided not to allow the commission, while trying to distinguish the blame, to make yet another attempt to exculpate the party. Its task is finally to say something accurate and responsible about the party's political responsibility for the current state of the country. Difficulties arise from the contradictory stand taken within the party itself about the guilt of the party as an institution and about the guilt of its members, and the commission clashed over these differences already at its first meeting.

Definite individuals stood behind every political decision. It is time to abandon the phrase "closest entourage" which in the event comes down to a couple of people, Mr. Ventsel Raychev says. In his view, then list of culprits which appeared in "SVOBODEN NAROD" last week is far from complete. The matter should be addressed in a different way: on principle and comprehensively. The commission, too, should not limit itself to the pre-November 10, 1989, guilt of the party. Today's state of the country is a result of a number of errors or obvious responsibilities of the BSP leadership after that date, too, Mr. Ventsel Raychev indicates.

He believes that in a week or too it is impossible to find out which people are to blame district by district, but it is possible to find out the responsibility for political decision-making over the last 20 years of the people in the higher echelon, who should be called to account by the people. The question of the guilt is not an inner-party matter, it concerns the entire nation.

Mr. Ventsel Raychev raises the question about personal conscience, too. Every member of the Communist Party at that time must sense his own responsibility and experience repentance.

BSP Leaders Hold News Conference

AU3010193890 Sofia BTA in English 1848 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 30 Oct (BTA)—At a news conference here today, Mr. Aleksandur Tomov, Prof. Chavdar Kyuranov and Mr. Georgi Pirinski did not commit themselves to specific forecasts of the Socialists' actions in case the Lukanov programme does not get support from all MP's.

The two deputy chairmen of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council and the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers made it clear that the Socialists are waiting for the opposition to take a formal stand on the parliament floor. Mr. Georgi Pirinski mentioned some "nuances in the SDS position" which the ruling party expects to be clarified. "I think that it is the prime minister who should answer that question," Mr. Pirinski said when he was asked whether the Lukanov government would resign if it does not get support from all sides of the chamber.

Mr. Tomov confirmed the Socialists' thesis that "certain forces, not necessarily political formations," placed partisan interests before national interests by rejecting the Lukanov programme. According to the deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, the economic section of the programme is supported by President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, by the standing committees of parliament and by "serious foreign experts."

Mr. Tomov talked about the ongoing renewal of the BSP. Seventy per cent of the municipal party branches are already headed by new people.

A commission of the BSP Supreme Council, headed by Mr. Aleksandur Tomov, is looking into the accusations of corruption and other breaches of party ethics, into abuses and law violations committed by top party functionaries under the Zhivkov regime. The idea is to come up with a political declaration in which the BSP would take a stand on the specific culprits for the crisis and would hand over the findings of crimes to the judiciary "without the Socialist Party itself turning into a court." According to Mr. Tomov, all data in the party archives concerning the activity of Todor Zhivkov have been made available to the investigative authorities. The BSP Supreme Council commission is holding an independent inquiry into the charges of state property misappropriation by Zhivkov's top aides Ognyan Doynov, Stanka Shopova, Drazha Vulcheva and other "nomenklatura cadres" who founded their own private companies taking advantage of their official status and connections.

Mr. Tomov and Prof. Kyuranov dismissed as "unfounded and ridiculous" the allegations that opposition figures' homes and phones are bugged. Mr. Tomov described as a "criminal affair" the leaking of a tape recording of a Supreme Council meeting, excerpts of which were made public in parliament at the end of last week. He said that the words of Mr. Dimitur Yonchev, spokesman for the BSP Supreme Council, had been misrepresented in the transcript made public by the opposition, which quoted him as recommending that the employees of the BSP local archives should apply "special criteria" when they distribute the party's archive materials, i.e. that they should decide, depending on the party's political interests, which materials should be handed over to the state archives and which should be withheld.

According to Mr. Tomov, Mr. Dimitur Yonchev was quoted out of context and as a result his words created the wrong impression. Mr. Aleksandur Tomov said that the BSP regional archives keep going into the state archives and that "nothing in the history of the party will remain hidden from public view."

Assembly Argues Over Foreign Minister Gotsev

AU3010202290 Sofia BTA in English 1911 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 29 Oct (BTA)—Speaking in parliament today, Dr. Petur Dertliev, the Social Democrats leader, accused the Socialists and their prime minister Mr. Andrey Lukanov of foisting two generals on President Zhelev in order to restrict his right to initiate legislation and to cripple his foreign policy.

The generals in question are General Atanas Semerdzhiev, an ex-minister of internal affairs, and the incumbent minister of foreign affairs Mr. Lyuben Gotsev.

Dr. Dertliev accused Mr. Lukanov of taking for a foreign minister "a person who is synonymous with the police." "The whole Foreign Ministry passes through Simeonovo," Dr. Dertliev said, referring to the State Security training centre.

Mr. Gotsev did not take the floor today to refute the allegations of the opposition MP.

Addressing Dr. Dertliev, Mrs. Elena Poptodorova MP of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], a top-ranking diplomat, said that "you should not make generalizations about the entire Foreign Ministry. I don't think that certain points in somebody's biography can warrant such statements."

Mrs. Poptodorova accused point-blank the opposition MP Mr. Stoyan Ganev of having read lectures on state law "in that same Simeonovo."

The presiding officer of the sitting denied Dr. Dertliev an opportunity to reply to Mrs. Poptodorova's statement.

Reform Debated; Lukanov Rumors Noted

AU3010220890 Sofia BTA in English 2051 GMT 30 Oct 90

["Parliament Debates Government Programme, Lobbies Rife With Rumours"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 29 Oct (BTA)—The programme of the one-party Socialist government, the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and Prime Minister Mr. Andrey Lukanov in person drew fire from the opposition in parliament today.

In the course of the debate on the government programme, the opposition MP's emphasized repeatedly that the economic reform must be accompanied by political changes.

"Things cannot go on like that any longer," Mr. Milan Drenchev, the leader of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian Party, said vehemently and reminded the Socialists that the laws of dialectics do not apply merely to bring them to power. Mr. Drenchev repeatedly called on Mr. Lukanov and on the Socialist government to act instead of just talking and waiting for a parliamentary consensus.

"The SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] does not want a cabinet crisis, if we set off a parliamentary crisis, we will confront Bulgaria will a still graver drama," Mr. Drenchev went on to say.

"The Lukanov programme is radical but it is too general and gives the prime minister much tactical leeway," said Mr. Ivan Pushkarov MP of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), an economist. In his view this programme is nevertheless inevitable. Its political legitimacy, however, is questionable: The BSP won the elections on a different programme, and now the government has hastened to give up the promised ironclad social guarantees for the transition, Mr. Pushkarov said. He accused Mr. Lukanov that over the last few months the Socialists had pointlessly wasted all domestic resources which were so badly needed for the reform. "How many times will you go back on your word, on your ideology?" Mr. Pushkarov asked the Socialists and added that he did not trust them.

"The main obstacle to the implementation of your programme is sitting beside you," Dr. Petur Dertliev, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, said turning to Mr. Lukanov. He accused the prime minister that he is under the influence of the hardliners in the BSP. In his view, the Socialist government's programme should be judged according to the biblical phrase, "Even a child is known by his doings." Dr Dertliev fears that the Lukanov programme is too harsh and that Bulgaria may build a market economy without a social safety net.

In the lobbies of parliament, it is rumoured that Mr. Lukanov will resign.

Opposition MP's say off the record that the SDS does not seek this resignation. However, they keep asserting that they will not vote in favour of the programme.

Yesterday's statement by the opposition leader Mr. Petur Beron that the Union of Democratic Forces favoured a SDS-dominated coalition government was modified in the lobbies today by an opposition MP who spoke of conditions of anonymity. He said that it would be impossible to form such a government because the Nikola Petkov BZNS and the Social Democrats oppose any coalition with the Communists at this stage.

The opposition greeted with applause of approval the statement of Mr. Dragomir Draganov, a Socialist MP, who said that in its political section, the Lukanov programme should guarantee that the top Socialist nomenklatura will not turn into a new middle class. He insisted that the government takes measures against the establishment of companies by former Communist big wigs. Mr. Draganov declared himself in favour of an urgent formation of a "parliamentary bloc of reason."

Quite a few statements by opposition MP's sounded a note of caution about the appeals for fast privatization. "This is a populist slogan, any privatization error may explode the reform," Mr. Ivan Pushkarov said.

Kozloduy Accident Causes Nationwide Power Cuts

AU3010202190 Sofia BTA in English 1915 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 30 Oct (BTA)—This morning two generating units of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant were switched off as an emergency: the 1,000-megawatt Unit 5 and the 440-megawatt Unit 3, Power Engineering Committee officials reported over the phone. The breakdown is outside the reactor core and has hit the electric generators.

Unit 3 was back in operation in the afternoon, and work is going on to repair the 1,000-megawatt unit.

Power supply has been disrupted throughout the country as a result of the accident. Every four hours, the electricity supply in all population centres is cut off for two hours. Power supply was rationed before the emergency switch-off, leaving households without electricity for one in every four hours.

Five days ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency completed its mini-Osart mission, partially inspecting the safe operation of Kozloduy's Unit 5. In their findings the experts stressed that the unit is going through a critical phase in its operation.

Private Business To Form Right-Wing Party

AU3010160790 Sofia BTA in English 1433 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 30 Oct (BTA)—The Bulgarian Business Bloc will be formally registered as a new right-wing political formation in Bulgaria at the end of November. Its platform is based on the conviction that private property and capital are the sole guarantors of economic and political freedom for every citizen, of social stability and national prosperity.

The idea of such political organisation was propounded a couple of days ago by Mr. Valentin Mollov, president of the Union of Private Entrepreneurs. In today's issue of the "168 CHASA" [168 Hours] weekly, a publication of the union, he motivates the need for a Bulgarian business bloc. His motives are that Bulgaria's future will only stand a chance when and if conditions are created for the free development of property and capital in the country. Mr. Valentin Mollov blames the major political forces for leading society to hyperpoliticization. The struggle between the Bulgarian Socialist Party (which commands a majority in parliament) and the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) practically blocks the reforms indefinitely, the article says.

Without denying the place and the future of left-wing parties in the country, he believes that now it needs a right-wing orientation and a rightist government. Communists cannot introduce private property. Socialists cannot lay down capitalist laws. They either will not manage or are simply demagogues and are not a left-wing party, Mr. Mollov writes, calling on the Socialist Party to realize its historic responsibility to Bulgaria, to relinquish power and hand it over to the right-wing parties. Of course, this should be achieved through a peaceful transition.

The Union of Democratic Forces, too, did not live up to the expectations of private business. The opposition is blamed for "having a heterogeneous power base," for allowing the union to be directed, apart by the elite, by nobodies and people incapable of serious policy-making, for committing itself to an "almost socialist programme." The vote hunting virtually destroyed the right-wing character of the SDS as a coalition and steered it to populism, to promises the fulfilment of which would block the reform and a possible unfulfilment would erode the people's confidence, Mr. Valentin Mollov sums up.

In his view, "present and future owners" may be represented in parliament.

Concerning the economy, he urges for the immediate removal of all obstacles to free enterprise and for lifting all restrictions from foreign investment. The waiting for a well considered and consistent legal framework is an absurdity, as it is an absurdity to invent a new, unprecedented, superfair system of privatization.

The ideologue of the Business Bloc opposes wage indexing and the promises to the socially disadvantaged. He suggests that the state and the owners form a survival fund which should guarantee that no one in this country would starve. That is all, because anything else results in agony, not in cure.

Free food for the poor? Yes. Illusions about equality? No. Everything has its price, Mr. Valentin Mollov emphasizes. A realistic social protection system without demagoguery can only develop when the economy recovers, when it starts producing, when it becomes a partner of Europe and the world.

Further on the article stresses the need to revive moral values in people: respect for the family, for law and order, boosting national self-confidence.

In conclusion Mr. Mollov again blames the politicians who, struggling to redistribute power, wasted precious time of the country which can only be rescued by "property and the owners." By now Bulgaria could have had a clear and unambiguous orientation, everyone could have worked for himself, there could have been fair trade instead of profiteering so that the capable instead of the crooks could get rich. A light could have already be seen at the end of the tunnel. That is why private business people have run out of patience, Mr. Mollov says.

He advocates the idea that political equality is sacred, but not so with economic equality, and he sees the future Business Bloc as an association of the affluent and powerful, of those capable of hammering out their own fortunes, of people who will only be restricted by integrity.

Semerdzhiev Briefs Envoys on Visit to Iraq

AU3010220790 Sofia BTA in English 2048 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 30 Oct (BTA)—The Bulgarian delegation, which visited Iraq from October 22 through 25, did not have any mediating tasks and ambitions. Its mission was purely humanitarian, seeking to ameliorate the condition of the Bulgarian citizens in Iraq and their possible evacuation from that country, General Atanas Semerdzhiev, vice president of the Republic, told foreign diplomats today.

Today General Semerdzhiev invited the ambassadors of the United Kingdom, Germany, the People's Republic of China, the United States and France and a representative of the USSR embassy here and briefed them on the results of the visit to Iraq by a delegation he led. General Atanas Semerdzhiev emphasized that Bulgaria expressed unambiguously its position on the Gulf Crisis before the Iraqi leaders.

Mr. Filip Ishpekov, deputy minister of foreign affairs, said that a report is being drafted on the damage and losses which Bulgaria sustains as a result of the Gulf Crisis. Within one week this report will be submitted to the UN Security Council and to the Committee on Sanctions of the world body.

Iranian Minister Concludes Economic Protocol

AU3010162790 Sofia BTA in English 1553 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 30 Oct (BTA)—"We are prepared, to the best of our ability, to provide help and assistance to the Bulgarian people to overcome the difficult period of the economic reform," Mr. Issa Kalantari, minister of agriculture of Iran and co-chairman of the Bulgaro-Iranian Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation, after his Bulgarian counterpart Mr. Atanas Popov, minister of transport, and he signed a protocol on the seventh regular session of the commission.

The guest emphasized that at the session the sides reached full agreement on cooperation in industry, banking, oil deliveries, transport and in all other economic spheres under discussion.

There are several new areas of cooperation outlined during the commission's proceedings and included in its final document. Commercial exchanges between the two countries in 1991 are to reach 500 million dollars, the negotiations on the joint construction of two dams in Iran and the rendering of Bulgarian technical assistance in the design of another two dams are in an advanced stage. Bulgaria will supply Iran with power transmission lines and will build electrical substations worth some 50 million dollars.

The agreements on road, rail and sea transport create conditions for a considerable expansion of cooperation. A convention on commercial shipping will be signed soon, and an air communications agreement will enter into force very soon.

Zhelev Sees U.S. Congressman, Senator Dole Aide

AU3010162990 Sofia BTA in English 1550 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 30 Oct (BTA)—Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic, today received U.S. Congressman Ronnie Flippo (Dem Ala) [D-AL] and Mr. Robert Duff, an expert on parliamentary procedure at the office of Senator Robert Dole. The guests were briefed on the most urgent reforms which are to be carried out in various spheres of life.

Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev set forth the priorities for the future: the passage of major legislation: on privatization, on land reform, on trade law, on elections, and second in time but not in importance, the drafting of a democratic constitution which should confirm the new relations and the new institutions in the country.

The U.S. delegation is visiting at the invitation of the Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights and will stay here for two weeks.

Foreign Ministry Concerned Over Moldavian Unrest

AU3010193790 Sofia BTA in English 1858 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 30 Oct (BTA)—In connection with the strained situation which has arisen in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official made the following statement for the Bulgarian News Agency (BTA):

"The Bulgarian public has been concerned to learn about the exacerbation of the socio-political situation in Moldavia. As is known, Bulgaria has long-standing economic, cultural and creative ties with that republic, and individual citizens in Bulgaria and Moldavia maintain active contacts.

"Our concern over the situation in the republic is furthermore prompted by the fact that its southern parts are partly populated by ethnic Bulgarians who, under the new conditions in the USSR, have the opportunity to promote and affirm their cultural and ethnic identity."

The diplomat expressed the hope that through further dialogue, agreement will be reached on the matters which have led to the present situation and that civil peace will be restored in the best interests of all inhabitants of Soviet Moldavia, irrespective of their ethnic identity."

Romania's Nastase Meets With Leaders in Sofia

AU2910193790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1733 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia ROMPRES, 29/10/1990—Official talks started in Sofia on October 29 morning between Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase and his Bulgarian counterpart Lyuben Gotsev. The Romanian foreign minister was received by Andrey Lukanov, prime minister of Bulgaria, and by president Zhelyu Zhelev.

The talks and interviews covered bilateral problems. The wish was expressed to further develop the traditional relations of friendship and collaboration between the two countries.

They established to maintain close contacts at a government and parliamentary level, between the new political parties, in culture and in the press.

In the field of political relations, President Zhelev invited President Ion Iliescu to pay a visit to Bulgaria the soonest. [sentence as received]

In turn, Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov evoked his fertile meetings with Premier Petre Roman, expressing the wish to meet him again. The two parties wished to seek out new solutions in the development of the economic relations of mutual interest, in the conditions of the new changes come about in the two countries. It was noted that some 40 economic agreements had to be revised and adjusted the soonest to the new conditions offered by the passage to the market economy. The talks also covered aspects of ecology in the Giurgiu-Ruse zone, of the siting of the two nuclear power plants in Bulgaria's territory. The parties agreed that a positive step existed in that sense, as tensions were eased following the invitation of international teams of experts to investigate the real sources of pollution in the frontier zones. Likewise, an expert team from Vienna will go to impartially investigate the opportuneness of the nuclear power plants, in both Bulgaria's and Romania's territories. The Bulgarian president stated to the Romanian press that "although each of our countries has its specific, they are both engaged in a democratic process. They leave behind the totalitarian model. And have a common target. This offers a rather congenial framework for our collaboration and revamping of relations.

"I think a solution for the controversial issues must be found for, it is absurd that profound cultural and historical relations with our neighbour, Romania, should be impaired in any way by particular cases like that of Ruse, the frontier traffic, etc. These are problems that we can successfully settle with good will. And I think we will."

G-24 Grants Emergency Aid for Farm Reform

AU3010220990 Sofia BTA in English 2047 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Brussels, 30 Oct (BTA correspondent)—The ambassador-level meeting of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), held in Brussels under the auspices of the Commission of the European Communities, today decided to grant Bulgaria emergency aid of 5 million ECU [European Currency Units] worth of medical supplies and a further 4 million ECU to stimulate the farm reform.

The G-24 confirmed that within its Phare programme Bulgaria can count on aid of little more than 67.5 million ECU. Of these, the EC will contribute 24.5 million ECU, Turkey 38.9 million ECU in import credit, Greece 3.45 million ECU and Italy 0.66 ECU. The material aid which will come from Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States is still unspecified in value terms.

Slavkov Summit Opens 'Road to Freedom,' Democracy

Leaders Sign Declaration

LD2910072490 Prague CTK in English 1824 GMT 28 Oct 90

[Text] Slavkov Oct 28 (CTK)—"November 1989 opened the road to freedom and democracy, as well as to the complete formation of a real federation for our nations", Czechoslovak leaders said in a declaration passed at their meeting at Slavkov today.

"After more than fifty years we thus have a chance again to build a free, democratic and equal home for the Czechs and Slovaks as well as all nationalities living on the territory of our state...we are citizens of our common state and as its citizens we feel responsibility for its democratic and humane development."

"We are linked together by the continuity of historic decisions which include not only the birth of this state but also the resolve to defend the Republic in 1938, the defiant rebellion in 1944 aimed at the restoration of the common state as well as the hope shared in 1968.

The parallel democratic revolution in both republics in November 1989 has now been added to this historic continuity."

"We re-affirm our resolve to preserve and further develop the federal order of the common state of the Czechs and Slovaks. We have met at Slavkov, a historical place of Moravia. Within the project of the common state for which we strive the citizens of Moravia and Silesia must obtain a dignified status which will respect their traditions.

We will energetically counter all attempts to disrupt the integrity and sovereignty of our state. We will resolutely counter all attempts to disrupt the constitutional order and the basic laws of this country."

The signatories said that the first step to a new constitution will be the adoption of a new constitutional charter of human rights and freedoms as the basic constitutional document of the state. They called on the Federal Assembly (parliament) to approve it as soon as possible.

"We will do everything for our state to be integrated into the European and world community as a state of two equal nations as soon as possible", the declaration said.

(Slavkov, German Austerlitz, is a historical Moravian town near Brno where Napoleon I fought the Austrian and Russian emperiors in 1805.)

Meciar Comments on Talks

LD2910114290 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 28 Oct 90

[Excerpts] At the invitation of Republic President Vaclav Havel, premiers of the Federal Government and the two national governments met in Slavkov near Brno today. Also present were representatives of the main political forces—Civic Forum [OF], Public Against Violence [VPN], and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]. Lidia Mrazova reports:

[Mrazova] [passage omitted] Although the subject of today's meeting was not exact division of powers between the two republics, nevertheless I asked the Slovak premier, Vladimir Meciar, whether in his view the future of the federation was successfully conceived?

[Begin recording] [Meciar] We have agreed on the timetable. We have agreed on the overall concept, the systems of which will be realized. We have arrived at the point concerning when the work of the governments should end and when parliament should begin discussions about the division of power. We have agreed the timetable for preparation of the possible to do without the constitutions being rejected [as heard] in public discussion.

[Mrazova] Mr. Premier, on your way in you said that the extent to which Slovak requirements will be accepted does not just depend on the Slovak side but also on the Czech side. Did you find such a joint compromise?

[Meciar] Views differing from ours were expressed. We found a compromise wherever possible. There are things which can be solved but there are also things that are fundamental for us where compromise is not possible. But I think that today we reached agreement and on Saturday afternoon and evening [3 November] the relations should have acquired a definite shape from the point of view of government standpoints. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Spokesman Airs Political Issues

LD2910202290 Prague CTK in English 1316 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 29 (CTK)—The atmosphere of yesterday's talks of leading Czechoslovak politicians at Slavkov near Brno, South Moravia, was positively assessed by the Czechoslovak president's press secretary Michael Zantovsky today.

The meeting at Slavkov, marking yesterday's 72nd anniversary of independent Czechoslovakia, was attended by President Vaclav Havel, Federal Premier Marian Calfa, Federal Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky, Czech Premier Petr Pithart, Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar, and representatives of the Civic Forum [OF], the Public Against Violence [VPN] and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], which form the present Federal Goverment. The purpose of the meeting was to divide powers between the federal, Czech and Slovak governments.

At today's press conference, Zantovsky pointed out the fact that Czech and Slovak leaders were willing and capable to meet and arrive at a united conclusion and that there were no controversies or quarrels at the talks.

The Slavkov meeting did not deal with personnel questions or with the language law in Slovakia, the passing of which by the Slovak parliament gave rise to political emotions last week. Zantovsky said that the question of the rights of the Hungarian minority (totalling about 600,000) was an affair of Czechoslovak federal institutions.

Referring to an article in the Czech tabloid midday paper "EXPRES", saying that Charter 77 (associating opponents of the communist regime) had been set up by Czechoslovak communists, Zantovsky described it as "fascist" and "rubbish." According to the article chartists and communists cooperated in November 1989 in changing the regime in Czechoslovakia. Zantovsky said the article was full of fabrications and down-right lies, and called for an amendment to the press law that would facilitate effective defence against deliberate lies and libel.

"Such articles are successful in situations when people think that matters are not moving quickly enough. People have the impression that the government and the political bodies are not meeting their demands sufficiently quickly, and those who fell victim to Stalinism, are still, often in vain, calling for wrongs to be rectified," Zantovsky said.

He expressed satisfaction at the results of talks of representatives of Warsaw Pact member states on quotas of weapons to be kept by these countries after the pact is transformed, recalling that the Warsaw Pact's decisive summit will be held at the end of November.

Presidents Vaclav Havel and Mikhail Gorbachev are to meet during the conference of the Helsinki final act signatories in Paris in November.

Zantovsky said President Havel was following closely the political developments in Hungary, and said that consequences of instability in Central and Eastern Europe would be unimaginable.

President Havel will visit Slovakia on October 30-November 1, for talks with Premier Vladimir Meciar. He will attend celebrations of the 72nd aniversary of the Martin declaration in which Slovakia supported the foundation of the common state of the Czechs and Slovaks in 1918.

On Friday, the president will have a luncheon with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and next week will have a week's autumn holiday, Zantovsky said.

Federal Assembly Passes Resolution on Screenings

AU3010154390 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

["ha, jop"-signed report: "Small Privatization Finally on the Agenda; The Seventh Joint Meeting of Federal Assembly Chambers Continued in Prague"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The second day of the seventh joint meeting of both Federal Assembly chambers started with deputies' interpellations, questions, suggestions, and comments. The sparsely represented members of the Federal Government were mostly unable to give a prompt reply to the interpellations and the deputies will therefore have to content themselves with written replies.

Deputy M. Zeman asked for the adoption of a one-sentence resolution on the need to compare the lists of candidates running in the local elections with the lists of secret StB [secret police] collaborators and to make the result of this comparison known to the public. He was reacting to the fact that people are running as candidates in the communal elections who had demonstrably collaborated with the StB. Deputy R. Sacher asked what will happen to those whose dossiers have disappeared from the Ministry of Interior archives (according to R. Sacher, this concerns the dossiers of 14,690 persons). Reacting to his words, M. Zeman and P. Uhl stressed that only the dossiers have been destroyed but not the file registers and other documents. It is thus possible to obtain the relevant information by means of cross examination. The range of persons to be subjected to screening has been gradually enlarged by the chairmen of district authorities, directors of labor exchanges, as well as directors of social and other institutions. The resolution on screening candidates for the local elections as well as appointees for the above mentioned leading posts of state administration bodies was passed. The screenings must be completed by 15 November this year.

Another interpellation which set off a debate came from Deputy Olga Andelova and was addressed to Foreign Affairs Minister Jiri Dienstbier. It concerned his statements at the session of the Pentagonal group in Bratislava as well his signature under a document dealing with nationality questions in Central Europe. The absent minister was represented by Josef Pirek, his deputy, who explained that the Copenhagen [CSCE] document adopted the generally known concept of individual human rights and that no document has been adopted at the Pentagonal session which would change our hitherto approach to the status of ethnic minorities. The deputies' reactions to O. Andelova's interpellation were all negative. Only Deputy Jozef Sedovic espoused the view that, although it is the oldest nation in the family of Slav nations, the Slovak nation does not appear in the United Nations as a sovereign nation. His claim triggered merriment and laughter.

New Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky had to answer questions on his decision to suspend the activity of the Free Legion. Justifying his decision, he said that after becoming acquainted with the organizational rules of the Free Legion and the 26 points adopted at its congress, he immediately reached the conclusion that these demands are "somewhat inconsistent with the principles by which army life is guided." Deputy Michal Prokop sharply protested in the name of deputies against the decision of the Federal Assembly Chancellery to bar journalists from the right-hand vestibule of the People's Chamber (we reported on this measure yesterday). This problem will be addressed at a meeting between deputies and the Federal Assembly Presidium, which will verify the alleged "tense situation as regards the number of parliamentary correspondents and their movement in the building."

New Deputy Interior Minister on Reorganization

AU3010211190 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 26 Oct 90 pp 1,5

[Interview with Petruska Sustrova, the newly appointed federal deputy interior minister by Jan Subert in Prague on 25 October: "The Interior Ministry Is Changing Shape"; first paragraph is ZMEDELSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] Last Thursday [18 October] the government recalled A. Samel and M. Kral from their posts as federal deputy interior ministers. Shortly before this it had recalled J. Prusa. Yesterday Petruska Sustrova was appointed the new deputy minister. It is generally known that the comprehensive restructuring underway in the ministry is behind these changes. We turned to Petruska Sustrova, the brand new deputy minister, with questions whose answers should explain in more detail the purpose and aims of this reorganization.

[Subert] First of all, let us start with something the public knows nothing about. Quite recently, you were wondering whether it was necessary to have a Federal Interior Ministry and you thought seriously about its abolition. Why has this radical step not been taken?

[Sustrova] Having considered the security problem in more depth, we came to the conclusion that there has to be a specific federal security commitment. Although jurisdiction still has to be clarified, its basis is indisputable. There has to be a federal police force and a federal foreign nationals force; it is also necessary to defend our borders and to conduct population surveys on a nationwide basis. According to the jurisdiction law, the protection of constitutional officials falls within the competency of the Federal Ministry. The new Office for Refugees also requires a federal roof over its head, although the administration of individual camps—in accordance with their location—will, obviously, come under the Republics' jurisdiction.

[Subert] In fact, it is already apparent from your answer what the new ministry will look like. Allegedly, there are still plans for its specific organizational break-down....

[Sustrova] Its projected configuration should only have two structures: An executive structure and a material and technical structure which should provide support. The executive element would incorporate the federal, foreign nationals, and border police forces, the protection of constitutional officials, properties of special importance, and the protection of buildings belonging to diplomatic missions. A division of Interior Ministry troops—considerably reduced in number—will also be part of this. The support element—apart from the economic unit—involves the ministry's apparatus, its inspectorate, its personnel administration, and its legislative and other administrative units.

[Subert] Of course, the ministry will not be able to operate smoothly without perfect communications and computer systems. Will this technology be operated as an independent service?

[Sustrova] We will establish the so-called technical division, which will be part of the support group, from the current Communications Administration, Development and Automation Administration, and Technical Administration.

[Subert] Two rather large units will be created as a result of this plan. This is in contradiction to your previous endeavors to decentralize the ministry and to make controlling and managing it easier.

[Sustrova] Of course, we realize this; however, we are banking on capable directors—appointed with the necessary powers—for individual departments. With their help, perhaps just two deputies will supervise the Interior Ministry in the future.

[Subert] Let us return, however, to the present when the reorganization described by you is just beginning. Can you tell us how responsibility for the department's smooth operation is divided among the individual deputies?

[Sustrova] First Deputy Ruml is responsible for all the executive elements. I am responsible for support, to which the Housing Administration and Sports Administration also belong. Mr. Kohut is in charge of the technical division.

[Subert] As far as the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy and the foreign intelligence service are concerned....?

[Sustrova] Both services are, so far, controlled directly by the minister. However, the public has been informed many times about the plans to transfer the Office to parliamentary control where it will become the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The same thing will probably happen sooner or later to the foreign intelligence service when it is separated from the Interior Ministry. Perhaps I should say one thing in conclusion: We are constructing a Federal Ministry which will not have a monopoly either in executive power or in information.

Border Guards Redesignated To Reinforce Police

LD3010203290 Prague CTK in English 1631 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 30 (CTK)—Chief of the main administration of the border guard and protection of the state borders Major General Stanislav Pokorny told CTK today that the border guards redesignated to reinforce the police as criminality in Czechoslovakia is dramatically growing will never be misued against honest people.

About 1,000 members of the border guard and troops of the Interior Ministry have been strengthening police patrols since last summer, and another 4,000 men will join them on November 1, under a Czechoslovak Government decision of last week. Some 2,225 men in the Czech Republic and 1,775 men in the Slovak Republic will reinforce the police until March 31, 1991.

Havel Interviewed on Situation in Slovakia

LD2910140890

[Editorial Report] Prague Domestic Service in Czech at 1315 GMT on 28 October broadcasts a 25-minute recorded interview by correspondent Vejvoda with CSFR President Vaclav Havel. The interview begins with Vejvoda pointing out that the interview was recorded on 26 October, and he then asks Havel about his engagements for the weekend.

Turning to the subject of the bill on the privatization of small businesses, Vejvoda asks Havel for his views on the Federal Assembly's approval of this bill. Havel replies that he is very happy about it because it is an extremely important matter since, for the first time, it has opened the way for putting our economic reform into practice. He then defends himself against the accusation of changing his views. This, he says, arose from a misunderstaning concerning his alleged support for a slow pace of privatization expressed at the meeting of the three governments in Kromeriz. Havel explains that in Kromeriz, where the bill was discussed, he was afraid that the best enterprises would be bought by the mafia from large state enterprises, and most of the smaller and probably not-so-profitable firms would remain in the hands of the state, which would in fact slow down the process of privatization. In fact, Havel says, he is in favor of speedy privatization and fully respects the assembly's decision on this bill since he is convinced that the bill is the only right and optimum way possible for the improvement of our economy.

Asked to give his views on the possible participation of foreign companies in the process of small-scale privatization, Haves says that from the point of view of a market system, the fact that Czechoslovak citizens have priority over possible foreign participants in the auctions is a bit unfair. He continued, however, saying that he considers it to be a very good compromise because under the current social, political, and other circumstances in Czechoslovakia, it is only right to give priority to Czechoslovak citizens. At the same time, it is quite obvious that sooner or later there will also be stores here owned by various foreign companies as is usual elsewhere in the world.

Vejvoda then asks about the current situation in Slovakia caused by the Slovak National Council's recent approval of the bill on the Slovak language. Vaclav Havel replies:

"As far as the language bill is concerned, I consider it very good and important that the Slovak National Council has not succumbed to the pressure of the demonstrators—many of which, I think, did not even know what exactly they were demonstrating for and did not fully think through the consequences of what they were demonstrating for—that it has not succumbed to their pressure, has not approved the Matica draft bill that was very unfair to ethnic minorities and was at variance with our constitutional system and with international law, and that it has approved the coalition bill.

"The Slovak National Council had been discussing this draft bill for a long time, and has been enriching it by various amendments and altering it. I have not yet had a chance to read the final version that has been approved, and so I am not 100-percent certain whether some of the controversial elements present in the Matica version have not after all gotten into the coalition one. Despite this, I very resolutely condemn those who demand the resignation of the Slovak National Concil and who call for new elections, etc. It seems to me that this shows a complete lack of any political standards of behavior. When someone elects his representatives in free elections and gives them a certain mandate, then he has to know and respect their decisions. In the next elections he then can elect somebody else who will approve a different bill; however, it is absurd that when the first conflict of views arises, someone demands the resignation of a legislative body and the calls for new elections. This is not proof of democratic behavior, and these acts only discredit us on the international scene."

Vejvoda then asks Havel to comment on the 72d anniversary of the founding of the independent Czechoslovak state. Havel starts by noting that several years ago he had studies this event in our history in detail to write a play on this subject, and pointed out that he had been very surprised to find a number of parallels between the upheaval at that time and the recent revolution. He then mentioned some of these parallels such as the so-called changing of sides, the sobering up, and the frustration that soon followed both events, the special role played by the Old Town Square in Prague, the fact that many things happened just by chance, the peacefulness of the two revolutions both of which lacked any form of violence, or the rather negative parallel of gradual legend-making.

Havel then stressed the real importance and legacy of October 1918, which he sees not only in the creation of an independant state, but first and foremost in the creation of a democratic state. The day also represents, according to him, a certain number of ideas—a policy based on humanism, respect for human rights, social justice, good morals, and tolerance.

President Havel concludes his interview by quoting the famous statement by Jan Masaryk that states can only be maintained by those principles from which they have arisen.

Meciar Predicts Quick Solution to Slovak Crisis

AU2910092990 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 24 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus and Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar by an "(MLY)"-signed reporter in Prague on 23 October: "A Time of Pain, a Time of Healing"; first paragraph is LIDOVE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] Prague—Following yesterday's unexpected meeting between Vladimir Meciar and Vaclav Klaus, we asked them both some questions.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What did you discuss together?

[Klaus] We discussed how to further proceed in the issues associated with the constitutional arrangement, particularly in the economic sector. It has become apparent that it is necessary to clear up more issues prior to 1 January 1991 than was originally envisaged.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Does this mean that you discussed the jurisdiction law?

[Klaus] If I say the constitutional arrangement, I have in mind the jurisdiction law.

[Meciar] We came to clear up the points of friction in the paragraph-by-paragraph wording of the law, which is a working draft, and to shorten the period between clarifying the draft and submitting it to the legislative organs.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Mr. Premier, is it true that you came to Prague with the aim of asserting the adoption of your version of the jurisdiction law in parliament?

[Meciar] The Slovak Republic Government only undertakes realistic tasks. Asserting something in one night is unrealistic nonsense. If our relations are to be good ones, an agreement about the entire arrangement has to be reached. It is impossible for one party to dictate things and for the other party to merely accept them.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Will the crisis in the Slovak Government influence political events in the country?

[Meciar] The situation that has arisen in the Slovak Government will be resolved shortly without political shocks. Support for the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement, for the government, and for me personally is increasing from day to day and even from hour to hour. Of course, the Christian Democratic Movement has to consider its position. I think they will adopt a sensible decision: A time of pain, a time of healing. This has no influence on the relationship between the VPN and the Civic Forum.

Meciar Says Slovakia Situation 'Under Control'

LD3010045690 Prague CTK in English 2139 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Bratislava Oct 29 (CTK)—Premier Vladimir Meciar told representatives of district bodies in the Slovak Republic today that in his opinion the situation in this part of Czechoslovakia will remain under control.

He invited these officials to Bratislava today to consult them on the present situation marked by wide-spread protests based on the pretext of the adoption of a law on the Slovak language last Thursday.

He told them that he had visited Matica Slovenska, a historical Slovak cultural institution which tabled a law that countered the language government bill, and had agreed with its representatives that its political initiative had exceded its role defined by its statutes. Although the board accepted this, the wider committee rejected the stand. He said he had told the institution's representatives that the state could not afford to finance an organization fighting it.

Meciar said he had also met some officials of the Slovak National Party [SNS] and their talks confirmed that part of the membership and officials dissociated themselves from its Chairman Vitazoslav Moric and other leaders.

The government has also found out that students who were active in November 1989 now defend democracy and the same applies to the intelligentsia.

He said that information has been received about planned terrorist actions but the probability is 50-50.

He asked the participants about the situation in their districts and to report on the preparations for next month's communal elections.

The premier recalled that a tense atmosphere over the law on the Slovak language had been created for some time, especially on the initiative of the SNS and mainly its Chairman Vitazoslav Moric. He has come to head what is called a "national bloc." During the debate of the language law last Thursday the Slovak National Council (parliament) received an ultimatum to resign. This was confrontation, "a clear attack on power," Meciar said. After the parliament approved the law declaring Slovak the state language in Slovakia and giving the right to national minorities to use their languages in official business the aggressiveness against the parliament members increased. 80 people went on hunger strike and over one-half remain, the premier noted.

One of the hunger strikers told CTK today that there were 65, about one-third of them women.

A newly formed group calling itself "National Salvation Movement" held a protest meeting in the centre of Bratislava today. It was attended by several thousand people.

Calfa Comments on Meciar's 'Impulsiveness'

AU2910100590 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 24 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Premier Marian Calfa by an unidentified LIDOVE NOVINY reporter; place and date not given: "Either Him or Me!"; first paragraph is LIDOVE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] Federal Premier Marian Calfa replied to a few questions from LIDOVE NOVINY about the situation in the Slovak Government, the position of the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement, and the proposed solutions which should avoid the danger of a constitutional crisis in the CSFR.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Mr. Premier, what was discussed at the VPN meeting that you attended in Bratislava on Monday [22 October]?

[Calfa] The meeting came to the conclusion that it would be expedient to transfer the dispute to the Slovak National Council [SNR], or rather to its Presidium, because this issue involves two government members who were appointed by the SNR Presidium. The SNR session will have a rather full program; it is due to discuss the Slovak language law on Thursday [25 October]. The strength of the coalition's cohesion in the Slovak Government will be tested here. The attitude of a premier from one political grouping toward his coalition partner is also important. The Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] representative has expressed the view that Mr. Andras should remain in office. In my opinion, representatives of all three coalition partners should begin coalition talks now. I do not know how the situation will turn out, whether it will be in Mr. Andras' favor or whether there will be some kind of reconciliation between the premier and his minister. I am not very optimistic regarding this because the KDH's statement is completely unequivocal: It does not allow for a large-scale retreat. A coalition partnership is an extraordinarily fragile thing and requires consideration and tolerance. It cannot be resolved with a public declaration of the "either him or me" type. I think such words have no place in politics and certainly not in the politics of a state that is finding it so difficult to find a new method of operating political and state mechanisms. I expressed this point of view on Monday at the meeting of VPN representatives in Bratislava. Premier Meciar certainly has his reasons and grounds for instigating this step. The VPN is demanding that Mr. Meciar's decision be debated in the SNR and, as far as coalition relations are concerned, it should be debated between the VPN and its coalition partners. In essence, the VPN has reproached Mr. Meciar for airing this problem at this particular time because we are now facing a difficult test in the language law. It is quite possible that the coalition partnership will even dissolve before the SNR meeting. This may, in my opinion, cause immense damage.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Mr. Premier, can you explain why Premier Meciar issued this rebuke against his own minister three days before the adoption of a language law in Slovakia?

[Calfa] I personally feel that Premier Meciar underestimated the supra-political circumstances that could arise from this, and, as is his particular trait, he dealt with the problem at all costs.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] I will now ask you a question, which as a journalist I have to ask—that is, whether such an impulsive person should be the Slovak premier?

[Calfa] Premier Meciar is an extremely impulsive person. Understandably, this is a matter of opinion; I personally think that matters can be resolved in an absolutely calm and rational manner. Impulsiveness can cause a great deal of damage.

Slovak Language Law Incites Protest, Controversy

Thousands Protest Language Law

AU2910174390 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 26 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

["(IH)" "(JVS)" and "(JAZ)"-signed report: "The Coalition Draft Has Been Adopted"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The people who had come to support the Matica Slovenska [Slovak Heritage Foundation] version of the language law began assembling in front of the Slovak National Council [SNR] building in Bratislava before 0800. The crowd later left for Slovak National Uprising Square where it was addressed—among others—by V. Moric, chairman of the Slovak National Party [SNS]. He quoted from an article entitled "Why I am Not a Nationalist" by Professor M. Kusy, which was published in yesterday's LIDOVE NOVINY, and he asked how this man could be the rector of a Slovak university. Shortly after 0900 the SNR began to debate the draft law. The demonstration continued, and in front of the SNR building we saw several youths carrying banners supporting the coalition version of the law ("Slovaks, Let Us Not Be Afraid of Tolerance," "We Want To Live Here, but Not To Dominate," "Slovak Is a Gift...."). A torn banner with the inscription "Humanely in Slovakia" lay on the ground. Verbal squabbles broke out with groups of Matica Slovenska supporters who recommended that the "coalition" supporters depart for Hungary.

Around 1000, when the SNR deputies were involved in their debate, the crowd of several thousand people moved back to the area in front of the SNR building. The nature of the banners was exemplified by a caricature of SNR Chairman Frantisek Miklosko, which portrayed him giving the V for victory sign accompanied by the text "Hungarian in Slovakia." Not even LIDOVE NOVINY was spared; its editors were sent packing back to Prague. A radio amplifier in front of the building conveyed some of the SNR deputies' speeches to the crowd. These were either accompanied by shouts of approval or by cries of "Judas!" and "Traitors!" SNS representatives, led by V. Moric, hovered around the cordoned-off area in front of the entrance to the SNR building. Using a megaphone, Moric informed the assembly that while Czech National Council deputies could participate as guests in private debates in the SNR, Federal Assembly deputies were not allowed in. Shortly after the announcement that the SNR had decided that the meeting should remain private, the area resounded with loud whistling and booing.

In front of the SNR building, Mr. Moric assured us that the SNS is not struggling against the Czech nation, but is merely struggling for the Matica version of the language law which, in his opinion, does not discriminate against anyone. In reply to a question on whether the demonstration should not have been held in another part of the city, Mr. Moric said that it had taken place elsewhere, but in view of the fact that opponents had appeared in front of the building, it had moved here.

We asked Moric what his party's next step will be if the coalition version of the law is adopted. He gave the following reply: "We would have to consult with the other parties and the Matica Slovenska; however, I will see to it that they continue the struggle in a democratic manner."

Meanwhile, the assembled crowd bearing Slovak flags and symbols was continuing to chant slogans directed mainly against F. Miklosko. When Mr. Mihalik, a member of the Stur Society, announced in the square that he was going on a hunger strike in support of the Matica version, V. Moric again grabbed his megaphone and began shouting "Long live Mihalik!"

In the vestibule we also spoke to Peter Tatar (Public Against Violence movement), a member of the SNR Presidium, and a member of the group that submitted the coalition draft: "The first discrepancy in the Matica version is that Slovak must be used in official and in public contacts. The expression 'public' is at complete variance with the essence of all laws concerning human rights, especially with Article 32 of the Copenhagen Agreement. The draft is also anticonstitutional in its current form. The SNR cannot adopt it. It can only recommend to the Federal Assembly that it be adopted. Another lie is that the Matica version is supported by 80 percent of the Slovak people. According to our research, 80 percent want a language law; however, they do not know which one, and practically no one can answer the question on how the versions differ. It is also untrue that Europe does not know about us.... Day after day the foreign press refers to the fact that we want to discriminate against our ethnic minorities. Of course, the draft has the political aim of splitting the coalition and breaking up the federation."

We asked Tatar if he was prepared to make a compromise. He replied: "There is nowhere to retreat. We have already lost enough face in preparing this version, which is quite populistic. Right from the beginning there has been a kind of breaking down open doors. Czech and Slovak are state languages; administrative regulations were enough to guarantee the minorities' rights. At a time of general uncertainty, people are looking for at least some certainty in national feelings."

Before the approval of the language law, citizens in the crowd in front of the SNR building signed a petition declaring this organ to be illegitimate and incapable of looking after the interests of the Slovak people. They announced that they will take part in acts of protest, including civil disobedience, throughout the Republic. Silent demonstrations in support of human rights and civil tolerance were held in other parts of Bratislava. The participants in these demonstrations were verbally assaulted by supporters of the Matica version of the law. [passage omitted]

Soon after the applause had died down in the council, Deputy Andel took the platform and announced that SNS deputies will leave the SNR session in protest against the adoption of the coalition version of the law. We must mention that the names of towns, villages, districts, squares, and public places will be defined in the official language. This is one of the most important changes contained in the new draft. (The original wording of the coalition version considered the possibility of using another language alongside Slovak. Public officials in territories occupied by the ethnic minorities do not have to speak the language of the ethnic minority).

Vitazoslav Moric declared at the Bratislava demonstration: "Until a new Slovak parliament is established, we do not consider ourselves to be bound by the decisions made by the current parliament." Tens of thousands of demonstrators demanded that the SNR chairman or the premier make an appearance. Neither the government nor the deputies succumbed to this pressure.

People Stage Hunger Strike

AU3010133890 Prague CTK in English 1704 GMT 26 Oct 90

[Text] Bratislava Oct 26 (CTK)—Dozens of people from various parts of the Slovak Republic, from various social strata and age categories, went on a hunger strike in front of the building of the Slovak National Council (parliament) last night. There were some 80 persons in the morning.

The strikers protested against the adoption of the so-called coalition draft law on Slovak as the official language. They demand the adoption of another variant of the law, the so-called Matica Slovenska proposal (Matica Slovenska is a Slovak Cultural Institution). Some of them call for the resignation of the parliament and the Slovak Government. Participants in the strike stress that their decision is not connected with any party affiliation.

Shortly after 1500 GMT several thousand Slovaks rallied in the center of Bratislava to voice their disagreement with yesterday's decision of the Slovak parliament to adopt the government draft law on Slovak as the official language.

Hunger Strikers Reject Proposal

AU3010125090 Prague CTK in English 2111 GMT 28 Oct 90

[Text] Bratislava Oct 28 (CTK)—Talks of Chairman Frantisek Miklosko and other members of the Slovak National Council (parliament) with representatives of hunger strikers against the Law on the Slovak Language passed last Thursday failed after three hours today.

The hunger strikers rejected the proposal of the parliament representatives to support a national debate on the law in the media if they end the strike.

Some 80 people have been on the hunger strike for the third day now. Three of them have been found in regular medical checks to be suffering from weakness and cold. One, a 37-year-old man suffering from bronchitis, has been taken to the hospital where he continues the strike. Two suffering from tonsillitis have returned to the other protesters against the law which declares Slovak the state language and recognizes the right of national minorities to use their languages on official business.

A bus has been stationed outside the parliament building to enable the protesters to rest and warm up in the cold weather.

Cibula Views Polarization Issue

AU3010140990 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 27 Oct 90 p 3

[Igor Cibula commentary: "Who Has Divided the Nation?"]

[Text] Every patriot must respect citizens championing their mother tongue but it is detrimental to democracy if the legitimacy of the parliament is questioned at the same time. There should be no exceptions in this respect because the efficient functioning of democracy is conditional on firmly established rules that must not be violated under any circumstances. If, however, the parliament's decisions do not reflect the will of the majority, the voters can express their lack of confidence in their deputies in the next elections. Apart from this, the freedom of expression in the mass media, in which views on any social problem can be vented, can also be used to influence deputies.

Looking at it from this angle, the debate in the Slovak National Council on the bill on the enactment of an official language and the tense social atmosphere characterized by the coulisse of fanatic demonstrators do not bode well for our domestic political development in the coming days. At the same time it needs to be reiterated that the problem of enacting Slovak as the official language has not been invented by Jozef Markus, chairman of the Slovak National Heritage Foundation, and Slovak National Party Chairman Vitazoslav Moric, but that the issue has arisen as a result of the conditions in southern Slovakia. The coming to a head of this issue cannot, however, be seen only in context with the reluctance of some members of the Hungarian minority to use the Slovak language in dealings with authorities and in public life and with the discrimination of Slovaks in the ethnically mixed districts of southern Slovakia. An active contribution to the escalation of the conflict has also been made by [Hungarian minority leader] Deputy Miklos Duray, who enjoys the support of some circles in Budapest.

After yesterday's vote in the Slovak National Council, the Slovak nation remains divided on the issue of the approved law on the official language. It is divided into the camp of those who failed to show tolerance for their Hungarian fellow citizens and among whom we could find even those who would like to move their Hungarian fellow citizens to the other side of the Danube. These people would like to emulate the Czech example, even though the majority of the Czech nation feels shame today for its treatment of the German fellow citizens [after World War II]. The second camp is that of Premier Meciar's followers, who did not let themselves be provoked by Hungarian irredentists but kept a level-headed view of Slovakia's chances to hold its own in the complicated Central European realm. They did not let themselves be manipulated by the exponents of the power political ambitions of circles which see the future of our homeland in obsolete historical models.

Responsibility for the present excitable state of the nation's minds does not lie only with the leaders of the radical nationalists. The same measure of blame rests with those politicians of the government coalition who misjudged the hierarchy of the nation's needs and started too late to explain their concept of solving the Slovak-Hungarian or Hungarian-Slovak antagonism. Premier Meciar can be exempted from this criticism because he was the only member of the "general staff" of the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement to realize the priority of national aims.

Government Deals With Unrest

LD3010200290 Prague CTK in English 1652 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Bratislava Oct 30 (CTK)—The Slovak Government has taken various steps to stabilize the situation in Slovakia following unrest over a law on the state langauge. The police force is controlled by the premier and First Deputy Premier Jan Carnogursky, Premier Meciar said after a government session today.

The premier asked last week for the dismissal of Interior Minister Anton Andras over incompetence in a dramatic "me or him" statement which said the matter would have to be solved within a week. He said today that in his opinion parties in the ruling coalition have already reached agreement but he did not say what it is.

The premier announced that negotiations were under way with several dozen people on a hunger strike in Bratislava calling for a law on the state language disregarding the national minorities and in his opinion this protest should end with a compromise.

Meciar proposed that Matica Slovenska, the historical cultural institution which had tabled the language law rejected by the parliament, act as the guarantor of the adopted legislation. We have until next spring, when the discussion of a new constitution will begin, to see how the law works, he said.

Commenting on his visit to Hungary later this week the Slovak premier said that it will be of a political nature. One of the subjects will be the Gabcikovo waterworks, an originally Czechoslovak-Hungarian project on the Danube now causing headaches to both sides because of enivornmental and other problems.

National Party Reaffirms Stand

LD3010201790 Prague CTK in English 1732 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Bratislava Oct 30 (CTK)—The Slovak National Party (SNS) today issued a statement saying that it "continues to support the stance of the broad Slovak public and Matica Slovenska on the state and official language" in Slovakia.

The question of enactment of the state and official language in Slovakia has generated a very tense situation in the smaller of the two constituent parts of Czechoslovakia. Last week, the discussion and approval of the relevant bill was accompanied by demonstrations organized by Matica Slovenska, a cultural organization founded in 1863, and the nationalistic-orientated Slovak National Party.

The Slovak National Council approved the so-called coalition bill (presented by the government made up of the Public Against Violence [VPN], Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], and Democratic Party [DS] which allows ethnic minorities to use their language in official contacts. The draft worked out by Matica Slovenska spoke about "Slovak without exception," i.e. it barred ethnic minorities from using their mother tongues in official contacts.

The SNS statement also complains that federal bodies are being strengthened and that Prago-centrism is being preserved, but takes on other forms (than under the previous communist regime). Slovakia is denied institutions which express the sovereignty of a national republic, e.g. its own foreign affairs and foreign trade ministries, national bank, bank of issue, etc.

The question of division of powers between the federation and the two national republics (Czech and Slovak) has been a bone of contention for many months, hindering progress of economic transformations which are to bring Czechoslovakia on the road of market economy, as Federal Premier Marian Calfa pointed out recently.

Asked to comment on the demand by some deputies to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (parliament) and Slovak National Council for the SNS that he withdraw from SNS leadership, SNS Chairman Vitazoslav Moric told CTK today that deputies have no power to decide whether he will be chairman or not. The less so deputies who are not members of the SNS, he added.

Vitazoslav Moric is a SNS deputy to the Federal Assembly.

Meciar Speaks to Journalists

LD3010234290 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 2100 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] It is not possible to break up the state under the pretext of adopting the language law, Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar told journalists today after a Slovak Government session. He spoke negatively about a strike alert declared by students of some secondary schools and institutes of higher learning, particularly in Bratislava. He also said that an attempt to make use of students in the policical game is irresponsible on the part of the people who do this.

Vladimir Meciar also informed the journalists that last week the government carried out some measures to help maintain security. He said that throughout Bratislava, extraordinary security measures were declared. These will be extended if necessary to the entire West Slovak region.

Meciar Interviewed on Slovak Government, VPN

AU3010204790 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 25 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with Slovak Republic Premier Vladimir Meciar, by Luba Lesna and Milan Richter, in Prague on 23 October]

[Text] [VEREJNOST] What did you discuss with representatives of the Czech Republic Government today?

[Meciar] The aim of today's talks was to bring into line the views of the Slovak and Czech governments on the legislative arrangement of the spheres of competence [of the republics and the federation] and on the amendment to the relevant constitutional law. Naturally, we are under great time pressure. We asked the Federal Assembly Presidium, through the Federal Government, to postpone the deadline for submitting the bill, which is of key significance for the arrangement of relations between the two republics. We would be simplifying matters if we said that this is only a question of the spheres of competence. It is a question of a far more fundamental importance. It will determine the shape of the future constitution, the future elections, as well as the arrangement of state administration and economic life. Those are the veins through which the blood of the reform will run. We want to increase the rate at which blood flows through these veins and, above all, we want it to flow in the right direction.

[VEREJNOST] Will the situation in Bratislava [possible reference to the current conflict between the Public Against Violence movement and the Christian Democratic Movement, the main Slovak coalition partners] have an impact on your talks in Prague?

[Meciar] No. The work continues. If one problem were to bring to a halt the work on all other problems, we would accomplish nothing. After all, every day we have to deal with some 100 problems, 10 to 20 of which account for stress situations. Yet even one such situation can influence decisions on important issues.

[VEREJNOST] Are you suggesting that the partially tense situation in the Slovak Government has not been transferred from Bratislava to Prague?

[Meciar] No. It has not even been transferred to the government session in Bratislava. When work needs to be done, the ministers must work. Once they are done with the work, let them exchange whatever opinions they please. Before a matter is decided, everyone must do his share of the work. Personal feelings or personal conflicts should not impede the progress of work.

[VEREJNOST] How do you feel the pressure that has arisen in Slovakia, with some people for Meciar and some people against Meciar?

[Meciar] I am very unhappy that the conflict has come to a head as a purely personal conflict. We should all be concerned about the quality of work. But otherwise I have been surprised by the massive support I am getting. Practically all organizations of the Public Against Violence movement [VPN] in Slovakia want to organize activities in my support. I am getting many phone calls; many citizens send me flowers. There are enterprises that have threatened to go on strike [if Meciar resigns]. I must be grateful to citizens for all this. The question is whether people from the Christian Democratic Movement had to let the situation become so acute. After all, they have known for a long time what is being discussed today. The premier can ill afford not to see that transport workers are getting ready to strike, and rightly so. He cannot afford to ignore the fact that the staff of national committees is contemplating going on strike, that elections are being poorly prepared, that the wrong people are being selected for the posts of district officials, that the security force is becoming inoperative, that senseless personnel changes are being made. He can ill afford not to see that the entire work of the Ministry of Interior is falling apart. The whole system of state administration, the responsibility for which lies with the minister of interior, is in such a condition today that no one knows what it should look like. Can we tolerate such a man in such a responsible post? We cannot. I have been alerting the coalition partners to this fact for a long time. I begged and beseeched them. Only when it became too much did I make public that part which concerned the talks and the powers of the minister of interior. [sentence as published]

[VEREJNOST] I would like to ask you about the situation in the VPN, specifically about the proposal from Trnava [where the critics of the current VPN leadership met on 20 October]. Many people would like to see you, instead of Fedor Gal, chair the Slovak VPN Council.

[Meciar] I would not interpret this as a split in the VPN. A certain group of people only expressed their opinion on personnel changes and demanded all kinds of other things. We dealt with this issue in the VPN Council. Fedor Gal is doing his job well. There is consensus and mutual support between us. We have agreed that at present, before the elections, at a time when we must deal with the language law issue, with the division of the spheres of competence, and with relations with Civic Forum, it is simply impossible to make any changes. There is not even any great interest in such changes taking place. These issues should be tackled at the extraordinary VPN assembly in December. People's attention should not be directed to personnel changes but to more important matters. We are facing elections for local self-administration bodies. We should promote the VPN's positive policy.

Differences at OF, VPN Meeting Reported

AU3010191490 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 25 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Petr Sabata report: "Much Ado and Mixed Feelings; It Was Not Just Impatience Which Drove Meciar's Cabinet to Prague"]

[Text] Meciar is on his way to Prague to destroy the federation. This report spread with the speed of light in Prague on Tuesday [23 October]. The reality was finally less disturbing—we reported on the Slovak premier's steps in some detail yesterday. Today we publish additional information on the joint meeting of Civic Forum [OF] and Public Against Violence [VPN] groups of deputies held Tuesday night, in which virtually all the country's top politicians participated and from which journalists were barred, as well as views [on this meeting] which we collected in the parliament yesterday.

Vladimir Meciar brought with him to Prague an amendment to the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak federation, which defines anew the division of the spheres of competence between the federation and the republics. By this he caused a surprise, to say the least. The commissions of experts set up on the basis of the three governments' talks at Trencianske Teplice have already released the results of their work, as Pavel Hoffmann, federal minister of strategic planning and member of the commission which brings together the results of individual commissions, told us yesterday: "We were about to take another step and decide what to do next. The Slovak Government's proposal jumps ahead of the development to a certain extent."

Faits Accomplis

Tuesday night Vaclav Klaus advocated a gradual change in the spheres of competence and rejected the Slovak ultimatum. Vladimir Dlouhy said that he assumed that the changes in powers would continue only after the commissions of experts complete their work. He also rejected the line pursued by the Slovak side, which has confronted everyone with faits accomplis. Deputy Federal Premier Pavel Rychetsky drew attention to the agreement reached by the three governments that fundamental changes to the constitutional law, such as the one which the Slovak premier brought to Prague, would be submitted to the Federal Assembly jointly by the two national councils and that the law would contain only that on which a consensus has been reached. The other issues would be postponed, the deadline of 1 January 1991 is not absolute. Some deputies from the "Czech side" displayed indignation Tuesday night, which one of them formulated as follows: "I have the bad feeling that independence is being prepared in Slovakia." He proposed that one should deal only with economic matters and, at least in the foreseeable future, not with changes in the division of powers. In the lobbies, the Slovak Government's maneuver was then described as an offensive and unacceptable ultimatum.

Without Comment

Let us try to compare the bill proposed by the Slovak Government with the results arrived at by the commissions of experts dealing with the same issues. Minister Hoffmann told us about it yesterday: "There obviously is a certain discrepancy. It can be seen, for example, that whereas the commissions were formulating joint spheres of competence for the federation and the republics, the Slovak proposal favors a clear delineation of competence either only for the federation or only for the republics." In other words, it is clear that the search for a new constitutional arrangement by means of commissions, a method on which all three governments had agreed, is at variance with the line pursued by the Slovak cabinet. If we consider the fact that ministers of the Slovak Government, too, were represented in these commissions, there is no need to comment on the issue any longer. Still, is it possible to qualify the Slovak Government's course of action as noncompliance with former agreements?

Minister Hoffmann: "It can be qualified as an effort to speed things up and submit the bill to parliament so that everything can be resolved by 1 January 1991. It is apparent, however, that this will not be possible because many issues remain unsolved."

The VPN's Shoe Pinches

What was it then that prompted a part of the Slovak representation to opt for a line which neither the Czech nor the federal representations could accept with understanding? Deputy Jozef Baksay, chairman of the VPN club of deputies, told us the reasons yesterday: "One reason is the linkage between the law on the spheres of competence and the economic laws. Personally, I consider the present political situation in Slovakia to be the main factor of the acceleration. The Slovak National Party [SNS] is becoming increasingly active and the adoption of competence laws based on the principles agreed at Trencianske Teplice would take the wind out of its sails. And, finally, we are actually only living up to our pre-election promises." At the Tuesday night meeting [of the OF and VPN clubs of deputies] in parliament, the Slovak representatives described the situation of the VPN as relatively dramatic. This is connected with the VPN's very fragile government coalition with the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] in the wake of the Meciar-versus-Andras conflict. If the KDH left the coalition, the VPN would head a government with insufficient backing in the Slovak National Council and talks on cooperation with the SNS or with Slovak communists are impossible, for reasons which are obvious. What did OF deputies say about the difficult position of their Slovak coalition partner Tuesday night? Pavel Bratinka described it aptly: "We must join our forces." And he called on the Slovak premier to refrain from rhetoric which makes closer mutual ties impossible.... The whole trip to Prague and the whole draft constitutional amendment actually did more harm than good to the Slovak Government in the eyes of OF deputies. Common policy is not done in this way.

After midnight, until Wednesday morning, the VPN club of deputies held a separate meeting with Meciar's cabinet. What was it about? Deputy Jozef Baksay: "On the competence law. We had to discuss it directly with the ministers, mainly those in charge of the economy."

What Next

The outlook after the hectic Tuesday is as follows: The Slovak proposal, as well as the results yielded by the commissions of experts, will continue to be considered at the level of all three governments. The result should be a legal norm regulating changes in the division of powers. This legislation should be submitted to parliament as soon as possible so that it can come into force on 1 January 1991 (The Federal Assembly Presidium has agreed to postpone the latest admissible deadline for the submission of the law [if it is to come into effect on 1 January]—25 October). According to Pavel Hoffmann, the problem will be discussed by the Federal Government today. Although Meciar's trip to Prague has cleared the air somewhat—the Czechs and Slovaks were listening to each other attentively and, sometimes, with surprise Tuesday night—it has also sown a seed of distrust about the Slovak Government's sense of responsibility.

Ex-Deputy Interior Minister Rejects Andras Claim

AU3010211790 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 26 Oct 90 p 2

["(TMP)"-signed report: "We Are Not Whipping Up Tension"]

[Text] Bratislava—Monday's [22 October] news conference given by Slovak Interior Minister Anton Andras was followed by another one yesterday at which Vladimir Borodovcak, head of the Office of the Government, invited journalists to convey to the public his point of view on the statement made by the Slovak interior minister.

"I do not want to further inflame the tension that has arisen between Premier Meciar and Minister Andras; however, I must react to the accusations made by the current Slovak interior minister," said Vladimir Borodovcak who was Slovak first deputy interior minister when Premier Meciar was the minister. "We have sufficient evidence, which can be verified, that prior to the appointment of Anton Andras people were not idle in the Slovak Interior Ministry. The very opposite is true."

Former Deputy Minister V. Borodovcak then refuted in detail individual accusations about the work carried out by the Interior Ministry and its former minister. This work involved dealing with personnel issues, methods for managing the department, and endeavors to improve the police force's technical equipment. Vladimir Borodovcak's claim was also supported by the testimony of four senior officers in the Slovak Interior Ministry. They all unanimously confirmed that Premier Meciar never said in front of them that he "would recall Minister Andras" before 1 October as Minister A. Andras stated on Monday. We were informed that "former Premier Milan Cic also expressed his satisfaction with the work of the previous interior minister and Interior Ministry. He declared that, of all the ministries, Meciar's ministry provided the best background information for the government's work."

Calfa Cautions Against Strong Slovak Nationalism

LD3010170690 Prague CTK in English 0959 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Bratislava Oct 30 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa said in an interview for NARODNA OBRODA daily he fears the national feeling of the Slovak side might be too strong to allow an objective and logical set-up of the federation, as it is usual in other countries.

He stated that the assertion of a strong Slovak national feeling in resolving constitutional issues poses a grave problem and is a specific feature of the current development in Czechoslovakia.

Commenting on the delay in discussing a bill on power-sharing he noted that the issue of the national governments' powers in the sphere of railways, transport, gas pipeline and the banking system remains open.

Calfa went on to say that the raising of constitutional questions delays the economic reform. Referring to the start of the economic reform next year he said that the most pessimistic estimates predict a 15 per cent unemployment rate, i.e. more than a million unemployed people.

"The future six months are going to be critical. Enterprises will either 'get into move' or collapse. There is no other option," Mr. Calfa said.

Miklosko Interviewed on 'New Situation'

AU3010151190

[Editorial Report] Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 24 October on pages 1 and 2 carries a 650-word interview with Slovak National Council Chairman Frantisek Miklosko, by Vlado Turkovic entitled "Slovakia Has Matured as a State." The place and date of the interview are not given.

In his opening reply concerning the threat of the federation's breakup, Miklosko says: "A new situation has arisen in Czechoslovakia. Slovakia has reached a point of development when it is no longer able to live within the former arrangement. Slovakia has matured as a state, which is evident by the extensive range of views, from extreme ones which demand Slovakia's separation to those representing the views of the government with the premier at the head. According to these, the powers of the federation should be reduced to the minimum and two strong autonomous republics should be created." Miklosko voices his "concern over the future development" in case the federal bodies do not accept the fact that this process of reinforcing the powers of the republics must be completed. At the same time, he voices his optimism about future development if the federal bodies realize that the federal institutions can derive their authority only from powers delegated to them by the two national republics.

In the next question, Miklosko is asked about his view on the current tension between the two main Slovak coalition partners, the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement and Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]. He replies that he would not dramatize the situation and expresses his "confidence" that "an agreement based on common Slovak interest is possible and that the coalition will not break apart in this serious moment."

In his final reply, Miklosko comments on the current debates about enshrining Slovak as an official language in Slovakia. While he concedes that every civil servant should be able to speak Slovak and that no civil servant should be forced to speak the language of the minority, he warns against depriving members of the minorities of the right to use their own language in dealings with the authorities because this would set Slovakia apart from "European norms."

Split in Congress of Slovaks Over Separatism

AU3010145490

[Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 20 October on page 16 carries a 300-word "open letter" from Helen E. Roman-Barber, the daughter of the late Stefan Roman, founder, sponsor, and long-time chairman of the World Congress of Slovaks, to "all members of the World Congress of Slovaks." In the letter, Roman-Barber announces the decision of the "Roman family and other founding members" of the congress to withdraw from this organization and sever all ties with its current leadership. As Barber-Roman explains, her decision is motivated by the policy of the new leadership of the World Congress of Slovaks, which "supports Slovak separatism."

Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 24 October on page 3 carries a 600-word Boris F. Lazar commentary on the above step. Lazar deals with the advocacy of Slovak separatism by many members of the new leadership of the World Congress of Slovaks and calls it "understandable" that the "Roman family does not want to be compromised by such people any longer."

National Council Declares Reconciliation Day

LD3010183490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1300 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] The Slovak National Council has declared 1 November the Day of Reconciliation. It is dedicated to the memory of victims of political violence. This day symbolizes, on the eve of the All Saint's Day, the will of citizens of Slovakia to base their future on understanding among people, on democratic principles, and on mutual respect. According to the law, 1 November this year is a public holiday in Slovakia.

Havel Arrives in Poprad for 3-Day Slovak Visit

LD3010182990 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1100 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] President of the Republic Vaclav Havel arrived in Poprad today where he begun his three-day visit of Slovakia. At the airport he was welcomed by Slovak National Council Chairman Frantisek Miklosko, Slovak Minister of Culture Ladislav Snopko, and the public. From Poprad, Vaclav Havel continued with his entourage to Dolny Kubin, where he is to unveil in the afternoon a commemorative plaque on a Jewish synagogue. In Martin he will attend celebrations of the anniversary of the Martin declaration. In the evening, Vaclav Havel will arrive in Bratislava, where he will attend a performance of his play, Memorandum, and meet artists.

Hungarian Ambassador Cited on CSFR Minorities

AU3010183890 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 25 Oct 90 p 5

[Interview with Gyorgy Varga, new Hungarian ambassador to Czechoslovakia, by Karel Hvizdala in Prague; date not given: "Making Use of Personal Contacts"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Hvizdala] Let us mention also the more painful spots of our relations, such as the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. This is a burning issue for both sides, is it not?

[Varga] I have to say one thing quite frankly: We certainly do not intend to solve the question of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. This is a matter and a task for your republic, your federation, and the Slovak Government. The responsibility for these citizens is yours and the Hungarian state and the Hungarian ambassador do not want to represent these people. If I saw that certain things were happening that are inconsistent with international agreements or which run counter to basic human rights—i.e. if, for example, a discriminatory language law were adopted—Hungary would naturally have to protest. But I am convinced that in such a case the Netherlands, for example, would also protest, that the whole of Europe would protest. I am confident, however, that the Slovak liberals will be strong enough to prevent the discriminatory bill proposed by the Slovak National Party [SNS] and the Slovak National Heritage Foundation from being passed and that common sense and people such as [Public Against Violence representative Peter] Zajac or Premier Calfa—who knows very well as a realistic politician that it would be Slovakia that would suffer from such a law most of all— will prevail. In other words, the minority problem does not have a direct impact on our relations but it influences them to a significant degree indirectly by influencing public opinion in Hungary. I should perhaps say one more thing: Hungary will naturally support all its minorities to help them retain their national identity and our state will provide them with all necessary assistance, especially in the field of culture. I would cite as an example that it is our state's task to secure for these people places at our universities. It would certainly be good if the largest possible number of Slovaks living in Hungary were, in turn, able to study in Slovakia. After all, we should not try to get rid of our minorities because they enrich us. There are Romanians, Swabians, and Slovaks in Hungary and we are all the richer by them.

[Hvizdala] How would you respond to the accusations, being raised in Slovakia, that Hungarian Television incites the national question?

[Varga] This is a sadder part of the matter. The press on both the Slovak and Hungarian sides, but sometimes even on the Czech side, is not always well informed and the mass media bear enormous responsibility today. Nonetheless, I am convinced that ambassadors should not get involved in these issues. As a former journalist and Radio Free Europe correspondent in Budapest I can only express my private opinion. That is all.

[Hvizdala] And what is your private opinion?

[Varga] Privately I would draw the attention of your public to one fact— the journalists who write most passionately about nationality issues are those who were the staunchest supporters of communists under the old regime. [passage omitted]

Parliament Queried Over Saddam Husayn Letter

LD3010145690 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1300 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Excerpt] We shall now go over to the Federal Assembly building in Prague where the seventh joint session of the Chamber of the People and the Chamber of Nations of the Federal Assembly continues today. Ludmila Bulakova, our correspondent, reports on the proceedings so far:

[Bulakova] Good afternoon from the parliament. Most of the time since our last report two hours ago has been taken up by a break. Some 30 minutes ago the afternoon session opened with an unscheduled address by Deputy Ruml from Civic Forum [OF], who asked for an explanation of who distributed a letter to deputies from Saddam Husayn addressed to the Federal Assembly—and how this, in his opinion, is irresponsible, when a letter, without being previously checked for reasons of health and safety, is distributed to deputies who a week ago approved a resolution on sending special antichemical warfare units to the Persian Gulf area. The entire matter is being investigated and the plenum will be informed on the results by the Federal Assembly Office.

At present the joint session continues with a debate on amendments to the restitution bill passed three weeks ago. [passage omitted]

Dobrovsky Rejects Speculations at News Briefing

AU2910184490 Prague CTK in English 1724 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 24 (CTK)—The Soviet Union announced to Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel that serious domestic political reasons lead it to ask the Warsaw Pact member states to postpone the Budapest session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. There is no concern about disintegration of the Pact, Czechoslovak Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky said.

At a press conference here today he rejected other possible backstage speculations and said that President Havel responded to Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Boris Pankin that Czechoslovakia needs to know the answer to questions concerning, for instance, agreement on the reduction of contingents of tanks and artillery.

Referring to results of inquiries of a presidential commission into the Army activity in November 1989, he said that Czechoslovak Army General Staff Chief Lieutenant General Anton Slimak "did nothing that might be characterized as hindering the work of the commission. His behavior even made it possible to keep better the documents in the archives".

Asked whether he plans to dismiss the chief of the General Staff and other deputies, the minister said that not even one hour would he do without these people. "If it were not for the present supreme Army command, its maximum political foresight, high professionalism and the interest of these representatives, the Army would be in a much worse state than it is now".

Commenting on his order to stop the activity of the Free Legion, a group of officers who have never been in the Communist Party, who worked outside the Army structure and demanded inter alia the resignation of Former Defense Minister Miroslav Vacek, he stated that he would not have issued the order, if he had not considered it democratic. "I have come to the conclusion that the Free Legion goes beyond its rules of organization in some of its activities, and asked the office for the protection of the constitution and democracy to reassess it", Minister Dobrovsky said.

[Prague CTK in English at 1926 GMT on 24 October in a similar report adds: "Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today sent a letter to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposing to convene a session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee to Budapest by the end of 1990 at the latest. He wrote he thoroughly assessed the reasons which led the Soviet leadership to propose the postponement of the special session of the committee. Czechoslovakia will not impede the achievement of consensus on a new date of the postponed session, President Havel wrote."]

Calfa Returns; Details Talks With Ryzhkov

LD3010223790 Prague CTK in English 2125 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 30 (CTK)—Czechoslovakia will immediately start looking abroad for purchases and completion of oil producing equipment designed for export to the Soviet Union to meet the conditions of an agreement reached with Soviet representatives in talks today, Premier Marian Calfa told journalists during his return from talks in Moscow today.

The Soviet Union is ready to supply Czechoslovakia with 13 million tons of oil next year, which is the technological minimum for Czechoslovakia. It is roughly the same quantity as the real supplies will be this year.

The Soviet Union will sell its oil exclusively for hard currency next year and the only exception can be supplies of oil-mining equipment in compensation. Czechoslovakia will now seek the possibilities of these supplies and will also study the requests of Soviet oil workers for other deliveries, including consumer goods.

The premier described the agreement as promising and said that in very tough talks, especially his tete-a-tete meeting with Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, an increase in the original Soviet offer of 7.5 million tons to 13 million tons was agreed. "The time of camaraderie has ended and the period of tough economic relations begins. We want them to be correct," Calfa said.

He noted that for the rest of this year the Soviet Union has promised to maintain the deliveries at the level of 1.1 million tons a month although it did not agree immediately. "We are settled for this year and have a good start for 1991," Calfa said. He described the deal to pay for oil partly in goods as very successful.

He pointed out that failure to fulfill the agreement concluded on such a high level would not be just a commercial problem but also a political one, probably not just bilateral.

Calfa said that today's talks also concerned fulfillment of the agreement on the drafting of plans for economic cooperation in 1991 reached by Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Vaclav Vales and Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Konstantin Katushev in Prague on September 1. All unresolved issues, including the coefficient for the calculation of Czechoslovak financial claims in the Soviet Union, a new payments and banking agreement and lists of goods specified for trade exchanges must be settled by November 25 when the finance ministers of both countries, Vaclav Klaus and Valentin Pavlov, will meet.

Calfa specified the financial claims as a credit of 2,000 million rubles [R] which the USSR is to start paying from 1995, Czechoslovakia's mutual trade surplus of some R700 million of this year and Czechoslovak investments in mutual projects, especially the Yamburg gas pipeline and the ore treatment plant in Krivoy Rog. The use of these means for the payment of raw material supplies to Czechoslovakia should soften the impact of the transition to new conditions.

According to Calfa, Nikolay Ryzhkov described the question of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia as very sensitive. The Soviet Union reiterated its interest in the deliveries of Czechoslovak pre-fab houses which would partly solve the acute housing problem of officers' families. Details will be discussed by a Soviet delegation which will arrive in Prague on November 5.

Also discussed were problems cause by slow transhipment of goods on Soviet railways which are broad-gauged.

Czechoslovakia favours balanced mutual deliveries of special goods (arms material) but demands that civilian aircraft be not included in the total.

No Political Aims Behind Soviet Soldier's Case

AU3010131790 Prague CTK in English 1931 GMT 26 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 26 (CTK)—Martin Fendrych, press spokesman of the government commissioner for refugees, denied here today allegations by Soviet Sergeant Igor Naumov who asked for political asylum in Czechoslovakia on October 2 and withdrew the application on October 17, claiming that the Czechoslovak side sought political goals in his case and refused to provide him protection in the end.

Naumov also stated that he felt sorry for being described as a political deserter by Czechoslovak mass media.

Martin Fendrych noted that the Czechoslovak side only responded to Naumov's request for asylum and had to choose political measures corresponding to the existing situation. Audio and video materials were recorded where Naumov said that he was provided perfect care and had nothing to complain of. The protection of Igor Naumov and Takhir Zaripov (the other Soviet soldier protected) was very expensive and required much time. Sergeant Naumov decided voluntarily to go to a refugee camp in Zastavka near Brno, South Moravia, where he remained under the Czechoslovak state's protection until he decided to return to the Soviet Army, Martin Fendrych said.

Fendrych also informed about a comment on the case by Colonel General Eduard Vorobyov, commander of the Central Group of Soviet Troops. Vorobyov announced that legal proceedings against Sergeant Naumov were cancelled and Naumov would be free after his return to the USSR.

Adviser Comments on Economic Ties With USSR

LD2910210690 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1100 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] The Soviet Union continues to remain Czechoslovakia's biggest but most unreliable partner. Certainly, it has its own enormous internal problems, but this is nothing new and these problems could therefore have been foreseen. What could not, however, is the Persian Gulf crisis. Nonetheless, even without this crisis, our economic relations with this economic colossus would undoubtedly have been aggravated. This is confirmed by daily practical experience and by the words of Richard Wagner, the president's economic advisor. Our reporter, Jaroslav Skalicky, interviewed Wagner on the return from Moscow of a Czechoslovak delegation that attended a seminar on mutual relations.

[Begin recording] [Skalicky] Crude oil probably remains the number one issue. You apparently discussed it.

[Wagner] Yes, of course. I pointed out that it is not possible if a contract is finalized for someone to make changes without even telling us that he will reduce deliveries. I pointed out that our minimal requirement is

33,000 tonnes of crude oil daily. It came to a point where we were receiving less from the Soviet Union, which then led to the critical state regarding gasoline. This could lead to some of our factories having to stop work.

The Soviet Union is having great problems with production. They estimate that this year's production will be 50 million tonnes lower than last year. That means they are going to produce around 550 million tonnes. Their domestic consumption is enormous, which is due to the fact that they are not using oil economically. We are economical at home. Moreover, they are experiencing a very complicated situation in regard to the balance of payments and are therefore trying to acquire convertible currencies.

As you know, deliveries have been improving. We would like to see our relations, which are relations between two equal partners, be guaranteed, in the sense that it is not possible to withdraw from a contract. No one can imagine someone signing a contract and then deciding not to fulfill it.

[Skalicky] Individual Soviet republics are coming to the fore in the economy and want to trade with the outside world. Did you discuss such possibilities?

[Wagner] We discussed it, but, again, this is a problem due to a lack of clarity. I stressed that for us the Soviet partner is beginning to become, economically, a strong destablizing factor, among other things, because it is becoming, so to speak, undecipherable. We do not know with whom to conclude a contract, whether it should be with the central government or republican governments or enterprises. We discussed, for instance, the visit to our country of representatives of the Tyumen region who want to conclude a direct barter agreement with our goods in exchange for their oil. The situation in the Soviet Union is very complicated. The problem of economic development and economic reforms there is closely bound up with the resolution of the issue of political power. Who is going to possess political power will also decide economic matters, including deliveries. At present it looks like, as far as the so-called strategic raw materials, including crude oil, are concerned, the center demands the right to manage these raw materials by itself with the result of the sales to be divided differently than they have been to this point. This is, of course, their own internal matter. For us, the decisive thing is that we need someone with whom we will be able to sign a clear-cut contract for the deliveries of crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, and the like. That body must be the guarantor to ensure that the contract is fulfilled. [end recording]

Cross-Border Polish Traffic Only for Weekends

LD3010221290 Prague CTK in English 2043 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw Oct 30 (CTK)—A commission of Czechoslovak and Polish experts agreed at their talks here yesterday and today that free cross-border traffic along the common frontier will be possible only at the weekends, from Saturday midday till Sunday midnight, and on holidays.

The goal of the talks was full resumption of cross-border traffic which the Czechoslovak side conditioned by an exchange rate of the Polish zloty towards the Czechoslovak crown corresponding to reality. The Czechoslovak delegation wanted a rate calculated on the two currencies' relation towards the dollar (32 crowns or 9,500 zlotys per dollar), i.e. 296 zlotys per crown. However, the Polish side insisted on unconditional reopening traffic between the border regions.

The two delegations also agreed that when the cross-border traffic is restored, Polish citizens will be allowed to import from Poland Czechoslovak gifts worth 50 crowns and the maximum worth of gifts imported from Poland by Czechoslovak citizens will be 100,000 zlotys.

The two sides agreed that the technical and organizational questions of cross-border traffic will be discussed once a month.

The reopening of the Czechoslovak-Polish border has been discussed by the two countries for a long time. The closed borders have been considered an anachronism at a time when barriers between states are being pulled down. some time ago, it was agreed to resume full free cross-border traffic in November, but under the condition of introduction of a realistic crown-zloty exchange rate because the Czechoslovak side fears that goods along the Czechoslovak-Polish border would be bought up by Polish citizens.

Afghans, Indians Found Crossing Border Detained

AU3010131490 Prague CTK in English 1657 GMT 28 Oct 90

[Text] Usti nad Labem, Oct 28 (CTK)—Twenty-seven adult Afghans and ten children were detained in an attempt to illegally cross the Czechoslovak border to Germany in the Ore Mountains on the night of October 26-27.

According to the border guards authorities, they include former members of Afghan Armed Forces.

They asked to be granted asylum in Czechoslovakia and were taken to a refugee camp at Jablonecek near Mimon, Central Bohemia.

Eight Indians were detained in the same attempt at another point of the border. They had valid Czechoslovak visas and thus were returned back into Czechoslovakia.

Some 600 people were detained in similar attempts in October.

Renault Corrects Czechoslovak Press Information

AU3010133690 Prague CTK in English 1838 GMT 26 Oct 90

[Text] Paris Oct 26 (CTK)—Renault Foreign Relations Department Director Jean-Marc Lepeu today handed a statement to CTK in which the Renault management reacted to inexact information in some Czechoslovak dailies, in connection with possibilities of cooperation between Renault and Skoda.

The document pointed out that no official statement of Czechoslovak authorities has been issued in this respect and that it is impossible to consider the present state as if Volkswagen held a better position in the current talks with the Skoda car maker than Renault. The recent news is thus groundless.

Renault proposes a progressive industrial program enabling the Czechoslovak car maker and all its suppliers to use technology in the early stage which would make it possible to produce also Renault cars.

In the second stage (from 1994) an increase up to 400,000 cars to be produced annually is expected as well as the production of Renault cars.

The program, totalling some 13,000 million francs, will enable Skoda to increase its competitiveness on the international scene, Mr. Lepeu said.

Calfa Receives European Bank Head 29 Oct

LD3010045590 Prague CTK in English 1947 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 29 (CTK)—"If it were not for Vaclav Klaus, there would be no bank," European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (BERD) President Jacques Attali said here today at a meeting with Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa.

Mr. Attali appreciated Czechoslovakia's activity in the creation of "this first all-European institution which associates countries both from the point of view of politics and economics."

Czechoslovakia's joining the European Bank, whose foundation was proposed in December 1989 and which will start activity in March 1991, is currently under discussion by the Czech and the Slovak Republics' governments. An agreement is supposed to be submitted to the Federal Assembly (parliament) and Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel for ratification by the end of 1990.

The European Bank president pointed out that, unlike other bank institutions, the BERD member countries have equal rights to vote regardless of their capital share and that this bank does not focus attention only on the public sector but on the privatization process and the private sector as well.

The current European Bank mission aims to specify prioritities of cooperation with Czechoslovakia. Preferred should be such projects as, for instance, highway interlinks, construction of new oil and gas pipelines, telecommunications, and anti-pollution measures on rivers flowing through the territory of BERD members states.

The Czechoslovak premier stressed the need for both capital share and specialized cooperation especially in the upcoming privatization process which is unprecedented as to its extent.

Jacques Attali was today received also by Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Vaclav Vales who said that transition to a market economy is complicated in Czechoslovakia by disintegration of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) market and the Gulf crisis.

Mr. Attali expressed readiness for talks on concrete cooperation.

Council of Europe Radio, TV Meeting Begins

LD3010045490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] The second colloqium of the Council of Europe's Committee for Culture and Education on East-West cooperation in the dissemination of audiovisual programs on radio and television started in Prague today. Stanislav Kuzel reports on its proceedings:

[Kuzel] Deliberations by representatives of this political intergovernmental organization—the members of which are above all members of parliaments of the 23 European democratic countries—naturally focused on radio and television broadcasting in Eastern European countries which have embarked on the path of democratic reforms after the fall of totalitarian regimes.

At the morning session, held in the Federal Assembly building, the present members of the Council of Europe's Committee for Culture and Education were briefed on the situation in Czechoslovakia by Alexander Dubcek, chairman of the Federal Assembly, and shortly before midday by Jozef Miklosko, deputy federal premier. He then dealt in detail with the situation in our mass media, above all in radio and television where, despite penetrating democratic changes, the state still retains a broadcasting monopoly. He explained this by the vast number of legislative amendments, above all of econmic bills which have been given priority over the new draft bill on radio and television. He admitted that parliament is very unlikely to discuss it before the end of this year.

At the afternoon session of the Council of Europe colloquim, central directors of Czechoslovak television and Czechoslovak radio then talked specifically about the situation. Jiri Kanturek [TV director] characterized the situation as a transition of these media toward independent, democratic institutions which want to contribute considerably to changes in our society. Thus, a great emphasis is being placed on news and current affairs programs. He welcomes the possibility of private—thus, competitors'—stations, but said, however, that both Czechoslovak Television and Czechoslovak Radio will continue to be subsidized by the government. In spite of this, it is necessary to create conditions for them to play the role of independent institutions, such as the BBC in Great Britain.

Dr. Frantisek Pavlicek [Czechoslovak radio director] joined in Mr. Kanturek's views and spoke also about the radio reorganization into national radios, and federal broadcasting which will, in his opinion, have a considerably narrower scope. He said the slow progress of legislative changes puts radio in a critical situation at a time when it is necessary to complete organizational, personnel, and technical changes.

The Council of Europe's Committee for Culture and Education's session on the dissemination of audiovisual programs in Europe will continue in Prague tomorrow.

Foreign Minister's Statement on Minorities Abroad

LD3010202890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1410 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Remarks by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, in reply to a question from Deputy Csaba Tabajdi on foreign policy toward minorities abroad, at the National Assembly in Budapest—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] From the earlier and more recent standpoints of the parties of the current government coalition, as well as from the program of national renewal that constitutes the basis for government operation, it can be clearly established that an outstandingly strategic task in the foreign policy of the Republic of Hungary is the guarantee of rights of Hungarian national minorities who live outside our borders, as well as the so-called diaspora Western Magyardom. I believe that the esteemed opposition overwhelmingly supports this concept.

In this, of course, the Foreign Ministry undertakes the main task, but its activity is supplemented by the efforts of other institutions: the Secretariat for Hungarians beyond the borders in the prime minister's office, scientific institutions, political parties, churches, nongovernment organizations, foundations, and so forth.

The principled basis of our policy, alongside the generally recognized formulations of universal human rights and the contents of the Helsinki Final Act, is constituted by the recommendations adopted in September by the legal committee of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, on the protection of minorities' individual and collective rights. These will shortly go before the ministers' committee, for adoption as a convention. I will willingly place these recommendations and further documents at the disposal of Mr. Deputy.

The realization of our principles and objectives has been greatly facilitated by the democratic changes realized in the neighboring countries, which have enabled the formation of political and interest protection organizations for the Hungarian minorities. In the wake of this, our task now is not the representation and interest protection of the disorganized Hungarian minorities which previously were condemned to silence, but rather it is the support of their rightful and legal endeavors, their sovereignty, their autonomous decisionmaking without restricting or (?assuming) their responsibility. We wish to guarantee the international protection of the rights of national minorities by creating an exemplary practice in Hungary, and also through a multitiered and mutually supplementary system of bilateral, subregional, European as well as universal, agreements and treaties.

From the moment it was formed, my government, at every possible international forum, at bilateral or multilateral consultations, has consistently represented the aforementioned principles; furthermore, in its steps, it tries to gain the quickest and most comprehensive realization of these.

I took part in the Copenhagen meeting of the CSCE, which dealt with the so-called human dimension. We played a considerable role in the unprecedented step of the countries of the five-sided cooperation, called Pentagonal, working out a joint minority-protection proposal. In the closing document which was adopted, the participating 35—since then 34—recognized, among other things, that respect for the personal rights of minorities, as part of the general human rights, is a basic factor in stability and democracy. It proposed taking special measures for the creation of full equality, and it also established that autonomy was one of the possible means for the preservation of minority identity.

The Hungarian delegation taking part in the meeting was a coauthor of the proposals regarding minority rights, the elimination of racial, national, or religious hatred, and the convening of an experts' meeting to deal with the minorities. Since June, we have urged at nearly all of our talks, that the conference planned for 1991 in Switzerland be held. Most recently, at the meeting in New York of [word indistinct] foreign ministers on 2 October, my proposal urging this met with widespread support, and no one opposed it.

Hungary, within the frameworks of the UN, also urges the working out of universal minority protection norms. [passage omitted]

In conclusion, regarding the relationship of European public opinion and political leadership to our foreign policy, to our characteristically professed views and endeavors on national minorities, the basis of my press statement—of an optimistic tone—is that our policy on national minorities fully fits with the system of norms of the Europe that is being built—and it naturally meets with understanding. This is demonstrated by our role in the framework of Pentagonal, by the material support of the UN commissioner for refugee affairs, which extends beyond principled agreement, and by the guideline No. 456 of the Council of Europe, which deals with the situation of national minorities. We, of course, cannot disregard the fact that our country is the first, and so far the sole one in the region, that has gained admittance to the Council of Europe. I ask the Esteemed Deputy and the Esteemed House to accept my reply.

Soviet Electricity Supply Nears Normal Level

LD3010181190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1200 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] The Soviet electricity supply to Hungary has turned relatively normal. The deputy managing director of the Electrical Industry Trust has said that there was a 1,500 megawatt capacity in the morning and a 1,600 megawatt capacity in the afternoon at our disposal from the Soviet partner. This is still less than planned, as the capacity agreed for October was 1,940 megawatts. The loss on Monday [29 October] was greater than ever before. Yesterday, the Soviet import capacity was 1,200 megawatts smaller than planned. There were no power cuts or restrictions, because, without extra outlays, we managed to get help from abroad.

The deputy managing director said that the balance of Soviet electricity deliveries has only just evened out, because by 1 October we had received in advance some 125 million kilowatt-hours. The main problem is that there are Soviet power losses at peak periods. This happens irregularly, but endangers the winter supplies.

OKGT Member on Planned Soviet Oil Supply Cuts

LD3010210890 Budapest MTI in English 1754 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, October 30 (MTI)—The Soviet Union will introduce new cut-backs in oil deliveries in November and cease exporting oil for roubles in December, the company responsible for the exports to Hungary announced on Tuesday.

The Soviet exporter also said that in November, Hungary will only receive 143,000 tonnes of crude oil for roubles instead of the 343,000 tonnes agreed on earlier.

It is however prepared to deliver the remaining 200,000 tonnes, for products solely available on the Western market, and this payment alone.

As of December 1, the Soviet Union will no longer accept roubles as payment for oil deliveries.

Under the original inter-state agrement, the Soviet Union should have supplied Hungary with 6.48 million tonnes of oil this year. In fact, the shortfall in Soviet supplies is now no less than 1.9 million tonnes, a spokesman of the National Oil and Gas Trust (OKGT) said.

To make up for the drop in deliveries, the OKGT has bought 550,000 tonnes of crude on the free market so far this year, with at least a further 450,000 tonnes to be imported in the remainder of the year to keep the Hungarian economy ticking over.

Should there be any further hiccoughs in Soviet deliveries, though, the country will have to import a total of 600,000 tonnes, the OKGT spokesman said.

Trade Relations With Soviet Union Analyzed

AU3110101290 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Oct 90 p 1

[Karoly Csabai report: "Soviet Trade: Definite Uncertainty"]

[Text] It is estimated that in 1991, Hungarian enterprises will only purchase 20 percent of their usual goods from central Soviet organizations, and the rest will be purchased from the various federal republics. It is still uncertain, however, what goods the Soviet Union will have to offer, nor is it known how prices will develop.

Hungarian companies should have ordered the raw materials and component parts necessary for the manufacturing of their export goods a long time ago. A Hungarian delegation will travel to the Soviet Union next week, and its members will pay a visit not only to the central government, but also to the federal republics (first of all, to the Russian Republic.)

Laszlo Timar, head of a main department at the Ministry for International Economic Relations, informed us that by the end of September, Hungary had signed 99 percent of the delivery contracts allocated for this year, whereas the Soviet Union had only signed 92 percent of its contracts. The Soviet cancellation of approximately 300 million rubles is only partially explained by the fact that Hungarian enterprises have canceled some of their orders, notably for engineering industry products. In fact, the Soviets have not been able to deliver the rest of the amount because of shortages; undelivered articles include coal, cotton, paper, cellulose, chemicals, and various consumer goods.

It is also problematic that our Eastern neighbor is unable to regularly deliver the goods listed in the contracts it has signed, especially the contracts whih refer mainly to gasoline, oil, and electric fuel. (At this point, it has to be noted that this is the first time in decades that the Soviets have had to buy gasoline from abroad.) Oil deliveries affect us the most, and by the end of the year, we will have received 1.5 million to 2 million tonnes less oil than planned, so we will probably have to compensate by purchasing a further amount of oil in convertible currencies this year.

Hungary's 1989 export surplus of R800 million is expected to grow this year, and by the end of the year, it might reach R1.2 billion. It is a well-known fact that in March 1990, the leaders of our two countries agreed that this amount would be exchanged at the rate of 92[] to a ruble; in other words, we will be able to buy goods from the Soviet Union to the value of $1.1 billion. Meanwhile, the Soviets have asked to extend these deliveries over a period of five years, rather than just one year. Clearly, we cannot accept this proposal, so the negotiators will continue their talks to find a solution.

Taxi Drivers' Leader Comments on Fuel Prices

LD3010155390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1100 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Organized private taxi drivers will not raise their prices until the law on free price fuel is enacted. (Peter Feredi), secretary of the national industrial body of private carriers, also said that, with the introduction of the new fuel prices, the raising of prices will be unavoidable. The present scale of this, however, is presently unknown.

Gas Supply Tight in City, Normal in Countryside

LD3010173990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1100 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Summary] The general manager of the Mineral Oils Commercial Enterprises said on 29 October that there is no shortage of gasoline and that gas station tanks are 85 percent full.

According to reports, however, the supply in Budapest is not sufficient, and there are lines at the stations. Some types of gasoline ran out yesterday, and there is a very short supply of domestic fuel. Drivers have to visit several stations before they can get the kind of gasoline they need. The Budapest Police headquarters says no problems are expected in connection with the gasoline shortage.

Correspondents from various other parts of the country report that the supply is normal, and that all types of fuel are available. They report no lines at the gas stations in the countryside.

Jeszenszky Interviewed on U.S. Visit, Diplomacy

AU2610183590 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 24 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Pal Bokor aboard flight home from United States; date not given: "Diplomacy on a Broader Circle"; first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Together with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall and other members of the Hungarian Government, Geza Jeszenszky spent almost one week in the United States. On the long flight back home, Geza Jeszenszky answered our correspondent's questions. His words showed that Hungarian-U.S. relations have reached a historical height with the recent visit by the Hungarian prime minister; the diplomatic activity of the coalition government will not decrease in the coming weeks either.

[Bokor] Mr. Foreign Minister! It is well-known that you spent quite a lot of time in the United States as guest professor at various universities there, and lately, as a politician, too. Have you had any experience during this visit which is new and important, compared with your previous experiences?

[Jeszenszky] Indeed, I spent two and a half years in the United States, and, during the last year, I have traveled to the United States several times, both as a historian and a politician. I must say, however, that this current visit will remain the most memorable for me, and not because of the formalities—like the reception in the White House and the obviously rich splendor of the festive dinner—but because of the political content of this visit. I mean here primarily Prime Minister Antall's talks with President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, Under Secretary of State Kamman, the national security adviser, and other members of the U.S. Administration on various occasions. Your readers have already been informed about the results of these negotiations. I would like to stress here the fact that, while the Antall-Bush talks lasted much longer than originally planned, we were also able to carry out a comprehensive and informal exchange of views with Bush's closest aids. On the basis of what I heard in such an informal atmosphere, I can say that present Hungarian-U.S. relations are the best they have ever been in the history of our bilateral relations. This does not mean that I am not considering the concrete agreements, like the agreement on the issue of visas, the establishment of a Hungarian consulate in Los Angeles, or the U.S. aid to purchase animal fodder.

[Bokor] What is your opinion about the fact that the agreement on abolishing visas only applies to U.S. citizens? Only Hungarian diplomats can travel without a visa to the United States.

[Jeszenszky] In my opinion, our partners went as far as they could on this issue. The U.S. Congress places extremely strict restrictions on travel into the United States from every foreign country. The reason for this is that half of the world wants to travel to the United States and a lot of people want to stay there. If anyone is allowed into the country, it would be rather easy to disappear among the 250 million people and settle illegally. Several million people were smuggled into the United States through the Mexican border alone in recent years. That is why the United States cannot abolish the visa requirement; however, the entire procedure of issuing visas will be significantly simplified. There will be no more visa fees, and the entire process of issuing U.S. visas might become a formality taking up half an hour. The processing of Hungarian visas in the United States was also extremely complicated until now. People from all over the country had to get their visas personally or by mail from New York or Washington. The abolition of the Hungarian visa requirement and the setting up of a Hungarian Consulate in Los Angeles will create a totally different situation for the U.S. citizens of Hungarian origin, U.S. businessmen, and U.S. tourists. Today, one cannot even predict the extent of the positive effects these measures will have on bilateral trade and tourism. If we only look at the difficulties encountered by the U.S. citizens of Hungarian origin in securing visas for their own homeland, the current changes are very important and the agreement should be evaluated from this viewpoint.

Half of America in Hungary

[Bodor] You repeatedly announced that an agreement had also been achieved on the political level on holding regular consultations. What will the mechanism of such consultations be?

[Jeszenszky] We do not plan a mechanism whereby we would obligatorily hold consultations every six months or once a year. Visits and the coordination of opinions have in any case been quite frequent. Besides, the Americans are extremely agile people. A lot of Americans have already visited Hungary and we often have the impression that half of the United States is visiting Hungary, given the large number of senators, congressmen, and businessmen who visit. From the viewpoint of the development of our political contacts, I regard it as extremely important that, during our current visit, President Bush personally confirmed that Washington considered Hungary a full democracy, and not a country in the process of democratization. This declaration is a presidential guarantee for U.S. politicians and businessmen, and they can now trust Hungary.

[Bokor] The fact that the prime minister met with representatives of the Hungarian community in the United States at least five times this week clearly shows that the Budapest government sees Hungarians in the United States as a particularly important element in new U.S.-Hungarian relations. The assimilation of this role, however, has been hampered not only because the Hungarian community in the United States used to be uncertain about our previous regime, but also because this community had never been politically united. Are there any noticeable changes in this area?

[Jeszenszky] It is a well-known fact that the political profile of Hungarian emigrants to the United States developed according to the circumstances under which a particular group left the country. We make several distinctions: There are the economic emigrants who left before the turn of the century, the people who "staggered out;" it is mostly their descendants who play an active role in the public life of Hungarians in the United States. These economic emigrants are mostly old people who fled before Nazism. Then there are the emigrants of 1945, who form perhaps the most conservative and introverted group among the emigrants. Then there is the so-called class of 1947, who left Hungary when democratic institutions were being closed down. This group includes Bela Varga, the former chairman of the National Assembly. The next wave was the large group who emigrated in 1956, and then, finally, there are the emigrants of the past 15 years, who also include Transylvanian refugees who could not come to Hungary. At some point during the Kadar era, Hungary began to tolerate emigration. This deepened the gulf between the various Hungarian community groups in the United States, who were often rivals. Conservatives spoke of communist temptation, and the right wing prevented any links at all. Through the change in Hungary, however, these antagonisms have lost their breeding ground. Everybody can come back home, even the right-wing extremists, given that there are no war criminals left among them—the U.S. judiciary made sure of that, and the others have passed away—but I cannot foresee any relations with former Hungarian Nazis [Nyilasok]. The other groups of emigrants, however, could be integrated if they identified themselves with the new Hungary. I hope that the first step in this direction was taken when the long-standing rivals AMOSZ (the National Association of Hungarians in the United States) and the AMSZ (the Association of Hungarians in the United States) offered each other peace at the Hungarian Embassy in Washington, in the presence of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, when the two leaders shook hands.

Young, Dynamic People

[Bokor] That is the U.S. side of the issue. What could Hungary do to maintain organized links?

[Jeszenszky] We could give a certain amount of help to the political and economic organization of Hungarians in the United States, but it would be wrong if we interfered in their affairs in any way. We can only hope that they will unite their ranks, hopefully under the leadership of young, dynamic people. There are such people; for example, I could mention the New York-based Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, led by Laszlo Hamos, which has been operating for 15 years. The foundation is comprised of top-notch people who know the political mechanisms of the United States, and who are well aware of the fact that the 1.8 million U.S. citizens who claim to be of at least part-Hungarian descent, or the 1 million citizens who still speak Hungarian, constitute a force which could make its voice heard in every constituency. If they organized this force, the Hungarian community in the United States could act as a pressure group, just like all the other U.S. national minority groups who exercise a considerable influence on U.S. politics. As I said, however, this is incumbent upon the Hungarian community in the United States. Our aim at home is to bring about harmony not only between individual emigrant groups, but also between Hungarians abroad and at home, so political and economic problems may be solved. The World Federation of Hungarians could provide a lot of help in this area, but as far as I can tell, the image of this association has suffered during the past decades; we hope that the association will be able to renew itself in a credible way. The Mother Tongue Conference, for its part, is able to continue with its work under better circumstances now.

Soviet and Chinese Relations

[Bokor] The road to the United States has been opened. There is, however, a world power which lies closer to us, and another great power with which we do not seem to be able to improve our relations. What is your opinion on our relations with the Soviets and the Chinese?

[Jeszenszky] As with any other big (or smaller) power, we would like good relations with the Soviet Union. To use an expression we heard from President George Bush, I see the Soviet Union as a democracy which is unraveling. I could also quote Jokai [Hungarian writer]: Current developments in the Soviet Union indicate that "there is freedom under the snow." Practically every aspect of individual and public life is being liberated, both in principle and in practice. It is noteworthy that the Russians themselves are not behaving in a chauvinistic way. Yeltsin supports the independence of the republics precisely because he wants to maintain federal links. We hope that the Soviet Union will enjoy economic success and democratic progress, and we want to live together as friendly good neighbors. That was our opinion when we were in the opposition, and that is also our opinion now that we are in power.

[Jeszenszky] The Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact will also give us the opportunity to continue with our dialogue; this meeting will take place after the Paris summit of the CSCE. We would also be glad to travel to Moscow as soon as the Soviet leadership no longer has its hands full with the issues of German unification, the series of disarmament talks, and many of its other relations. From my talks with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze I know that that both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze are definitely in favor of high-level talks. As far as the PRC is concerned, it is very important for us to know the direction in which this huge Far Eastern country will develop; I have had the opportunity to meet the Chinese deputy foreign minister in Budapest, and in New York I met with the Chinese foreign minister. Economic cooperation is the most problematic aspect of our bilateral relations. We believe that trade based on ideology has no future, but we have not been able to create the conditions for a substitute for this basis yet. Our Chinese counterparts have also stressed at our meetings that they wish to continue with our trade on a non-ideological basis, and they have welcomed the new independence of Hungarian foreign policy. I think, therefore, that it would be possible to establish good relations.

In a Widening Circle to Australia

[Bokor] What does the working plan for Hungary's diplomacy look like for the rest of 1990?

[Jeszenszky] In November, our prime minister will pay an official visit to Israel. The meeting will be held at the highest level since the existence of our two countries. At the same time, however, we do not wish to neglect our relations with the Arab countries either, especially not with the countries that have proved to be our reliable partners. Our prime minister is planning to pay an official visit to Egypt in December, and he will be preceded there by Secretary of State Tamas Katona. The initiation of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia is on the agenda of both our countries. We see the upcoming visit of President Arpad Goncz to Japan as an important diplomatic mission; Arpad Goncz will be present at the festivities celebrating the emperor's accession to the throne, after which he will pay a visit to South Korea. Personally, I will travel to the Far East and Iran toward the end of 1990, and next year I will be traveling to Scandinavia. These trips have a common factor—namely, that Hungary's economy has quite serious potential in these countries, and most of these possibilities have not yet been used. I would particularly like to mention Australia, because the significant Hungarian community there knows the languages and cultures of both our countries; the Hungarian community could provide a lot of assistance for our economic cooperation. If we were to place all these plans and concepts side by side now, then we could clearly see that a firm concept is emerging in Hungary's foreign policy, a concept that we could also call a widening circle policy. First, we devoted our attention to our immediate neighbors, and as far as I can see, our efforts so far have not been in vain. The government also devoted a lot of energy in trying to establish the necessary links and personal contacts with all the leading powers of Europe, and I do not think that anyone would dispute the success of this policy. With Prime Minister Antall's visit to the United States, this widening circle has now reached the Pacific Ocean. We aim to establish close cooperation with all the states that could be our partners in trying to improve the external conditions that are necessary for the development of a democratic Hungary.

Candidates Air Views on Election Program

LD3010121590

[Editorial Report] Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish at 0625 GMT on 30 Oct broadcasts a 30-minute election program from its election studio featuring the programs and personalities of the six presidential election candidates.

The program begins with a presentation by candidate Stanislaw Tyminski, and this is followed by three activists of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN], who talk about KPN policy in general, on behalf of KPN candidate Moczulski. Next candidate Roman Bartoszcze talks about prospects for agriculture and its importance in Poland's economy.

There follows a recording of remarks by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who states: "I did not want Poland to get divided as it is. That is why I suggested a third way out, and I looked for solutions, which could have prevented the division. [Music heard in background] I did not initiate the division. I accepted it as a fact, and the need to defend and continue this line of conduct. [Music] I have not stopped respecting Lech Walesa, I did not forget that he proposed me as prime minister. But I would like him to have respect for his partners too, and to remember that he also owes something to them. Lech Walesa says various things. I would like to know his eventual program. Is it a program of easy made promises, or is it a program of talking that in principle everything is the same. [Music]

"Every government is to face difficulties that we have been facing. So either it is making promises easily, or saying honestly how (?to achieve the goals). This is the first issue. Second, is a different idea of the presidency itself. The Presidency as presented by Lech Walesa creates a picture of a president who can do everything and is responsible for nothing. He can put the blame on everybody else. This is the difference in the idea of the Presidency. One can see a president not only as a person who represents but also who has certain powers, above all to take some importaant strategic decisions, but also a president who has respect for other authorities, who respects the division of powers, or a president who attempts to improve things here and there and then he says medals for me and responsibility for you."

Senator Stanislaw Stomma then talks about presidential attributes and says that Walesa does not possess them, while Mazowiecki does.

Mazowiecki then talks about different styles of presidential campaign, saying: "Election campaigns all over the world are full of various promises, which are later forgotten. I am taking part in the campaign in a double role, as the prime minister of the government, to which one can have some remarks, but which is responsible for the period of over a year, and as a candidate in the election campaign. And I cannot afford and I do not want to use demagogy and make empty promises. I think that it is better to make promises one can keep, and I believe that Poland is facing a great chance, but we must not waste what we have achieved so far."

Next is Lech Walesa. His slot begins with recordings of a welcome to a rally in a town, and Walesa taking about pluralism and his lack of satisfaction over political and economic development so far. He goes on praising the market economy and privatization, and says that every second Pole should be a businessman.

Sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis says that Walesa is competent, determined, and the only suitable candidate, while Mazowiecki lacks imagination, and is weak and inconsistent.

The program concludes with candidate Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz talking about himself and his professional career.

List of Presidential Candidates Reviewed

PM2910112990 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 15 Sep 90 p 5

[Mariusz Janicki article: "Before the Run on Belweder Palace Begins: Presidential Candidates"]

[Text] In recent times, the law and the Constitution have seldom kept up with the pace of political developments in Poland. No sooner are any kind of decisions made—be they only provisional and temporary—they are almost immediately rendered "invalid." Everyone knows that formalities exist only in order to be sidestepped. This principle applies also when it comes to choosing the president.

New names are constantly being added to the list of possible candidates to the highest office in the land.

To begin with, let us consider the three suggestions hailing straight from the realm of political fantasy. Six months ago a new hope emerged for forging closer ties with the Czechs. The historic nuptial union between Mieszko and Dobrava was supposed to be replaced by a personal union embodied by **Vaclav Havel**. After **Zbigniew Brzezinski's** visit to Poland, it became fashionable to imagine the presidential mantle worn by this former security adviser to the U.S. president. Finally, we looked at the eminent philosopher, **Leszek Kolakowski**: a level-headed, Oxford-trained brain; a master in the realm of paradoxes; a former Marxist who would know only too well where to search for the vestiges of that misguided scientific discipline.

Of the more serious suggestions, six names tower above others, though it is still not known which of the putative candidates have actually decided to run in the election. They are listed below, in alphabetical order.

Bronislaw Geremek (58); university-educated; historian, expert on medieval France. Attempts to apply universally accepted moral principles in political practice, which—according to some—is a logical contradiction. If we were to put his vision of politics into practice, politics as such would become redundant and would undergo self-destruction. This constitutes a program of sorts. The professor is a brilliant speaker, with a somewhat sermonizing manner. When he addresses the Sejm, silence falls in the chamber. He is presentable; women find him attractive. Has the looks of a patriarch and runs his parliamentary club in a patriarchal manner, too. A strong personality, with a barely perceptible weak side.

Ewa Letowska (—), university-educated; lawyer; fanatical defender of civil rights—that is, the right to abode, money, and a comfortable frame of mind. Does not like politics, especially when it interferes with the law. Has many adversaries, whose ranks swell with each case that she fails to win for them. Defends representatives of the former nomenklatura and former landowners, which can make her seem insufferable. Very hardworking and conscientious; for the time being, she can only put forward suggestions and issue threats; perhaps she would like to rule, but you need politics to rule. She looks like a pleasant but exacting university professor whose students must work very hard at their subjects to pass examinations before her. She has a dynamic and at the same time feminine personality.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki (63); university-educated; lawyer; journalist; premier. A man of deep religious faith, but tolerant with it. Formerly (1961-71) Sejm deputy; however, he could stand up for his principles when necessary, which lost him his Sejm seat. An advocate of cautious action; nevertheless, he seems to be capable of very firm resolve (in government circles, he is sometimes nicknamed "Kutuzov" [reference to Russian military commander and innovative strategist instrumental in defeat of Turkish Army in 1811 and of Napoleon's forces in 1812-1813]). He still remains a somewhat mysterious figure. Whenever he asks you for something you instinctively want to meet his request so as not to disappoint his hopes. He gives the impression of achieving many things only through a last, desperate dip for the finishing tape. You can trust him with any difficult case and rest assured that he will sort it out to the best of his ability. A poet's face (to quote Tadeusz Kantor), with a somewhat weary look.

Krzysztof Skubiszewski (64); university-educated; specializes in international law. A summary of his academic career contains so many names of cities and universities and titles of publications which are extremely hard to pronounce that it automatically commands high respect. He appears to be politically indifferent, which is a typical virtue of every truly thoroughbred diplomat. His acceptance of the ministerial portfolio constituted a compromise; at the same time, the professor showed considerable adroitness in keeping one of the sides of that compromise on tenterhooks for a longish time. He looks like a survivor. For the time being, he is engaged in the difficult art of confronting university-bred theories with practice—the latter largely German. Marital status: bachelor. This leaves him plenty of time to devote to public office duties.

Andrzej Stelmachowski (65); university-educated (law degree); expert on civil and agrarian law. Mild-mannered, though recently he has increasingly often revealed signs of his discreet but steady resolve in the Sejm forum. Stelmachowski's students have already had plenty of occasions to become acquainted with this trait of their professor's. Very throroughgoing, though not pedantic. Usually seeks compromise; however, he rejects certain kinds of compromise out of hand. Values common sense as a fundamental principle of all human activity, and here he clearly ranks politicians as humans. He certainly appears to be free of doctrinal prejudice. You can be certain that he will reject any absurdity and every intellectually dubious idea—unless they are clearly to the state's advantage.

Lech Walesa (47); vocationally trained; electrician. Repeatedly overestimated in matters of no consequence and underestimated in one significant aspect: that of power, which constitutes a fundamental political category. He places his aides in the firing line and marches on. Cynical and sincere at the same time. Brilliant public speaker with deplorable Polish. Skilled in playing his weaknesses to advantage: He knows how to infuriate people initially and then force them to support his ideas. What he says frequently lacks cohesion, but it nevertheless has its own, intrinsic logic. It is essentially battlefield logic. He does not like to be a loser: This is why he tends to be unpredictable whenever things do not go according to his plans.

The above is a review of the current list of possible candidates. It would be futile to ask for their qualifications, because presidency is an office rather than a profession. You do not need to pass an examination to become a president, whereas you do to become a trial lawyer. As you proceed higher and higher up the career ladder, the significance of your formal qualifications decreases while that of your contacts and influence increases. The presidential chair is placed somewhere at the intersection of these two aspects.

It is worth stressing one thing here: We are not in a position of having no worthy candidates to choose from. We should not allow ourselves to develop complexes. It would be advisable to give up our traditional Polish practice of running ourselves down as parochial and un-European. Reagan was an actor; De Gaulle was a soldier; Havel is a writer. The important thing is to ensure that the election contest takes a reasonably decorous course and that the new president does not provoke the feeling of hatred among those who did not vote for him. We must learn to defend and protect our new head of state. We will share in his wisdom and his mistakes.

Let us not delude ourselves that people in other countries will respect our president if we do not respect him ourselves—that is, unless we elect a monarch and guarantee to give him the obligatory tokens of our loyalty and esteem. The problem lies in deciding which royal dynasty we should revive for this purpose.

PAP Gives Presidential Campaign Update 30 Oct

LD3110015790 Warsaw PAP in English 2152 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 30—The campaign staff of Lech Walesa have named at least twenty-two social organizations, political parties and groupings which have officially declared their support for Walesa as president. Parties which earlier had their own candidates also declared their support for the Solidarity leader. They are the Union for Real Politics [UPR] and the Polish Green Party [PPZ].

Today, Lech Walesa received the leadership of the Christian National Union and decided to appoint their representatives to a consultative council which would form later on a presidential council.

The campaign staff of Walesa told PAP that there had been cases of disturbing the presidential campaign, such as the destroying of campaign posters and warnings given to those participating in the campaign.

Cimoszewicz in Bydgoszcz

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz who is running for the Presidency, met today with members of the Social-Democracy and with youth. He said he would like to win the western capital through the liquidation of the bureaucratic system of agencies and artificial barriers in relations with foreign partners. He criticized the present foreign policy of Poland in that it lost the proper equilibrium in relations with both Eastern and Western neighbours.

Bartoszcze in Wielun

"The history offers us a challenge of unity in the name of constructing a new strong and democratic Poland. The nation must face this challenge," chairman of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] Roman Bartoszcze told a meeting in Wielun today while presenting his concept of the presidential office.

He came out in favour of family farms as a basis of the farming system, but said there were no barriers to creating conditions favouring large, market-oriented farms. "All should be subordinated to a market economy based on sound competition," he said.

Moczulski in Zyrardow

Another candidate for the Presidency, the leader of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN], Leszek Moczulski, told a meeting in Zyrardow that if he became Poland's president he would man the two key offices: of prime minister and his deputy, with a person who derives from the Solidarity movement and has its support, and with a representative of the peasant movement.

Michnik Editorial Denounces Walesa's Ambitions

AU3010134790 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27-28 Oct 90 pp 6, 7

[Adam Michnik editorial: "Why I Shall Not Be Voting for Walesa"]

[Excerpts] This commentary will contain my own personal views. I feel compelled to write these down for the benefit of all those people who still do not fully understand what has happened and write to me or phone me expressing their anxiety and solidarity. My first emotion is that of embarrassment. This "Solidarity" split is messy. Instead of an open debate around ideas we have murky insinuations and quarrels over symbols.

The conflict over the "Solidarity" logo has become one of the manifestations of a more fundamental process, namely, a conflict over the future shape of Polish political life, its political culture, and Poland's future. It is not a matter of details, but of principles. That is why the "Solidarity" split was unavoidable. It began with the battle over the "Solidarity" logo and has ended up with the transformation of union structures into an electoral machine for Lech Walesa. It is hard to go over these events without feeling some bitterness.

For those people who for 10 years remained faithful to the "Solidarity" symbol, the symbol has great emotional value and that is why it so difficult to part with it now. [passage omitted]

This symbol has been distorted into an instrument of blackmail and censorship by the majority of the people who now sit on "Solidarity's" National Commission. Every newspaper that is allowed to carry this logo in its masthead has been made aware of the sort of articles they should not publish. That is why I welcomed the decision of my editorial colleagues at GAZETA WYBORCZA to drop the words: "There is no freedom without 'Solidarity'." I cannot feel any solidarity with people who want to transform this symbol of freedom and hope into a sign of conformity and suppression.

The declaration of "Solidarity's" National Commission says what is really behind all this, namely, criticism of Lech Walesa.

I am not sure that I know all the people who sit on this commission, but I pity them. Their lack of reasoning and their small stature obstruct them from seeing that they are in fact demeaning themselves. I congratulate Lech on such supporters. He fully deserves them in his fight for the Presidency.

At the preelection rally at the "Warszawa" Steelworks, he finally crystallized his thinking. Asked what he would do with the newspapers that were critical of him, he replied: "Let those people build up the circulation of these newspapers, and afterwards I will hand these papers over to you." His press spokesman was more precise: "Yes, democracy will take it all back, because the free elections will highlight new political forces.

These forces will want their own press organs and they will be faced by the choice, either to create them from nothing, or to take over the organs of those who have lost politically."

I never thought that I would hear Walesa or his press spokesman give such a concise definition of Bolshevik thinking. [passage omitted]

I have a lot of understanding for Walesa. I like his type of humor, admire his intuition and dexterity, and I fully realize what a significant role he played in the fight with the Communist system. That is why I am saddened to see the way the "Solidarity" leader, the Nobel prize winner, is wasting Poland's unrepeatable opportunity, how he is destroying his own image and is doing Poland's cause irreparable harm internationally. It pains me to watch Walesa's evolution from the symbol of Polish democracy to its grotesque caricature. The decision to deprive GAZETA WYBORCZA of the right to carry the "Solidarity" logo was a taste of what will happen to Polish democracy if these people are successful in their bid for power. It is also a good indication of how Walesa himself sees democracy. [passage omitted]

As chairman of "Solidarity," Walesa has not formulated one single program for the union enabling it to function in difficult times. Throughout the last twelve months, we have not heard a single word about what the union's tasks are in a period of transition to a market economy, how it is to defend the interests of the workers, or how to cope with unemployment.

Instead, we have been hearing to the point of nausea is that "Solidarity" has to split. Now "Solidarity" has indeed split, because of Walesa. He has removed all those people who were able to compete with him and bar his way. He found it expedient to publicly label them "highbrows" and "Jews."

I can understand Walesa. His ambitions have not been satisfied. Twice, he declined to compete for a place in the political institutions of the state. He chose not to stand for either of the two legislative chambers of parliament. He did not reach out for the prime ministerial portfolio. On each occasion he was—in my view—guided by the same motive, namely, his concept of his own specific place in public life. Walesa's political ideal is: Full powers, but absolutely no responsibility. That is how he sees the position of the president. The president is there to rule and the prime minister, the ministers, and all the others, are there to take the blame.

Walesa will not be the president of a democratic Poland. He might lose the presidential elections. Listening to his boastful statements, one is led to believe that the "Solidarity" leader has nothing else to offer except himself and a torrent of conflicting promises. How is one to reconcile the promise of "a fair sharing out of Poland's poverty" with the calls to "accelerate privatization?" How will he eliminate unemployment by unleashing the mechanisms of a free market? How seriously should one take his promise to distribute millions of zlotys. Walesa may succeed in the elections, but even then he will not be a president of a democratic Poland, but a factor that destabilizes the political system, introducing chaos and isolating Poland from the rest of the world. Walesa has said: "I am not a supporter of the classic concepts of the Presidency, be it the French, Italian, or U.S. model. I will do it differently. I want to surprise everyone. My model is not to wine and dine, but a Flying Dutchman who will tour round the country, interfering everywhere where I deem it necessary. There will be too much Walesa and that is why people are afraid." [passage omitted]

Walesa possesses qualities which allowed him to be the leader of a multi-million member union, but these same qualities disqualify him from being a president of a democratic country. Walesa is unpredictable, irresponsible, and incorrigible. And finally, he is incompetent.

Unpredictability was a great asset in the fight against communism. In the democratic structures of a modern state it will be a disaster. Irresponsibility was a product of the situation where one had to act in opposition and clandestinely. If you have no influence on the state, you do not take any responsibility for the state. Walesa does not know how to learn from his mistakes, because he remains deeply convinced that he does not make any. Finally, Walesa makes statements about the economy and international affairs. His glaring incompetence is frightening and dumbfounding. It is not just the Poles who are taken aback, he has the same effect on his foreign interlocutors.

There was a time when Walesa was the symbol of Poland and the whole world. I can still see him in the U.S. Congress receiving the ovation of both chambers to the leader of "Solidarity." He had just given a masterful speech, an exalted example of the Polish desire for freedom. Subsequently, in the space of a few months his own statements proceeded to destroy this image.

Personal qualities of leaders are their private domain. Lech Walesa always had a large dose of egoism and we managed to live with this fact. Now, the situation has changed fundamentally.

Walesa always reasoned that what was good for him personally, was also good for Poland. For long time I thought so too, and I think that in essence this was correct. Today, things are different. In his drive to be president, Walesa is doing untold damage to Poland. Thanks to Walesa, we are witnessing the increase of a new and brutal tone in our political language. Walesa cries: "This is a scandal! I say that this government will have to answer for the destroyed documentation, for helping the communists get rich, and for the theft of Polish property. It must be brought to justice and it will be. It has not fulfilled its duties."

This is language that acts like a magnate for all those who are frustrated, driven by personal ambition and desire for power. This language assumes a patronizing and superior tone of voice against everyone who is critical of

Walesa. He promises his followers that he will "clean up Warsaw." He promises them that he will be their springboard to spectacular careers. He is already distributing the ministerial portfolios and continues to make promises and more promises.... He promising everything to everyone. That is, after all, the sense of the words "personal revolution."

I want to say quite emphatically and on the basis of good personal knowledge of the man, that Lech Walesa was never a populist or had any anti-Semitic tendencies. He regarded one and the other as pure nonsense. Nevertheless, mouthing stupidities about the "highbrows" and dividing people into racial categories of Jews and non-Jews, he has played into the hands of those people who display anti-intelligentsia and populist tendencies and carry anti-Semitic phobias. These people will now throw their support behind Walesa in his bid for the Presidency.

Walesa has said: "I am a pure Pole, born in Poland." This implies that there are "impure" Poles, who were born elsewhere.

Walesa has refuted the critical views aired in the Western press by saying that "the hands of some people reach very far indeed."

Where in the past have I heard such terminology of obsession and innuendo?

Walesa says: "As a Nobel prize winner I would like to help secure greater compromises in Latin America and Africa." I would gladly hear more concrete details on this subject. [passage omitted]

Observers from Western Europe and America are watching post-communist Europe with anticipation. Their initial euphoria has given way to anxiety. Where are these countries heading for? Are they really returning to Europe, or are they regressing to the old system of populist dictators, tribal conflicts, and permanent instability? This is precisely where Walesa has damaged the Polish cause. He has created the picture of a country of instability, a country pulled apart by raging conflicts. [passage omitted]

I thought long and hard about whether I should write this commentary. I must be prepared for the fact that I may be misunderstood and people will accuse me of the most squalid intentions.

But I have the feeling that I cannot remain quiet any longer. My readers may say that I am wrong, but I must be sure that I have written everything that my honest thinking has dictated I should write down. This is why I think that Walesa as president might be a catastrophe for Poland. The whole thing could turn into the first example of a Peronist-type regime in Central Europe. All that will remain of the great ideal of national rebirth will be a tattered flag sacrificed on the altar of the "Solidarity" leader's personal ambition. If I remain silent and not sound my warning, I shall have the feeling of participating in a great lie dictated by reasons of personal convenience.

I am not accusing Walesa of bad faith. I blame him for his total lack of imagination and knowledge of what a rule-of-law democratic state is all about. The way Walesa conducts himself politically—a force during the strikes and clandestine actions—has become a dangerous trap now that we are constructing the institutions of our democratic order. The same behavioral traits that led to the destabilization of the totalitarian order will now inexorably lead to the destruction of the political culture of our fragile democracy. The charismatic leader will begin to eliminate all independent movements until he breaks the back of the fragile Polish democratic system.

We must listen very carefully to what the "Solidarity" chairman is saying today. We have to listen to his promises and threats, because, contrary to what he may believe he is saying, he is clearly promising to flaunt the laws and democratic procedures, to revenge himself on political adversaries, to deliver amateur solutions, and install incompetent people to govern over us. I think television should transmit every public declaration he makes several times over and without any editing. Everyone has to be certain what they are voting for in these presidential elections so that later they cannot turn round and plead ignorance.

Lech Walesa is a politician with a great gift for setting people at each others throats. For this reason he is very dangerous. His former great achievements are turning themselves into their direct antitheses. In this form they will prove to be a curse on Poland. That is why I shall not be casting my vote for Lech Walesa.

The appropriation of the "Solidarity" logo by Walesa is a warning signal. It signals the end of "Solidarity." "Solidarity" was the most important thing in my life and I believed that the road to an independent Poland led through "Solidarity." I often asked myself: What kind of Poland is this free Poland to be? Last November I wrote: "A Poland that is self-governing, tolerant, multicolored, based on Christian values, socially fair, friendly to its neighbors, namely, a Poland capable of compromise, restraint, realism, and loyal partnership. A Poland incapable of slavery and spiritual submission. A Poland impossible to subjugate spiritually. A Poland full of the normal strife of a modern society, but imbued with the principles of 'Solidarity.' A Poland where the intellectuals will defend the workers, and workers' strikes will call for more cultural freedom. A Poland that speaks about itself with pathos and at the same time with self ridicule. A Poland that so many times before been overwhelmed, but never conquered, so many times routed, but never vanquished. A Poland that today is regaining its own identity, its own language, its own face...."

I believed that "Solidarity" even with all its internal differences, would be able to maintain unity in the name of all that is universal and important. Today, I have the feeling of bitter defeat.

The "Solidarity" ideal is already at death's door. The person responsible for this is Lech Walesa. I shall remain a man of "Solidarity" for as long as I live. But today I am putting away the "Solidarity" name and logo along with my other most prized possessions along with the various court sentences and the books I wrote in prison. I will not deny that I feel numbed. I do not want to, and never wanted, to use the symbol that today stands for power and force as a crutch. I wore the logo during the times when all it ever brought me were prison sentences, I will not wear it now when all it now stands for is privilege. I feel that this is a time of trial for me. We shall soon see what each of us is really worth without the logo.

Committee Rejects Call for Parliament To Dissolve

LD2810003590 Warsaw PAP in English 2011 GMT 27 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 27—The debates of the Citizens Committee at Lech Walesa were held here today and the debaters rejected a draft resolution calling on parliament to swiftly dissolve itself.

Neither did they accept a proposal that the entire committee should support Walesa in presidential elections as a move incompatible with the candidate's intentions and improper because Tadeusz Mazowiecki remains a member of the committee.

On the other hand, the debaters adopted a resolution protesting against the Sejm deputies' draft according to which only half of the future Sejm would come from free elections.

The debaters deemed it necessary to possibly swiftly turn the committee for radio and TV from a government agency into a public institution.

The committee asked proper state authorities to take steps to explain problems of illegally depriving Poles living in the present Soviet borders of their Polish citizenship.

Neither Walesa, who met the electorate today, nor Zdzislaw Najder, who left for Washington, took part in the debates.

"Today, we build the foundations for the system of future republic which must be independent, democratic, respecting the most valuable national traditions and looking to the future and to Europe," Walesa stressed in a letter to members of the committee.

The Solidarity chairman regretted that many of these who disagreed with him had left the committee over the past few months.

The committee is to be a broad pluralistic representation of political forces coming from the independence movement and democratic opposition, particularly from its Solidarity current. The committee is to formulate postulates to be addressed to the government, state institutions and public opinion, say the rules of the committee.

The Presidium of the committee was elected, with Zdzislaw Najder becoming its chairman.

The debaters devoted most time to discussing the state of the economy. A new president will face the necessity to take firm antirecession steps and to accelerate the privatization process. He should also clearly declare that Poland cannot any longer repay its debt that increases only because of adding interest, Stefan Kurowski said.

The next meeting of the committee is to be held on December 1.

Council of Ministers Approves Plan on Press

LD3010130190 Warsaw PAP in English 1033 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 30—The Council of Ministers approved late last night the plan for administration of the property of the RSW publishing concern worked out by the liquidating commission.

The law on RSW liquidation obliges the commisison to both liquidate the concern and work out foundations for a modern, pluralistic press market. Serious dangers connected with transformations proposed by the former RSW units have emerged on the road towards this goal, the main danger being the dispersion of press market.

The Council of Ministers deemed it necessary to counteract these threats while launching the process of ownership, economic and organizational changes in the concern.

Five assumptions were adopted with a view to realization of this task, including:

—formation of strong publishing offices and press groups,

—large privatization of the RSW property,

—introduction of foreign publishers and investors to the Polish market while maintaining control over central and most important local dailies by the Polish side,

—protection of the titles economically weak but important for the Polish culture,

—formation of a democratic order of the press.

The Council of Ministers resolved to auction 119 newspapers and publishing houses while 69 titles are to be conveyed to journalists' cooperatives.

Council of Ministers Approves Rural Strategy

LD3010171190 Warsaw PAP in English 1138 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 30—The Council of Ministers approved late last night fundamental assumptions for a rural policy.

Agriculture Minister Janusz Bylinski told PAP that this was a genuine political declaration of goals to be realized in the rural policy within the coming 10 years.

The plan is acceptable to the World Bank as it is compatible with the assessments of its experts, hence extra means for the development of Polish agriculture may be obtained, Bylinski stated.

The assumptions underline that the development of farming is a chance for the whole Polish economy, Especially in regard to food self-sufficiency, exports, greater economic effectiveness of agriculture.

The plan is in tune with market rules although some state intervention into food economy has been provided for. The document also assumes the demonopolization, decentralization and privatization of the farming surroundings, especially of cooperatives and processing plants such as sugar mills, meat factories, fruit and vegetable processing plants and state grain mills, Minister Bylinski said.

Polish Socialists Elect Chair, Executive Bodies

LD2910225490 Warsaw PAP in English 2131 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 29—Jan Jozef Lipski was elected chairman of the Main Council of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) at its meeting here today.

Stanislaw Wasik and Adam Bobryk were elected vice chairmen and Wladyslaw Dobrzanski the council's secretary. Next, the meeting appointed a 17-strong Central Executive Committee and appointed Piotr Ikonowicz as editor in chief of ROBOTNIK (WORKER) newspaper.

Also today, the Central Executive Committee elected Wlodzimierz Olejnik its chairman.

Socialist Party Resolution Denounces PZPR

LD2910111590 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1830 GMT 28 Oct 90

[Text] The activity of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] was aimed against the Polish state and the Polish nation—that is why any kind of cooperation with post-communist structures is imposible, states the resolution of the 15th Congress of the Polish Socialist Party.

[Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish at 2300 GMT on 28 October adds in a similar report: "Delegates to the 25th Polish Socialist Party Congress adopted the electoral law that envisages, among other things, that the party's Supreme Council will include 50 members. Several of those people will be elected to the Central Executive Committee."]

Border Talks With FRG Begin 30 Oct

LD3010045790 Warsaw PAP in English 1935 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 29—Polish-German two-day negotiations are beginning here on Tuesday, October 30, to hammer out the legal and political foundations of relations between both countries. The talks will deal with two issues: a draft treaty confirming the existing border between Poland and united Germany, and it will outline a pact on good-neighbourliness.

The Foreign Ministry told journalists today that the former pact, prepared by the Polish side as a complete draft, was sent to the German side on October 8 of this year. The draft takes into consideration the present stage of the Polish-German negotiations, the results of the "2 plus 4" conference in Paris last July, and the Moscow meeting of last September.

The adopted draft states that united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever and would never have any in future.

The pace on cooperation and good-neighborliness between Poland and united Germany has not reached the form of a complete draft and therefore the Warsaw meeting will discuss its general concept and the main points.

Talks End in 'Fiasco'

LD3010193890 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1830 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Czechoslovakia has not agreed to reinstate cross-border traffic with Poland. Two-day talks in Warsaw have ended in a fiasco. Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski has issued the following statement:

Poland demands that full implementation of the convention on cross-border traffic be reinstated by Czechoslovakia. Possible permits issued by Czechoslovakia for cross-border traffic, on the basis of single-entry permits on a much smaller scale than the convention itself, do not suit the duties ensuing from it. Merely from the point of view of human needs, the small scale of its application is better than none, although it is not in keeping with the convention. Full-scale cross-border traffic should be reinstated soon. Regardless of the considerable restrictions introduced by Czechoslovkia, Poland continuously implements the convention on cross-border traffic.

Experts Concentrate on Treaty

LD3110112490 Berlin ADN International Service in German 0847 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Excerpt] Warsaw (ADN)—The second day of the talks at the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw by German and Polish experts is concentrating on the envisaged treaty on cooperation and good-neighborliness. Jerzy Sulek, head of the Polish delegation, told the press today that they face a more difficult task than they did the previous day because, in contrast to the border treaty, there is as yet no draft for this one. A discussion is planned on the general political principles for the cooperation treaty and on its role in bilateral relations. There are also plans to talk about the treaty's structure and to establish the content of the main points. The precise text of the paragraphs will only be considered at future negotiations. [passage omitted]

Kozlowski Denies Polish Spies' Existence in U.S.

AU2910152490 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Oct 90 p 2

["K.G"-signed report: "No Polish Spies in the United States"]

[Text] Last week, the Krakow newspaper CZAS carried a two-part interview given to Irena Lasota by John Barron, one-time American intelligence officer, today considered to be one of the best known Sovietologists.

In the interview, devoted mainly to the KGB, Barron also mentions Poland and Polish intelligence.

"Regardless of what has happened in Poland, Polish intelligence still exists as an aid to the KGB in the United States," Barron told CZAS.

Leslaw Maleszka of GAZETA asked Interior Minister Krzysztof Kozlowski to comment.

"Everything Barron says about the present work of Polish intelligence and its connections with the KGB is journalistic make-believe or, to put it simply, downright lies," said the minister. He explained that the Polish intelligence network in the United States, cooperating with the KGB, has been completely disbanded.

Without ruling out the possibility that individual Polish intelligence men might have been hired by the Moscow network, as was the case with the GDR's Stasi [State Security Service], Kozlowski said: "The whole structure has been eliminated, and the agents have returned to Poland."

Kozlowski was of the opinion that CZAS' publication of the Barron interview, now of all times, is an election ploy.

Miners' Union Holds Congress, Elects Chairman

LD2910010390 Warsaw PAP in English 2052 GMT 28 Oct 90

[Text] Katowice, Oct. 28—The Miners Trade Union Federation (OPZZ) held its 2nd congress here on October 27-28. This largest union organization affiliating 320 factory union organizations was represented at the congress by 423 delegates who granted the vote of confidence to the stepping-down board, amended the federation's statute, and re-elected Rajmund Moric to the office of the organization's chairman (with 392 votes for).

In the adopted programmatic resolution the congress obligated the federation to protect the miners of the lower Silesian coal basin which is under liquidation, to speed up work on the mining industry collective contracts, and to support the OPZZ in its efforts to sign a welfare pact with the government. The congress also decided to support the organization of the "fraternal union" that would supervise miners' health care service. The delegates decided to ask the Polish president to veto the law on returning union property taken over under martial law.

OPZZ leader Alfred Miodowicz took part in the congress which was also attended by unionists from Czechoslovakia, France, the Soviet Union, and Hungary.

Parties Ask Gorbachev To Intervene in Moldavia

*AU3110100790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0825 GMT 31 Oct 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 31/10/1990—An alliance of four parties [as received], the Democratic and Christian Union, the Independent Christian and Democratic Party/the Maniu-Mihalache Line, united under "the Inter-Party Treaty for Romania's Rebirth in Democracy and Freedom", have issued a communique warning that the already explosive situation in the Republic of Moldova may deteriorate to the point of endangering the stability of peace and democracy in Europe.

The document appeals to the United Nations organization, and to all democratic countries to do their best not to jeopardize their efforts to build peace in democracy and freedom. It also calls upon President Mikhail Gorbachev to take action in order to end the deterioration of the climate in that republic.

Senate 'Welcomes' Supreme Soviet's Peace Appeal

*AU3010144590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1405 GMT 30 Oct 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/10/1990—In consideration of Romania's policy of peace, understanding and cooperation with all states and in support of the strengthening of the climate of security by achieving general and total disarmament, nuclear disarmament in the first place, Romania's Parliament welcomes with interest the initiative of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and expresses its belief that the intervention of the parliaments of the other countries and of the world public opinion will determine the states that conduct nuclear tests to take steps for a total and general halt to such tests and to conclude accords providing for a corresponding fulfilment of that desideratum, shows a message which Romania's Parliament adopted today.

Romania's Parliament considers that parliamentarians throughout the world have the lofty task to contribute to an understanding of the frame of mind of those who elected them, to the fulfilment of their wish to live in a peaceful world, without threats and of their aspirations after a more rapid resolution of this major imperative of our days, the message responding to the appeal launched by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR shows.

The Senate also discussed a note from the Foreign Policy Commission of the Romanian Parliament on the calling of a meeting of representatives of the foreign-policy commissions of the parliaments of the Balkan states, to be held in the first decade of December either in Bucharest or in another Balkan capital city. In this respect, the senators adopted the draft of a letter to be sent to the chairmen of the foreign-policy commissions of the parliaments of Balkan countries.

The Senate also started discussing a draft law on cumulated jobs, which regulates possibilities for a natural person to hold several jobs at the same time, in line with his professional training, and to be paid for each of his jobs.

Iliescu Receives Armenian Minority Leaders

*AU3010193590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1849 GMT 30 Oct 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/10/1990—In an interview with a delegation of the Union of Armenians of Romania President Ion Iliescu was presented on October 30 the current situation of the Armenian community in Romania and its specific problems.

Getting to know the still unsettled problems of the Armenian community, President Ion Iliescu assured the delegation of his full cooperativeness.

The members of the delegation stressed that the efforts of the Armenians in Romania, enjoying support and understanding, would be channeled primarily toward facilitating Romania's integration in the international cultural and economic current.

Iliescu Receives Former Austrian Vice Chancellor

*AU3010193390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1846 GMT 30 Oct 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/10/1990—Romania's President Ion Iliescu received on October 30 Hannes Androsch, president of the Androsch International Consulting, ex vice-chancellor of Austria, ex minister of finance.

They discussed possibilities of cooperation with the respective firm in managerial assistance as well as the optimal guarantee on engaging investments in Romania.

The proposal was received with interest by Romania's president.

Road Transport Unions Begin General Strike

Army Ensures Vital Transport

*AU3010192790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1847 GMT 30 Oct 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/10/1990—The Federation of Road Transport Unions, reads a communique of the Ministry of Resources and Industry, have started a general strike which has encompassed so far almost two thirds of the total workers in the respective sector.

The communique shows that the strike keeps spreading, as other units in the country join in. The strikers claim, among other things, the remedy of shortages in the material base (spare parts, batteries, tubes and tires, new buses), the revision of the goods transport tariffs, the pensioning after 30 years of service for men and 25 years of service for women, other social claims.

The strike, the communique shows, has serious consequences on the passenger transport which is completely stuck in some counties, and on the goods transport, telling on the activity of big economic units of national interest.

The strikers want an interview with the prime minister or a representative of the prime minister.

A decision of the Romanian Government authorises the Ministry of National Defence to run, upon request and against payment, without impairing the military units' operational schemes, transportation of food stuffs, raw materials and others, in strike-stricken areas.

Strikers' Claims Deemed 'Unjustified'

AU3010202490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1923 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/10/1990—The Press Office of the Government stresses in a release that the strike started on October 29 by the Federation of Road Transport Unions of Romania—STAR—is unjustified, since the claims of pay rise with drivers and other categories of employees, extra holidays for hard work, etc., were granted.

For further pay rises, holidays and lower age for pensioning also with other categories of employees, it was agreed together with the federation leadership the working out of a bill to stipulate the granting of like rights to the extent to which the monetary results of the commercial societies of transport allow for it.

The government, the release reads, is aware of the fact that the situation in transport is not an easy one, but the difficulties can only be increased by strikes that prevent the smooth operation also of other enterprises. The activity in transport should be reorganized by the principles of the market economy. Already in November, the current system of car units will be replaced by some 170 transport commercial companies. In future, the government will support in the domain of goods transport the formation of private commercial companies with a small number of vehicles, companies with only one truck even, that are readily adjustable to the market conditions.

As for the passenger transport, the government will keep supporting, through credits and other economic levers their activity, including imports to the extent to which the general monetary results and the balance of foreign payments will allow for it.

All these measures, meant to improve public transport in the country will be taken in the following weeks. The strikes and other actions conducive to the interruption of activity can only delay and render them less efficient, the government's release reads.

Cooperation Between Government, Parliament Viewed

AU3010154190 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 20 Oct 90 p 3

[Petru Clej article: "Danger of Delegating Competence"]

[Text] Prime Minister Petre Roman's report was received favorably by the majority of our political class (this being a translation of a French term which is very flattering for our politicians). Talking in front of a BBC microphone, some of the leaders of the opposition such as Messrs. Ion Ratiu, Radu Campeanu, and Dumitru Teaci expressed their pleasant surprise after the government report was read in Parliament. The only one who was reserved about it was Mr. Dinu Patriciu, who qualified this report as being "ambiguous."

It has become increasingly evident that the current government started reaching its real cruising speed in reform. Initiating measures aimed at liberalization of economy, the current leaders actually apply ideas which had been advanced by our paper as early as January. One can say, therefore, that the government has found a supporter in the paper ROMANIA LIBERA, as long as it consistently implements the policy of real and rapid transition to the market economy. Mr. Petre Roman, in his capacity as prime minister, made a visible qualitative jump compared to the preelectoral period. The prime minister is supported by the Vatasescu-Severin-Dijmanescu trio, who, together with Messrs. Andrei Plesu and Adrian Nastase seem to detach themselves from the platoon of the 23 cabinet members.

The prime minister asked for increased assistance to his government with a view to accelerating the implementation of necessary measures to assist the transition to market economy. Everyone understands this need, but—there is a "but," and not a small one—there is a risk. If Parliament cedes part of its legal duties to the government, not only does it violate the principle of the separation of powers, but there is also the risk of reaching a dictatorship of the executive power over the legal power. Certainly, one can always come up with the need to rapidly legalize certain projects issued by the government. In a democratic country such as France, the Parliament can empower the government to legislate through decrees or the government can impose the adoption of draft laws without discussions, taking responsibility for such actions in front of the National Assembly. In Romania, however, the memory of the old dictatorship is too fresh not to give way to suspicion.

Another aspect of the problem is the fact that some controversy between the government and Parliament has recently emerged; some projects contain certain less-than-precise statements made by the government. At the same time, the gap created between the executive power and the legal power also has a cause which emerges from the difference in quality existing between the government and Parliament, which is definitely in favor of the latter. The majority group, that of the National Salvation

Front [FSN], is not a homogeneous group at all, a fact which sometimes upsets the legal process. I even believe that the parliamentary group of the FSN in its current form is no longer viable. The leaders of the two chambers—especially that of the Senate—are not up to the very difficult tasks incumbent upon them.

The latest tendency is to concentrate political forces toward the center of the political spectrum. The FSN, therefore, should shake off the deadweight made up by the leftists and should reach a consensus with the opposition forces, which, after all, have been preaching the ideas that were taken over by the government: the National Liberal Party, the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania, the Ecologists, the Social Democratic Party, and the National Liberal Party-Young Wing. Then, why not have a coalition government?

Campeanu, Ratiu on Roman's Economic Program

AU2710193690 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Oct 90 p 7

[Interview with National Liberal Party leader Radu Campeanu and Ion Ratiu, leader of the National Peasants Christian Democratic Party, by Sorin Rosca-Stanescu; place and date not given: "'The Roman Report'—Dog's-Bane?"]

[Text]**Radu Campeanu: "A Liberal Program."**

[Stanescu] The prime minister responded in Parliament to your question. What can you tell us about the concept put forward by Mr. Petre Roman?

[Campeanu] We demand an acceleration of the reform. This is one of our criticisms against the government for the four-month delay so far. The history of the package of laws the prime minister talked about dates further back; we expected these laws a long time ago. The law on trade societies is quite late. We believe that the reform the prime minister mentioned is inevitable; however, there is a large gap between his declarations and his deeds. We are very curious to see what will be undertaken.

[Stanescu] Government representatives criticize the slow pace of the proceedings in the Deputies' Assembly and Senate.

[Campeanu] I find that this accusation is completely unfounded. No executive power in a democratic state may accuse the Parliament of such a thing. The Parliament is not a forum for the registration of laws. This should not be forgotten by anyone. The country's Parliament is a body which discusses and votes on some laws—positive laws—which are not formulated at random.

[Stanescu] Does the lack of a constitution not create additional difficulties in the adoption of some laws?

[Campeanu] Obviously it does. This, however, does not mean that the law on the ownership of lands should not have been formulated right at the beginning. In our view, this should have been the first law. Farmers ownership is at stake, as is everything that has to be done in this connection so that it functions properly. Prime Minister Roman should have solved this problem himself. It is not normal to leave the farmers in the state of chaos which prevails even to this very day. This is a great mistake. The statements made by the prime minister, however, now are heading in the right direction, only I doubt whether their application will proceed in the same direction. It is not my habit to practice systematic opposition, but I have noted that, for instance, in the case of the trade societies certain dispositions sneaked in, which are at odds with the spirit of the liberalization mentioned by the prime minister. Let me give two examples: Article 23, which creates a number of complications regarding the registration of these societies at the Tribunal. The initial draft provisions were prohibitive. The Parliament tried to reduce them, but it only partially succeeded in doing so; as far as the agency of control, supervision, and guidance of foreign societies is concerned, this is an economic aberration and a tactical error. An agency of clerks will not be able to guide investments and Romanian investors. It is a tactical error because it will do nothing but prevent foreign investors from investing in our country. The Romanian economy, however, will not make any headway without serious investments.

[Stanescu] The prime minister's report gave us the impression of being a liberal report.

[Campeanu] I have told the prime minister: "For the second time you are taking over our program." Indeed, it is a liberal report; however, once again, I want to say that it is one thing to affirm and put forward liberal principles and regulations and something else completely to apply them in a liberal spirit.

Ion Ratiu: "It is a Peasants Party Program."

[Stanescu] What is your opinion about the report presented by the prime minister to our country's Parliament?

[Ratiu] The greatest compliment for us is the fact that the ideas he put forward were copied. The final version of the Roman program is nothing but an extenuated version of what I said throughout the election campaign. If you recall, Mr. Iliescu spoke about a Swedish model, a Japanese one, or about a fantastic strategy to create a Romanian model. Mr. Campeanu spoke repeatedly about a gradual and liberal privatization carried out with great care. From the very beginning I said that we have to carry out a radical and profound reform throughout the Romanian economy. What has been proposed now is the same thing. From this point of view I am very satisfied. On the other hand, Mr. Roman ended his speech with a sentence which seems to me the most significant: He said that the apparatus of those in command has to be changed. This is perfectly true: "New concepts require new people." This is exactly what we need. Giving an impetus to individual initiative, unfettering and freeing the people's enterprising spirit is the keystone of the entire program and can yield positive results.

Iliescu's Regime Blamed for Nation's Collapse

AU3010184490 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 25 Oct 90 p 3

[E. Mihaescu article: "The Oriental Question"]

[Text] What is happening in and around Romania has become an international issue as of last winter, especially after 13-15 June. Even the most fervent supporters of the Iliescu regime had to reconsider their position and are still reconsidering it. There is no doubt that a regime which resorts to violence and to gross violations of the human rights, and which sentences its own people to starvation and to all kinds of privations, is hardly suited to promote true democracy, which offers everyone the chance for happiness and a dignified life.

Under Iliescu's regime, Romania is collapsing not only from within—by going through a complex crisis—but has become an international issue, a true problem for Europe. The Romanian citizens have become migratory, which poses several hardships to the Western governments faced with the need to resolve this phenomenon. Romania has also become an obsession for the European consciousness, due to its orphanages which resemble concentration camps; to its AIDS patients, pollution phenomena, and contagious illnesses; to its repressive organs which commit acts of violence on its citizens, and to its poverty which affects more than 20 million people. There is the danger of a social explosion without precedent in Romania in post-war Europe; there is also the danger of malnutrition and, with the departure of its young people, there is also the risk of our country becoming a country of old-age people. Unfortunately—this is yet another misfortune—all these phenomena are occurring at a fast pace, leaving deep traces, which we might never be able to resolve. All this is happening exactly to us, when, less than a year ago, we enjoyed the best situation of all former communist countries. Unfortunately, the regime that took over power last December managed the counter-performance of destroying everything, or almost everything....

Students Protest Draft Law on University Autonomy

AU3010150390 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 20 Oct 90 p 2

[Unsigned "Protest"]

[Text] In connection with the draft law on University Autonomy, issued by the Ministry of Education and Science, the Students' Independent National Union protests against the following:

1. Canceling of the veto rights of student representatives in faculty councils and in academic senates;
2. Limiting the number of students in faculty councils and in academic senates to 30 percent;
3. Subordinating the student organizations to the rectors of the higher education institutions;
4. Institutionalizing by law certain bodies set up in a democratic way (National Conference of Rectors and the Inter-University Senate).

We also express our indignation at the fact that this draft was issued without previous consultations with student organizations. This way of acting allows for concern through its consequences, if this practice continues.

Furthermore, we protest against the way in which the draft law has been worded in connection with trade unions, a law which, through its Article No. 2, permits students to organize in trade unions only with previous approval and after overcoming numerous obstacles.

FSN Calls on City Hall To Improve Supplies

AU3010174890 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 23 Oct 90 p 1

["Appeal" to Bucharest City Hall by Claudiu Iordache, first vice president of the National Salvation Front]

[Text] **Appeal**

An ever larger number of letters received at the headquarters of the National Salvation Front [FSN], as well as reality itself, prove that the problems related to ensuring a dignified life for the capital's citizens are not being appropriately resolved. The number of these problems is growing at an alarming rate, just on eve of the forthcoming winter, which will also mark the commemoration and anniversary of one year since the December revolution.

In spite of the fact that many municipal city halls such as Timisoara, Pitesti, and Tirgoviste, found adequate solutions which can correct the negative effects of the transition to the market economy, Bucharest Municipality is still unable to find—at the level of its sector city halls—the necessary resources for overcoming an increasingly unsatisfactory situation for its inhabitants. Commodity supplies are minimal, services have reached an unbearably low level, housing construction lags, and the urban aspect of the city is decaying at will. This situation cannot possibly continue.

The FSN Leading Collegium expresses its concern with these negative states of affairs and calls on the Bucharest City Hall and on the city halls of the capital's sectors to search for and find solutions which can change the unfavorable course of the exercise of its prerogatives!

There is a widespread feeling that too many administrative employees—far from doing their duty—are simply blocking the way to the light at the end of the tunnel of this crisis, which has become one of trust!

The FSN cannot stay indifferent toward these unfavorable developments and, in anticipation of imperious and immediate changes, it will try, through all the legal influence means available to it, to actively participate in improving the living standards of the Capital's inhabitants.

Claudiu Iordache, first vice president of the FSN Leading Collegium

PNT-cd Asks Government To Curb Fascist Signs

AU3010200690 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 24 Oct 90 p 1

["Communique" of National Peasants Christian Democratic Party]

[Text] The National Peasants Christian Democratic Party [PNT-cd] notes the revival of fascist tendencies in some of our country's press with inceasing concern.

By means of would-be patriotism, which is systematically carried beyond tolerable limits, this press has launched a campaign against minorities in Romania, which smacks of totalitarian nostalgia and fans reprehensible interethnic tension.

The PNT-cd wants the government to take firm action against these alarming developments, thus fulfilling the duty it has assumed toward both the Romanian democrats and foreign democratic governments and organizations.

Press Department of the National Peasants Christian Democratic Party.

PNL Protests TV Reference to PNL-Young Wing

AU3010193390 Bucharest VIITORUL in Romanian 25 Oct 90 p 1

[The National Liberal Party Press Bureau signed "Communique"]

[Text] Noting the fact that Romanian television more and more frequently broadcasts interpolations and speeches by representatives of the group that was excluded from the National Liberal Party [PNL], we express our protest against:

1. The PNL-Young Wing name being used for diversionist purposes and for giving the impression that the opinion of liberal young people within the PNL is expressed. On the basis of our information, the immediate purpose of this group is to weaken and disorganize the most powerful opposition party at a time when it has become clear to the broadest social categories that a liberal movement and the PNL policy are the only way to get out of the current crisis.

2. The systematic usage of a lie to give the impression that this group has a viable social basis and a large audience. Romanian Television and the press have spread remarks according to which 80 percent of the PNL members have joined this "wing" and recently it was said that they have set up organizations in all counties nationwide. Taking into account the fact that both these remarks are absolutely incorrect—a fact which, by now, has become known in all counties—we believe that, out of sheer professionalism, Romanian Television should carry out a minimal verification before its broadcasts.

3. We remind readers that, objectively examining the situation that has been created, the Arad and Timis PNL County Organizations have, several times, requested the expulsion from Parliament of the three deputies who represent that group, a fact which has not yet been achieved for reasons unknown to us and to the cause of the Romanian liberal movement.

The PNL Press Bureau

Television Broadcasts Program on Securitate

Newspaper Criticizes Program

AU3010200490 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 25 Oct 90 p 4

[Serban Popa article: "This Is Not Possible, Is It?—Our Daily Leninist Television in Competition With ROMANIA MARE; The Campaign for the Securitate's Rehabilition Has (Re)Started Openly"]

[Text] Yes, in spite of everything, it is possible. The supreme proof is the fact that a certain A. P. [Ceausescu "court" poet Adrian Paunescu]—one should not really waste any time about him, about who he was (and is), and about what he used to do (and still does)—appeared on the screen with a group of journalists discussing problems concerning the credibility (?) of the Romanian Securitate, while the journalists of the main opposition newspaper were not even invited to participate in the discussion. Then, how can Mr. Tugui [TV moderator] hope to be credible at all, when he defends—in the strictest meaning of the word—the Securitate, "at the request of the young people called up for service?"

Following, from beginning to end, this program put together by mayors, prefects, FSN [National Salvation Front] leaders, and officers (less so by active Securitate cadres), we are helped to understand, thanks to an avalanche of details, that:
1. The duties of the former Securitate troops were to guard the national wealth (the people's revolutionary conquests).
2. The Securitate troops participated in the revolution alongside the people.
3. The former Securitate troops—currently the Gendarmerie troops—continue to be indispensable for defending the national wealth (the Romanian people's revolutionary conquests).

What we cannot understand—because we are not told—is the following:

1. For whose benefit were the Securitate troops defending the national wealth and revolutionary conquests of the Romanian people?
2. On whose orders did the Securitate troops participate or failed to intervene last December?
3. For whose benefit are the former Securitate troops—the current Gendarmerie troops—defending the national wealth and revolutionary conquests of the Romanian people?

We, therefore, will try our hand at explaining all this, in the hope that it will be understood once and for all. This does not mean that we will not come back to this subject whenever we deem it necessary.

1. The Securitate troops did not guard the wealth of the Romanian people, but rather the wealth of the Romanian state, that was confiscated by the Communist Party, which in turn had been confiscated by the Ceausescu clan. They did not watch over Romania's independence, sovereignty, and integrity, as all these things disappeared with the country's occupation by communism, with the help of Russian tanks.

2. Because we have not yet learned—and the current president promises us that we will continue to be uninformed—the truth about the events of last December, we first have to know—to give the benefit of the doubt to broadcasts like those sponsored by Mr. Tugui—who was it and why he did not order the Securitate troops to open fire or why he allowed these troops to stay neutral in the conflict. If we admit (and it is difficult not to admit it, when the masterminds of the "Revolution" confess it themselves) that it was a coup d'etat, we have the explanation for the behavior of the Securitate troops, which were loyal to the coup's organizers.

3. With Nicolae Ceausescu's elimination, the power was taken over by the representatives of the communist nomenklatura, who, in turn, confiscated the state, which is the owner of the national wealth. That is why the former Securitate troops necessarily became the new Gendarmerie troops, with the same mission to fulfill, for the benefit of the same masters.

Under these circumstances, is it still necessary to draw attention to the gross manipulation to which public opinion is subjected?

Is it still necessary to remind the readers of similar provocations by Romanian Television, beginning with the appearance, on 5 January, of the two representatives of the Timis County, members of PCR [Romanian Communist Party], who, on the very day of Eduard Shevardnadze's visit, demanded the reactivation of the Communist Party?

Is it still necessary to ask in whose service is Romanian Television?

Is it still necessary to ask who stands to benefit from such broadcasts?

Is it still necessary to search for answers to the question: Who is destabilizing the country and why?

Is it still necessary to ask why the brave interviewees did not ask (as we are asking) the following question: If the Securitate did not shoot, if the Army did not shoot, and if the terrorists did not exist, then who caused over 2,000 victims?

Is it still necessary....

TV Trade Union Protests

AU3010200590 Bucharest ROMANIAN LIBERA in Romanian 25 Oct 90 p 3

["Protest" of Radio-Television Free Trade Union]

[Text] The Romanian Radio-Television Free Trade Union firmly protests the program: "The Truth About the Former Securitate Troops" broadcast on 22 October 1990 at 2115 [1915 GMT] on Channel I. We believe that broadcasting this program on the national television channel has caused great moral and professional harm to the workers of our institution.

We view an eventual continuation of the announced series—in the form of the first episode as produced by the Dacia Opinion Poll Office—as completely inopportune.

This program, which was broadcast during prime time, contributed to the deterioration of the national atmosphere, which is frail as it is. We request—as a necessity—that the full truth about the Securitate—an institution which terrorized the Romanian people for 45 years—be revealed by means of a thorough professional, explicit, and unambiguous investigation.

The Romanian Radio-Television Free Trade Union (The Professional Group for the Independence of Romanian Television joins this protest)

AZR Criticizes Decision To Cut TV Subsidies

AU3010175290 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 23 Oct 90 pp 1,7

[Unattributed report: "Statement by the Romanian Journalists' Association related to Romanian Radio and Television"]

[Text] The Romanian Journalists' Association [AZR] took note, with concern, of the latest government communique, according to which Romanian Radio and Television will no longer be subsidized by the government. The AZR also has many substantial complaints about the way the Television is run; about the way this important national institution is manipulated, from the inside and the outside, by the political power; and about the often biased selection of news for the viewers' consumption. That is why we unconditionally support all the honest editors of the Romanian Radio and Television (some of whom are AZR members) and the Free Trade Union led by Mr. Dumitru Iuga. At the same time, the AZR firmly condemns the recent government decision, considering it either hasty or a gross attempt at blackmail, aimed at further subordinating Romanian Radio and Television. Moreover, the AZR does not rule out the possibility of a large-scale diversionary move, aimed at turning the people's monetary funds away from the National Company for an Alternative Television "Continental," initiated by SOTI [the Society for an Independent Television]—a television station which will be entirely under the control of the civic society. We believe that this decision of the government exceeds its competence, because Parliament is the only body entitled to decide what part of the taxpayers' money should be allocated (until the application of market mechanisms) to the Romanian Radio and Television. In this respect, we await an urgent and unambiguous answer from the Senate and the Deputies' Assembly. Likewise, we expect Parliament to give an answer to the request made in the Deputies' Assembly to have Mr. Vartan Arachelian suspended from his position as director.

The AZR Leading Committee

Iliescu Receives 'Alfa' Union Cartel Delegation

AU3010193490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1842 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/10/1990—Continuing the dialogue he initiated on issues of national interest, with political forces, personalities or non-political organisations, Romania's President Ion Iliescu met Tuesday, October 30 a delegation of "Alfa" Union Cartel, grouping union federations in various economic branches: electronics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, mining, oil engineering, petrochemistry, metal-working, steel-working.

Issues were approached concerning Romania's social-economic life, certain difficulties facing production, and the mechanisms of as rapid a passage as possible to the market economy, stress being laid on efficient social security measures. As for the forthcoming prices liberalization, it was pointed out that urgent measures were needed for diminishing the negative effects of high price rises. It was also said that the measures envisaged should be better known, and the role was pinpointed incumbent on mass media in this respect.

* Front Official Comments on Rumored Dissension

91BA0034A Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian 5 Oct 90 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Claudiu Iordache, first vice chairman of the National Salvation Front, by Radu Adrian; place and date not given]

[Text] [Adrian] Esteemed Mr. Claudiu Iordache, I suggest we begin our interview with a self-introduction.

[Iordache] As far as readers' interest goes, my biography begins on 20 December 1989 when, together with all the people of Timisoara, I became involved in the revolutionary movement. I was a member of the first steering committee at the Opera. Later I became vice chairman of this committee under the leadership of Lorin Fortuna. At the same time, I was one of the founding members of the Democratic Romanian Front [DRF]. When the NSF [National Salvation Front] was formed I became chairman of the front's [Timis] County organization, and at the national conference I was elected deputy chairman of the NSF Steering Collegium. At the 20 May elections I was elected deputy for Timis, and in the Chamber of Deputies I was designated vice chairman of the Commission for Culture and Mass-Media. And finally, a while ago I was elected first deputy chairman of the NSF and coordinator of the preparations for the Front's national convention.

[Adrian] What is the present mood in the NSF?

[Iordache] After an almost unbearable period of waiting, I think that at present the Front has the energy resources to initiate new actions apt to impart it the vigor that the electorate has long been expecting. The current inertia was due, among other things, to the fact that the Front is a political movement that was forced by circumstances to produce the largest contingent of personalities for the parliament, government, and administration. Those personalities had to be replaced, and this is the process that is now underway.

[Adrian] What is the solution for this shortage of cadres?

[Iordache] The main NSF organizations are increasingly leaning toward the option of opening up the county steering collegiums to groups of intellectuals called upon to participate in studies, analyses, and conclusions concerning the prevailing socioeconomic realities.

[Adrian] What is the composition of the current Front grassroots?

[Iordache] We asked the county collegiums to apprise us of their organizational resources and to let us have lists of the movement members. Preliminary data show that important categories (our social friends) are made up of workers, peasants, wage-earners, and a large number of technocrats.

[Adrian] Is it true that the old nomenklatura infiltrated the leadership of the NSF organizations?

[Iordache] If you are referring to the less well known members of the numenklatura, we can state that some of them tried but failed to penetrate the administrative structures of some counties. The NSF denies such situations and is acting, to the extent possible, to foil infiltrations.

[Adrian] Some newspapers carried reports of conflicts between the NSF leadership and local bodies—prefects' offices and city halls. Any truth in them?

[Iordache] I would say that this is the effect of the confusion resulting from an unnatural perception of duties. There can be no direct relations between the administration and the party. The NSF communicates with the administration through its government. It can be stated that the situation has greatly improved lately.

[Adrian] In a recent interview, Mr. Silviu Brucan accused the Front of lacking an ideology. Does the Front have an ideology, or does it not?

[Iordache] Mr. Brucan's accusations are less important to us than the issues under discussion. The NSF's initial platform was intended to carry the aspirations of all the social categories of the electorate. Now, however, when we are preparing a much more precise outline of our political movement as a national center-left movement with a social-democratic origin, we will identify with those categories whom we shall represent and for whom we must secure specific protection for the transition period. By the time of the national conference we will undoubtedly have a much improved ideology.

[Adrian] Do you intend changing its present name?

[Iordache] Many Front members have raised the question of adjusting the front's name to the new situation with which it is contending. Some of the names suggested were: Romanian Social-Democratic Union and National Center-Left Movement. A decision will of course be made at the national conference by a majority vote.

[Adrian] Foreign and even local newspapers have been talking about an alleged rift within the Front. There was even talk of a young wing reportedly in favor of a more radical policy, and a more traditional wing. What is the reality?

[Iordache] I can authoritatively tell you that there has been no rift, but a more explicit steering in support of the reform. Judging by immediate criteria, it was not the young wing, but the good wing that has taken the initiative in the NSF, the wing that wants to build a social-democratic political movement apt to provide appropriate social protection along with the reform.

[Adrian] Is this the prelude to the emergence of currents within the Front?

[Iordache] We have calmly surveyed the question of the emergence of currents in our political movement. At the last meeting of the Steering Committee we even agreed to accept several concepts concerning the drafting of the movement's political platform. This does not necessarily imply a rift, but a correction to accommodate diversity in the search for the best solutions.

[Adrian] What are the Front's relations with the other political parties?

[Iordache] I would like to refer to the kind of relations that the Front will develop: relations across the board and along all the lines of communication based on the consideration that the Front does not have adversaries in the Romanian political life, only groups with options different from its own. Consequently, we have widely opened the door to cooperation with the other groups.

[Adrian] Have you coordinated your actions with other political groups in Parliament?

[Iordache] We had to ensure our cohesive majority in both chambers, and that absorbed much of our efforts. We believe that there too, in the parliamentary arena, we must try a new approach to dialogue and coordination, which are actually indispensable, with representatives of other parties.

[Adrian] What are the Front's major concerns in the social area?

[Iordache] We are interested in all the issues that currently affect our society. Not experiencing any sense of original guilt, the NSF sees no reason not to touch base with these social realities. Consequently, we will intensify our presence in social life, discharging in its entirety the role incumbent on us from our position as a government party.

[Adrian] What is new in your relations with the trade unions?

[Iordache] The trade union movement is currently going through its own problems and confusions. That is precisely why we hope that it will gain a more authorized and authoritative structure. Similarly, we believe that the trade union movement must have its own options concerning the reform, considering that the reform is inevitable and that it must be either supported or opposed. As far as we are concerned, we are open to cooperation with the entire trade union movement, without discrimination, in the national interest. We think that the policy aimed at turning the trade union movement into a force hostile to the current government and at preventing the reform is an irresponsible policy.

[Adrian] Are you optimistic about NSF's future?

[Iordache] I am neither skeptical, nor pessimistic, nor optimistic. But I am convinced that the NSF will become what we want it to become: a political movement left of the liberal milestone, capable of offering, aside from its generic differentiation, the social protection required to correct the social effects of the reform.

* FSN Plan Endangers Other Parties

91BA0034B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 9 Oct 90 pp 1, 7

[Soric Rosca-Stanescu article: "Danger to the Parties"]

[Text] Hark, history is repeating itself. In 1946 the Communist Party was taken out of moth balls and marched out, under the protection of Katyshas, to achieve its first disguise through a lightening blow below the belt. Alternating blackmail and promises, the stick and the carrot, a few hundred extremists caught the most vulnerable (but also the most numerous, one million members) historical party at a bad time. A traitorous wing of social democrats was formed; it ceded, and the Romanian Workers Party [PMR] was soon established. After swallowing the social democrats at leisure, the PMR once again became the RCP [Romanian Communist Party]. Like every extremist movement, the kominternists had few active members, and even fewer among them bore Romanian names. They had no credibility. They had no mass support. Sooner or later, in order to gain legitimacy, any extremist organization attempts a shift to the center—pro forma and for exclusively tactical reasons—by displacing the nearest political group. In 1946 the RCP's first victim was the PSD (Social Democratic Party). The resistance put up by the wing led by Titel Petrescu and Adrian Dimitriu did not count for much. In 1848 the persecutions began. The few survivors were pursued by the Securitate until and including 1989, the year when Colonel Crainiceanu and Major Georgescu "took care" of the social democrats. Where are you today, gentlemen? Even the treason of some of the social democrats did not mean anything; when the PMR became powerful enough through the perpetration of mass deceit, the former social democrat activists were cast overboard; some of them ended up in the same cells as the earlier ones who had refused to compromise.

In 1989 the Communist Party disappeared from the political arena; the most hardened among its activists rallied around the FSN [National Salvation Front]. From the very beginning the second rank of the FSN (the one in the shadow) was appropriated by the old coauthors of the extreme left dictatorship. They had (and continue to have) prominent representatives among the first rank. The place of the Soviet tanks was now taken by the television and the first FSN publications; the citizens were systematically disinformed, and soon a third rank was formed. Bythe spring of 1990 the FSN had a large power base, and it won the 20 May elections. Paradoxically, however, it did not manage to secure a fixed position in the political arena. The models of Romanian communism became intermingled with those of Soviet communism, as well as with social democratic or liberal models in quasi-total confusion. The first internal struggles for power took place. The first to be removed from the top was Silviu Brucan, once the theory of the "society without a party" collapsed (a Utopia in which the FSN represented all the trends and which gained ground for a while); then came N.S. Dumitru, when the "link" to Moscow became even more ineffective and bothersome to the Kremlin. Mr. Claudiu Iordache took over as FSN ideologue—the first man at the top of that party with clean hands. That was a decisive moment. The profound political, economic, social, and moral crisis in which the country plunged led to a vertiginous drop in the FSN's mass support. Once again thrown into disarray, this time by the reality, the third rank began to unravel. The power of the day increasingly resembled the battle ground between a conservative wing, hardened by dogmas and clan interests and wishing to restore communism and its privileges, and a reform wing. In its turn, the reform wing was made up of both honest men and opportunists thirsty for power. Mr. Claudiu Iordache was neither a communist nor an opportunist. He was merely an intelligent man who tried to reshape the FSN. He was merely a man who committed a grievous mistake. The only possible life buoy was to secure some political space. Under internal and external pressure and in order to not end up self-destruceting, the FSN had to move toward the center. However, the center-left position was taken by the Romanian Social Democratic Party [PSD] which, only a few months ago, the Front tried to discredit as a historical party.

History is repeating itself. According to the same scenarios but adapted to the present, a more or less insidious, more or less violent attack was launched against the PSD. Someone happened to "have something" on several of its leaders. According to documents drafted by the FSN Steering Collegium that we briefly presented in the first part of our series, it is quite clear that the FSN intends to change its name into the Social Democratic Union (the union being achieved by swallowing other parties of social democratic tendency: increased attraction for left-wing intellectuals). How is this objective to be attained by December, when the National FSN Convention is scheduled? Legally, only thus: have a conference or congress of the PSD, at which its members decide, as per statute, either to simply dissolve the party to make political room for the FSN, or to join the FSN and have the name changed. If it is to be done legally, then the PSD members must be informed by that date. Something at least should be brought to the informaiton of the party's collective leadership. Has anything transpired? Are they aware of the fact that on Monday 1 October between 1000-1300 at the Onesti St. offices of the PSD, a secret meeting was held between Messrs. Claudiu Iordache, Scortan, and Sincai on behalf of the FSN, and Sergiu Cunescu and Traian Novac (the latter is a friend of Mr. Iordache's and head of the PSD organization of Timisoara) on behalf of the PSD? No. Because Mr. Cunescu banned other participants from among his party's leadership from the talks. Was treason plotted? Is the 1946 history repeating itself? What is clear is that the PSD supporters must urgently find out what the party chairman agreed with the FSN in such great secrecy. There is also an illegal formula, whereby the FSN can pro forma change its political coloring; a decision taken under pressure or for promises by part of the PSD leadership. Overnight the PSD members may wake up without a party, as members of the FSN. This is an "original" power struggle. But other parties with social-democratic tendencies may find themselves in the same position. The "demarches" are progressing full steam ahead, at a heightened speed prompted by the disclosures in ROMANIA LIBERA. The groundwork has been laid in the psychological arena, too, with the same speed, through an outpour of interviews given by Mr. Claudiu Iordache for various progovernmental publications. The latest appeared in LIBERTATEA of Friday. We want to ask you for an interview, too, Mr. Iordache. The FSN "data banks" and "early warning" systems have also been put in motion at the same pace. The turn of the "active groups" will soon come, because this is what we read in the program drafted by the Reform Council of the Romanian Government presided over by Mr. Petre Roman, chairman of the FSN (we are referring to the chapter entitled "Extremist Movements." According to the government, it is no longer a secret to anyone that extremist movements are those that challenge its policies). This was the text: "The Government plans to remove them by sponsoring competitive organizations within the same social segments, or organizations with opposite objectives. Such organizations will become active with the support of citizens, churches, professional associations, etc., until October, when extremist protest movements are predicted to break out."

If it is known so precisely that serious disturbances will soon take place in the country, is it or not to be assumed that (like on other occasions) they will be provoked in order to short-circuit the opposition and thus facilitate the planned disguise of the FSN? Except that, however much some may wish it, history does not repeat itself...

P.S. On the latest "Gaudeamus" broadcast, Mr. Marian Munteanu presented the documents (until recently secret) of the FSN Steering Collegium, and expressed his puzzlement at the FSN "policy" toward the students. In Sunday's AZI UNIS also demanded explanations from the FSN. In a future issue we will carry "the danger to the student trade unions."

* National Democratic Party Chairman Interviewed

91BA0036A Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 6 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with National Democratic Party Chairman Serghei Mesaros by Mircea Florin Sandru; place and date not given]

[Text] [Sandru] A recently published communique announced the formation of the Romanian Democratic Forum [RDF], a center political organization; the PND [National Democratic Party] is one of the main founders of this forum. Please give us some details about it.

[Mesaros] As you know, during the electoral campaign, our party initiated and promoted a group—the Democratic Center Union—that got some response from the public. Unfortunately, at the time we failed to consistently apply several selection principles to that alliance to ensure that the component members subscribe to a common political position. Consequently, we found ourselves saddled with extremist elements, like Nica Leon, who damaged our prestige, our position, and our 'centrist' image that we had until then promoted in the political arena.

[Sandru] Who should have effected that selection, the PND?

[Mesaros] Circumstances made the PND into the backbone of that group—perhaps because of its better organization and manner of asserting itself. Which did not mean that at the time the PND was better than other parties. The political circumstances simply allowed us to develop somewhat better than our then partners; we had a better material basis, a better organizational capability, and people better qualified in that respect. But don't think that there was any question of hegemony; after all, we are democrats, the party's name itself obligates us. The experience we gained at the time allowed us to promote the structure of the RDF that we now offer to the electorate and the political forces. This organization, which so far incorporates four parties, but which is expected to grow, expects to integrate the political and personnel structures of its members and to have joint decisionmaking powers and a uniform coordination, so to speak. With this kind of structure, the Forum will ensure maximum effectiveness and functionality. We established a political council, made up of representatives of the political parties, whose responsibility is to hammer out a strategy and a program. We have an administrative council that manages our joint assets derived from the joint fees of the political groups and individual members (one can join the Forum individually, too, without belonging to any component party), and of our fixed assets put together. We also established a structure called 'program of alternative government,' made up of commissions that parallel the presently existing ministries. Their function is to propose alternative solutions, criticize the solutions of the executive branch, and offer constructive suggestions. This will ensure a permanent dialogue with the public and the authorities. The objective of the Forum is to be and act as a constructive opposition. We thus declare ourselves ready at any moment to assume the responsibility of governing, should the situation require it.

[Sandru] Will there be a merger?

[Mesaros] Some of the parties that make up the organization will merge among themselves. Others will follow the formula of alliance and structural integration. As a whole, the Forum is an integrated political and economic structure; the parties that join it may preserve a certain extent of autonomy. I think that after a certain interval this forum will become a well organized and homogenous center party.

[Sandru] Will its program also feature social-democratic elements?

[Mesaros] Social-democratic elements are more likely than liberal elements. In view of the fact that we put great stress on social protection, we are evidently closer to social-democracy. We believe that the greatest danger for our country at present is the extremely serious social crisis in which we are sinking. Now that the old structures are collapsing without being immediately replaced by new ones, a liberal doctrine is not desirable. I don't mean to dispute the efficiency of such a doctrine, of course, but one needs stable social structures in order to implement it. Our priority is to ensure measures for individual protection before we throw the baby into the water to see if it can swim. After the great deprivations that the Romanian society endured under the dictatorship, it doesn't need new traumas. As political and authority factors, we don't need to sacrifice another generation for the sake of the idea that their children may perhaps enjoy a better life. That would mean thinking like the sinister and odious [regime].

[Sandru] Recently some voices have been raised in support of the idea of a national unity government. What do you think?

[Mesaros] The idea of a national unity government is either too late or premature. Here's why: So far the government in power has not declared itself incapable of exercising its mandate, so the idea of another government has no justification. We must stop playing around with concepts, gentlemen. A national unity government would have been justified immediately after the elections, if the present ruling party had opened up and reached a consensus with the opposition. No one says that such a government would not have been effective at that time, because all the participating political forces would have assumed the responsibility for stabilizing the political scence and ensuring the transition. However, once the government announced its transition program, for which it is responsible, it became of course the only one responsible for it. If the program yields results, the electorate will decide whether the government fulfilled its mission or not and whether it deserves continued trust.

[Sandru] What would you do if you were in the government at the present?

[Mesaros] I hope that the present team is the first and last postelectoral one-party government in the democratic history of new Romania. From now on we should have only government coalitions representing the broadest possible consensus of political forces. That does not exclude an opposition. The opposition is an absolutely necessary element in a parliamentary democracy. But the political action should never again be monopolized. And to your question: If we, the Forum, were coparticipants in the government within the framework of a coalition, we would do everything possible in our department (departments) to promote the principles of our own platform-program in the respective areas.

[Sandru] What is the government doing wrong?

[Mesaros] I think that the government's reform program is wrong. The weak points of the government are the moratorium on social demands and its reliance on foreign capital. These two elements can bankrupt the entire program. As you see, the moratorium can be said to have failed, because it cannot be said that social demands have been put on ice. As we all know, concessions were made before the moratorium for certain social categories. Discrepancies automatically appeared between them and others, who—as any social psychology textbook could have shown—will never accept to be dismissed in this manner and will attempt to obtain and impose their own demands. We are at present in a stage of anarchic trade unionism that is deepening daily.

* Government Restricts Autonomy of Unions

91BA0032A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 4 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Sorin Rosca-Stanescu article: "The Trade Unions in Danger"]

[Text] As we reported in our 23 September issue, the Steering Collegium of the NSF [National Salvation Front] has drafted a document dealing with the preparations for its National Convention. This is a plan hammered out by the political group that seized power after 22 December 1989 and won the 20 May 1990 elections with a crushing majority. NSF First Vice Chairman Claudiu Iordache admitted in AZI the authenticity of the said document and, in the same issue of 29 September he provided the readers with certain "explanations" under the title "ROMANIA LIBERA: A Decalogue of Effrontery," which did nothing to contradict the "reputation" of the NSF newspaper. Aside from more or less transparent threats to yours truly, AZI confirmed, in its unmistakable language, that the "thorns on the rose" constitute "a blow below the belt," "which confirms the unspeakable moral level of the newspaper and the intellectual infirmity of the author of the article," "a suspect passion," an "obsession," "stupefying dismay," "naivete, if not downright immorality," "a bit of naivete, a bit of slyness, a lot of embarrassment, and a whole lot of immorality," concluding that "SRS [Sorin Rosca Stanescu] cannot grasp more than that," that "ROMANIA LIBERA seems to have lost its respect for the reader, who must be informed, not systematically deceived," and that "SRS must have failed to understand what it is all about, because far be it from us to suspect him of hypocrisy." And finally, addressing me directly, AZI stated: "We understand that you are brave and that you don't shirk danger, but you would do well to shirk the ridiculous."

Why did the revelation of the NSF's plans cause such a stir? I will venture a preliminary answer. I will also venture to demonstrate why the NSF's strategy is extremely dangerous to Romania and how it practically blocks the process of democratization of the country, risking to renew its servitude to communism. All the more so since, as you will see, a number of actions have already been taken along that line. The NSF's political struggle against the democratic parties is in full bloom, both behind the scenes and in the open; it is destablizing Romania, primarily because it is using means unacceptable in any democratic system, no matter how "original" it may be. Today I will deal with only one point, namely the trade unions.

It is no secret to anyone that, side by side with honest men, the petals of the rose served to hide behind them former dignitaries and activists of the Ceausescu regime and a considerable number of Securitate members on the KGB payroll, too, who used the old political, administrative, police, and trade union structures to secure their electoral victory. Very few—including Senator Dan Iosif, whose biography is only too well known—of those who actually struggled to bring down the dictatorship and communism are still in the NSF today. Some of them realized earlier what it was all about and left the Front in December and January, others were deceived for a longer time, while the last were pushed to the fringes for reasons easy to imagine. For some of them, the temptation of power was stronger than the ideals. Most of them are regarded by the NSF with hostility; they are threatened and slandered just because they could not be converted at the time. The country's situation, too, is, if not entirely known, at least felt in its disastruous effects in the economy, trade, tourism, and services and, in the final analysis, in the general standard of living. The NSF leaders know that there can be no democracy without trade unions. On the other hand, they are aware of the fact that the NSF's supremacy decisively hinges on blocking the activities of the trade unions. Otherwise they will inevitably begin to react increasingly strongly not only as a social seismograph but also as a means of mass resistance against economic and political neocommunism. This reality has long been grasped. While independent trade unions were being established with varying degrees of discretion with the support of the respective countries' provisional leadership, the structures of the former UGSR [General Union of Romanian Trade Unions]—the conveyor belt of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party]—were also recovering, and today, after successive name changes, they have come to be known as the National Confederation of Free Trade Unions [CNSL]. Simultaneously, the establishment of alternative trade unions not subservient to the authorities was discouraged and hindered through all possible means. This explains why—after a document was signed in the presence of Mr. Ion Iliescu on an equitable distribution of assets following several hours of talks between representatives of the UGSR and the Fratia [Brotherhood] Confederation—the convention remained nothing but a piece of paper. Mr. Iliescu was not and is not interested in having the assets of the trade unions belong to the trade unions. The neocommunist trade unions need financial clout, and the NSF needs the neocommunist trade unions. How they are to be used we saw on the occasion of the counterdemonstrations, the attacks on students, press offices, and independent newspapers, and the terror staged against opponents. How they will be used in the future is quite clear from the plans drafted and actually recognized as such—the peak of effrontery!—by the NSF. Thus, I will remind you of the chapter entitled "The Commission for Relations with the Trade Unions and Other Apolitical Associations," whose point a stressed the need for drafting a plan to contact the major components of the National Confederation of Independent Trade Unions [CSNL], and whose point d appealed for "discussing and for theoretical elements to identify convergent points with the trade unions, with a view to in the future steering them and their policies along the line of the general orientation of the Front." Thus, the CNSL leaders, whose new statute states that the trade unions are independent of the political power and the government, will either deliberately violate this statute or amend it. In both cases, the affiliated organizations will be deceived. The Romanian workers will once again be conned. Another thing devolving from the untill recently unpublicized plan of the NSF: "The trade union movement is showing tendencies of soon becoming a self-motivated Solidarity-type political force! Were that to happen, the NSF's losses would be incalculable. We must take the initiative for joint ideological relations! We must bring the trade unions to adopt political options in the manner of labor trade unions, the German social-democratic trade unions, etc. Including trade union leaders in our coordination councils, including the NSF's Steering Collegium, can be extremely useful! It is not too early to start working to establish a large social-democratic trade union confederation!" Consequently, the "friendly" trade unions can expect to be practically swallowed up and digested by a political party in spite of their statute as independent organizations, as they registered with the courts. Another proof that this indeed is the situation is found in the NSF plan: "Strategy for persuading and absorbing the political option. Formation of the first trade unions scheduled to join the NSF, whose leaders are to be included in NSF county coordination councils." This kind of policy was not brought about by love and care for the workers, but by a desire to hang on to power at any cost. The situation is extremely serious, although not unique. It was the communist system that came up with this innovation, and this is what occurred in all the East European countrues after World War II. The results are known: in the absence of free trade unions, the workers, the so-called leading political class, were mercilessly exploited. If by December, when the former RCP turned NSF is to change its coloring into a social-democratic party (practically stealing the name and program of another legal party with traditions throughout Europe), will the rose stick its thorns into the other, less "friendly" trade unions, too? What will the NSF do? This can be clearly deduced primarily from the document entitled "Addenda to the Trade Unions Issue," whose point four states that "forecasts will be worked out on the degree of vulnerability of the trade unions in the wake of the economic reform," and point eight that "a data bank will be established. Studies on the relations between the trade unions and the major parties." I would be willing to accept that there is nothing illegal hiding behind the forecasts and the data bank and that all this is about is scientifically studying future opponents. Except that the chapter "Enterprise Problems" proceeds to talk of "identifying NSF members in enterprises," "establishing workers political clubs," and "influencing (pressuring) trade union leaders." According to information obtained through legal or less legal means and to data received from warning networks or gathered from discussions held at workers political clubs, the trade union leaders are to be pressured into converting to NSF policies. What kind of pressure? The book *The History of Stalinism in Romania* by Victor Frunza can help us learn that. Until then we should take time, but not too much, to figure out what is hiding behind the NSF's "active" groups.

The NSF plan grievously threatens the autonomy of the trade unions and the freedom they won after 22 December 1989. It flagrantly violates all the statutes, as well as the elementary norms of the struggle for power in a state of law.

In a future issue we will discuss the equally dangerous plan to "convert the parties."

* Union of Opposition Youth Forces Hailed

91BA0030B Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 5 Oct 90 p 2

[Madalina Mincu article]

[Text] On Saturday 29 September 1990, representatives of the youth organizations of the National Peasant Christian and Democratic Party [PNT-CD], the National Liberal Party [PNL], and the Romanian Ecological Party [PER] held a meeting at the PNT-CD headquarters.

Proceeding from the idea that the youth were the most important element of the December Revolution, the three organizations discussed the principle of unity in the joint struggle against communism and totalitarianism. Stress was put on the fact that, just as they struggled together against the common enemy during the Revolution, so now the youth must once again unite regardless of what party they belong to. This kind of "cartel," which should have been formed long ago, must be not only united but also active. While until now the opposition has shown a tendency toward division, whereby each party thought only of its own interests, the youth organizations of the three parties stressed the need to draw as many parties as possible, alongside the three founding ones, to united struggle against communism.

The discussions began with some common viewpoints, in line with the principles of the parties involved, concerning the modus operandi and goal of this future opposition union. The participants also emphasized the wish to incorporate all the anticommunist and antitotalitarian movements at a national level, because the concentration and coordination of the various groups of democratic opposition can acquire decisive power toward attaining the objectives proposed. While we have seen the consequences of the "divide and rule" principle at work until now, it would seem that people are beginning to wake up to the realization that in fact the entire opposition is struggling, in the spirit of the parties' programs, against the same thing—communism, and for the same objective—forging a state of law. The participants then discussed the issue of human rights in Romania, an issue with which all the democratic groups must deal. They also stressed the fact that if the struggle against communism is to continue, then all its structures must be examined and then disbanded. However, because the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] was not dismantled in Romania, there seems to exist a risk of fighting against a shadow. As long as it is not very clear what is happening with this party, its funds, and its members, it will not be possible to disband the communist structures very soon.

The participants then attempted to outline in greater detail their ideas concerning the operation of this opposition union, to crystallize a position toward the parties to which these youth organizations belong, and to ensure that the principles of each participating organization will be observed. The discussions also dealt with the need to establish an independent television station and with the issue of a press bill, in view of the fact that it has been said that a press bill was not necessary as long as press violations were specified in the Penal Code. The representatives of the three parties presented their positions on the current situation prevailing in the area of student accommodations now, at the beginning of the new university year. More precisely, they reiterated the decision of the students' leagues to go on strike if these issues are not resolved.

The proposed opposition union of youth organizations will exclude the struggle for power and will attempt to draw as many forces as possible to efficiently struggle against communism and totalitarianism and for establishing a state of law. All the organizations who wish to establish contacts among the opposition forces in their common struggle were invited to join this opposition union. The intiative group—made up of the PNT-CD, PNL, and PER youth organizations—hopes to finally drive home the fact that, before we are members of any party we are all Romanians, and while we endured the communist darkness for so long, the time has now come to unite all the democratic forces with a view to destroying the communist system in all its aspects.

The three youth organizations launched an appeal to unity, in the hope that their common views on the struggle against communism will be converted into a unity of efficient and powerful opposition.

* Brucan on Joint Interview With Militaru

91P20004A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 25 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Silviu Brucan article: "The Ceausescuite Counteroffensive—The Right To Reply"]

[Text] The Brucan-General Militaru interview (ADEVARUL 23 August 1990) aroused a lively discussion in the Romanian and foreign press. The time has come to respond to some questions and to express our opinion on the main issues raised in this discussion.

1. The first issue is the relationship between the popular revolution of December 1989 and the dissident actions—public or covert—organized for the purpose of

removing the Ceausescuite dictatorship from power. We have considered (and we are stressing once again) that the decisive and predominant factor in the revolution in Romania was the popular explosion of December 1989 and we pointed out that the entire activity aimed at producing a breach in the three pillars of Ceausescuite power (the Communist Party, the Army, and the Securitate) was conceived of as a secondary aspect, subordinate to the popular revolt. At the height of the popular revolt of 22 December, the generals and officers who formed the Military Resistance Committee took over the leadership of the Army and served as the military shield for the popular revolution.

Therefore, the attempt to place the dissident action in the Army in opposition to the popular revolution or to present the two as conflicting forces is a distortion of history and, surely, an intentional distortion of the concept and actions to which our interview referred. They have something in mind here and later on we will try to find out what it is. But before that, let us say that in our interview we referred only to actions intended to create a breach in the party, Army, and Securitate. We did not propose to include all the dissidents in Romania, such as Mircea Dinescu or Doina Cornea, Radu Filipescu or Andrei Plesu, and many others, and we did not enumerate actions such as the Jiu Valley strike, the Brasov demonstration and others. All these things were outside the framework proposed for our interview, although we acknowledge that they played an extremely important role in the revolution, inspiring the fighters and offering them an example of courage.

2. Categorically we do not agree with the opinion expressed by one of our critics to the effect that in Romania, as a result of the repressive nature of the Ceausescu regime, "the only solution would present itself in the form of a real social explosion" since this would have meant to wait for this social explosion with our hands folded, and we would not undertake anything because "in Romania, it was not possible to bring about changes from within the system." In the final analysis, we are dealing here with the theory of political passivity in the face of the national disaster and of the savage crimes committed by Ceausescu, a theory with which we, obviously, cannot agree.

We realize, however, that the subject is rather popular since it is to the liking of all those who docilely submitted themselves to the dictatorship for more than two decades and their number is not small.

3. It is only one step from the theory of passivity to the denigration of those who have acted against the dictatorship and another one of our critics is doing this, spreading his long rigamarole over three consecutive issues of the newspaper. According to this gentleman, the Romanian Army joined the side of the revolution because the soldiers, NCO's, officers and generals "were convinced that they had to do this" and because "they felt very strongly that they had been oppressed under the dictatorship." Such jingoistic absurdities cannot explain why there were crowds of soldiers, NCO's and officers in Timisoara, Sibiu, and even Bucharest on 21 December or why there are so many generals and high-level officers on trial. The secretary of the editorial board, who allocates the newspaper space by the acre, has no idea of the meaning of a military structure which has been consolidated during more than 20 years of dictatorship. In reference to the generals who assumed command of the Army on 22 December for the very reason that their underground activity had prepared them for this, he writes that "they had received the order to join the side of the Revolution."

What else can we say about the confusion in the head of this journalist, who, as a worthy follower of the admirers of Garibaldi, discusses "the error of war" in Drumul Taberei, juggling the armored vehicles and tanks, which he has at his fingertips, confusing the regular Ministry of the Interior troops with the elite units of the Securitate, concluding as follows: "We learn that the former Colonel Trosca (wearing the military uniform of a technical officer which he actually was since he was a chemical engineer) had been a counterintelligence [CI] officer; there was a rumor that since he was a CI officer he was concerned with some compromising dossiers, given the names of birds, which disappeared mysteriously after the Revolution." (One might say that it was not a matter of birds but of bats in the belfry!)

I cited this long quotation since it is typical of the neophytes in the trade of journalism who have invaded the press since the Revolution and who, without any inhibitions, attack the most complex military themes, although one can see by their writings that they were never in the military.

4. From the denigration of the resistance it is only another step to the presentation of General Ilie Ceausescu as a "patriotic historian," to the romantic stories which draw tears for the Ceausescu children whose "fault is that they had a bad father" and to the statements that "terrorists actually did not exist since it is not known who fired," supported by authorized attacks on our statements on "the fate of terrorists or the presence of foreign terrorists," which, after almost a year, "still need numerous clarifications" etc. How many more years are necessary for clarifications since even the slightest trace might disappear by then. Indeed, we are witnessing a counteroffensive on the part of all those people who, in January and February, were hiding wherever they could to escape the fury of the crowd. Now, one after the other, they are coming out of hiding and, with the millions acquired during the dictatorship, are printing publications, brochures, and manifestos, in which they are becoming more and more daring and aggressive. They "anoint" journalists who are desirous of getting a nice berth so that they can introduce into the press the idea that "it was not as bad as they say," that their situation "still needs numerous clarifications," etc., etc.

Of course, the principal target of the counterattack is the dissidents , whose activity against the dictatorship is the negation of that mass cowardice and moral and material corruption which permitted Ceausescuism to continue its crude and savage domination for more than two decades. So who is attacking the dissidents? The former chief of Ceausescu's propaganda section; also, a number of scribes who raised hosannas to the dictator or the dictatoress are now in the first ranks of the counteroffensive. You can recognize them from a distance by the nationalistic-hooliganistic and antisemitic invectives which they do not hesitate to reintroduce into journalism today. They all have set up a common front against the Brucan-Militaru interview, which, for the first time, proves with concrete facts, names and dates that there existed in Romania a resistance movement with a strategy devised by the best generals and with a coherent activity and which, under the conditions of the dictatorship, could only be a conspiratorial activity.

The fact that many of those who belonged to the conspiracy made us swear that we would not reveal their names proves that this counteroffensive of Ceausescuism is strong and has ramifications in the power apparatus. In regard to my own activity and the accusation of lack of modesty, I recognize that I have not been and am not modest, but, in regard to the facts, I have not mentioned anything in the interview which was not already known to all those who listen to foreign radio stations, that is, to Romanian public opinion. I contributed to this deliberately, with all the risks involved, for the very purpose of demonstrating that action could and must be taken against the dictatorship.

* Ana Blandiana Discusses 'Slanders' in Press

91BA0002C Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 21 Sep 90 p 1

[Interview with poetess Ana Blandiana by Sorin Rosca-Stanescu; place and date not given]

[Text] [Stanescu] Do you think that there exists in Romania any system for protecting the reader against disinformation, libel, or encroachment on one's personal life?

[Blandiana] Even if it does, it's not working. In fact, the only system of protection that can exist—and that exists in every civilized country—is the Penal Code. Normally, any person who has been slandered can go to court to establish the truth and exact justice. Unfortunately, this normal procedure is not allowed to work in our country, primarily because of the mistrust that 45 years of legal masquerade (in addition to all the people injustly arrested and detained without trial since February and June) have rooted in us. But even those who have managed to overcome this mistrust and proceeded to sue for libel, have not succeeded, not one of them, to overcome even the first hurdle of the judicial bureaucracy. After six months of almost surrealistic denigration of every moral or cultural value, I don't know of any sentence pronounced on anyone guilty of libel. It is very difficult to expect state laws to work where the moral law has lost its meaning. In a normal world, a journalist who has been proven to have lied will forever lose its credibility before the public and will be irretrievably disqualified from a professional viewpoint. In our country, today's slanderers have years and decades of open and unabashed practice behind them, which they amassed by writing shameless paeans and positively asserting things that no one doubted were lies. Nothing happened to them then, and nothing happens to them now! You may say that this unanimous recognition of the fact that their morality is below any criticism is be the best protection against the dirt that they are dishing out now. However, the human soul seems possessed of a chord that responds to the basest sounds, and of an appetite for scandal that defies one's own moral hygiene. Actually, the vulgarity of the official and semiofficial press is a two-edged sword. It delights those who accept it, thus increasingly corrupting their inner being, while on the other hand it disgusts those whose horror of squalor serves even as a political barometer.

[Stanescu] You are one of the most slandered persons in Romania. What have you done to refute all the statements made about you in the official press?

[Blandiana] Nothing. I haven't even read most of them. It is true that often I have been told, but in telling and passed through the filter of the disgust or humor of the teller, they certainly lost all of their poisonous effect and acquired an air of unreality. I realize that this attitude may be viewed as cowardly, but I think it is wiser. I think that I need my courage for other things than for fighting against the defects of a dictatorship striving to recycle itself in a history that they hope will be similar. In point of fact, many of the slanders published were so easily recognized as such, that I was thinking with an innocent sense of revenge about those who were capable of believing them. You cannot accuse a person of being a fascist and a Free Mason, an Iron Guardist and a Roeslerian, a nationalist and a traitor at one and the same time without leaving the realm of sanity and entering that of the ridiculous. As for the charges concerning my feminine condition, they were too vulgar and too absurd to affect me.

It is, however, true that one text deeply wounded and revolted me. It was entitled 'The Rotten Half of Our Fate' and appeared in ADEVARUL. The piece mentioned my father, who allegedly committed suicide by setting himself on fire because I refused to see him when he came out of jail for fear of endangering my literary career. So, mixed with infamous lies, the author used fragments of a real tragedy (my father's long imprisonment and the tragic accident that ended his life) in order to build a base structure in which to lock not only me, but my father's memory, too. Next to this foul allegation, the fact that later the author stated black on white that I should be physically eliminated for having spoken in the University Square, didn't surprise me too much. Nothing more natural for a newspaper that displays Bible quotations to the right of its masthead, than to invent the suicide of a priest and threaten a poet's life... How could I defend myself against such gigantic vileness? What can I add to my books, which attest to a genuine father cult transformed in moral symbol, to my books, the first of which was published after the political prisons were opened and after my father's death in 1964? What could I add? Maybe the consolation of the thought that however great the damage they do me by insulting me, it's still smaller than if they were to praise me (..."While I bear their hatred lightly and with a smile/ Their praises would undoubtedly sadden me no end..."). I hope I'm not putting ideas into their heads!

[Stanescu] The fact that you never offered a riposte, was it because you trust the reader to come to the right conclusions?

[Blandiana] Yes, and especially because of my faith in time. The time that I know works for those like me. These calumnies, which at times rise to apocalyptic heights, will undoubtedly some day become a genuine pool of incriminatory evidence against those who launched them. As for the reader who lets himself be deceived, his conclusions tell more about him than about me. Each one believes according to his heart.

[Stanescu] Ana Blandiana is a personality, a recognized name. But there are people who are slandered without even being known. If you can defend yourself by remaining silent, they are not defended by silence. Which means that the social mechanisms are blocked. What do you think can be done?

[Blandiana] I think that each word we have spoken here is a defense for them, just as everything I wrote and has been written by so many of our honest colleagues constitutes a protest against the besmirching of our collective soul. But what is more, the journalists should request, through their trade unions and professional organizations, a correct and effective use of the judicial power to unblock the social mechanisms you mentioned. This, not a new press law, which can only become a new potential censorship, can help eliminate slanderers while at the same time clearing the image of the journalist, who is free to say anything as long as he remains within the boundaries of well argumented truth. Let us not forget that a scandal sheet or journalist is not the one who tells topical and unpleasant truths, but the one who says things completely without a foundation or a logical justification. If the fourth estate, the press, is not to become a malefic power, it must set limits upon itself, limits that shouldn't be any other than those stipulated in the Penal Code. Thus, as our entire life proves, between shamelessness to lawlessness there is only one step, a step that the heirs of SAPTAMINA are taking without batting an eyelid. Unfortunately, the authorities themselves complain, in general terms, about all this, but are not doing anything to influence their own newspapers, the vanguard of disinformation and vulgarity. From which one may deduce that they don't mind the status quo.

Drivers Union Members Jam Traffic in Bucharest

AU3010202890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1928 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/10/1990—A claim action was organized in Bucharest on October 30 in the afternoon by the Union of Drivers as a result of the fact that the requests advanced to the government on September 17 were not granted. Along several kilometers a large number of big vehicles jammed the traffic in the capital.

Emigre Doru Braia Regains Citizenship

AU3010183590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1642 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/10/1990—The General Division for Passports, Frontier Crossing and Foreigners' Registration made public their decision to issue Doru Constantin Braia, a passport for Romanian residents abroad, upon his request and subject to compliance to the regulations in force. The division specifies that the above named has not lost his Romanian citizenship.

Energy Workers' Pay Claims Cannot Be Met

AU3010202390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1920 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/10/1990—The Press Office of the Government has released a communique which, referring to some claims of the Union Federation of Electric and Thermal Engineering (including pay rises and better working conditions) advanced last April, most of which have already been granted, shows that the endorsement of further measures of pay rise on account of the state budget is not possible.

Taking account of the outstanding economic and social importance of activity in power engineering, the government invites all unions and employees in this branch to show responsibility, based on the understanding of the general economic situation and of the fact that it is only through the firm implementation of the economic reform that an economic refloating of a nature to lead to a real rise in the population's living standard can be obtained.

Foreign Minister Reviews Balkan Meeting Results

LD3010214890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1625 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Oct (TANJUG)—Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, today was a guest of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the SFRY Assembly's Federal Chamber. He spoke extensively about the recently held ministerial-level second meeting of the Balkan countries. In his view, the meeting was the continuation of cooperation in the Balkans for which the foundation was laid by the first ministerial meeting in Belgrade two-and-a- half years ago. According to Loncar, the recent meeting served to consolidate common points of cooperation in the Balkans and to try to catch up with the CSCE process in Europe. Loncar emphasized the usefulness of the meeting in Tirana for efforts to remove the shroud of divisions, instability, and suspicion from the region, and to make fresh moves toward the period ahead; in other words, to help the Balkans to become an integral part of the processes underway in both Europe and the world.

In reference to the situation three years ago when a Yugoslav initiative for a first ever ministerial meeting of the Balkan countries was still in its inception, Loncar reminded those present of the atmosphere of incredulity and doubt which surrounded the initiative not just in other Balkan countries, but in Yugoslavia too. Time has shown how useful the Yugoslav initiative has been for the entire region. However, despite the initiative, the Balkans have yet to take part in ongoing changes, including the process of democratization in Europe, Loncar said.

Speaking about the final document of the Tirana meeting, Loncar said that the document reiterated the fundamental principles of cooperation in the Balkans adopted two and one-half years ago in Belgrade: independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, equal rights, and noninterference in the internal affairs of others.

The Yugoslav foreign secretary also spoke about the practical achievements of the meeting in Tirana. He said that in Tirana reference was also made to a possible summit meeting of the Balkan countries. A working group has been put in charge of preparations for such a meeting which, according to Loncar, could be held within the next two years.

Although Loncar's report was very extensive, the Foreign Affairs Committee members had a number of additional questions for the federal secretary, who was at the head of our delegation in Tirana. Delegates from Macedonia asked Loncar to explain the discrepancy between the way the press in Macedonia had reported the issue of national minorities and the official view put out by the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Loncar, said that the meeting in Tirana devoted special attention to the issue of national minorities. This is a logical development in view of the fact that the issue is the main bone of contention in the Balkans. There is a polarization of standpoints during the work on the final document and in the debate. Greece, initially "helped" by Bulgaria, is on one side, while Yugoslavia, supported by Turkey and Romania, is on the other. As for Albania, it has not shown much interest in the issue. Greece insists on a provision which will give each country the right to question the existence of national minorities. Greece remains, however, isolated over this provision. In the end, the meeting adopted a definition which is in line with all official documents of the UN, the CSCE, and other international institutions which deal with human rights and national minorities.

According to Loncar, the Yugoslav delegation was very categorical—all six Balkan countries have national minorities. When discussing this issue, one must proceed from that fact. "I think that in Tirana the Yugoslav delegation invested maximum efforts and attained good results in the formulation of the rights of national minorities," said Loncar.

As far as some different undertones in the Macedonian press are concerned, Loncar believes that the press did not realistically convey and interpret everything which had been discussed and decided in Tirana in the area of national minorities. "We can only regret that this has happened, but the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs is not responsible for that," stressed Loncar.

In conclusion, Loncar referred to his meeting with the Albanian head of state, Ramiz Alia. The meeting took place as a result of the developments in Europe, and it is clear that Albania cannot remain on the sidelines of all European changes. Without elaborating where Albania's position is today in these European processes, Loncar recalled a few facts:

Albania has normalized relations with several countries which until recently it had not recognized, has joined CSCE as an observer, and is ready to fulfill all the commitments adopted by CSCE during the past 15 years.

According to Loncar, his meeting with Alia was "long, frank, polemical, and very correct." The conversation was about the relations between the two countries, internal changes in Yugoslavia and Albania, and, of course, about Kosovo. The Albanian head of state said that, in Albania, Kosovo is treated as a Yugoslav problem. Loncar said that this statement is not consonant with what Alia said during the UN General Assembly meeting. Alia considered this remark by Loncar to be criticism.

Although on some issues Loncar and Alia agreed to disagree, the Yugoslav foreign minister stresses that this meeting was very useful, constructive, and realistic. This was the first meeting between an Albanian head of state and a Yugoslav minister during the past 44 years. One can infer from this fact that dialogue, as the only option of Balkan cooperation, is becoming a reality, said Loncar.

Instructions Planned for Work of Federal Organs

LD3010202390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1614 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Oct (TANJUG)—The budget of the Yugoslav parliament assessed today that "in the shortest possible time" the moratorium should be imposed on all acts passed by the Yugoslav constituent republics and which contradict the federal Constitution.

This is, as the committeemen maintain, the condition for carrying out a democratic dialogue on Yugoslavia's future. The committee also believes that before this year is out, instructions of some kind should be introduced for the work of the federal organs during the first few months of next year.

This proposal was made because the mandate of the federal parliament expires as of December 31 of this year, which practically means also the termination of the federal government's term.

Until then, no parliamentary elections can take place because the multi-party elections in four republics (Bosnia-Herecegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) have been called for November or December.

At its session, the committee announced that Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic will speak most likely on November 7 or 8 in the federal parliament about the country's economic and political crisis.

The federal parliament's judiciary committee announced at its session that Markovic's report would cover all the aspects of blockades in Yugoslavia, inclusive of the breakdown of the federal legal system.

The deputy federal justice minister, Svetozar Zecar, said that the government assessed that the Yugoslav State Presidency's information report, recently submitted to parliament, was "much too narrow" for a debate on resolving the crisis in Yugoslavia.

Slovene Leaders React to Federal Assembly Events

AU3010172590 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Oct 90 p 3

[D. Draskovic report: "A New Election Campaign"]

[Text] Ljubljana—Dr. Dimitrij Rupel most often manages to express his concern for Slovenia and new condemnations of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs at political weekends, in the interlude between two political shopping trips abroad. If one adds to this the fact that on the actual eve of the reformers' congress in Nova Gorica, president Kucan partially retrieved his suspended party status, everything indicates that a new political campaign is beginning in Slovenia whose main subject will be Yugoslavia, or rather the relations within it, and Slovenia's chances of seceding.

Last weekend, Rupel, minister of foreign affairs, spoke in Logatec about the latest events in the SFRY Assembly, concluding that everything had ended in only an illusory peace.

"The fact remains unchanged that the leaderships of the Yugoslav People's Army are still dissatisfied with the development of events in Slovenia, but the attempt by Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY Presidency, to present to the delegates only one model for cohabitation in Yugoslavia could easily be described as some kind of civilian coup d'etat which fortunately did not succeed," Rupel said.

President Milan Kucan visited Kopar and, in talking about events in the SFRY Assembly, concluded that "Jovic's concept is built on the assumption that the present generators of the Yugoslav crisis should be mended, patched up, and maintained." Kucan thought that most of the Yugoslav peoples which would agree with this concept would determine the conditions and ways for those, who did not want to remain in Yugoslavia, to leave the country.

Kucan thought that a confederal agreement should be reached by sovereign independent states which would already have their own constitutions, and after it was reached, they could sign this agreement as an international document. However, the latest events show that public opinion is increasingly in favor of independence, which means that this cannot be decided by the Slovene Presidency or the Assembly but by all citizens either in a referendum or in a plebiscite.

Speaking about the issue of recruits and demilitarization, Kucan stressed that the stand of the Slovene Assembly on military service was resolute and binding. "We Slovenes are not prepared to allow our children, our sons, to shed blood in conflicts which have been caused by a bad policy which we could not influence." Kucan thought that before the new constitution was adopted, Slovenia would completely determine spheres of competence with regard to national defense, and until then it should be decided whether Slovenia would become a demilitarized region.

As is well known, Dr. Dusan Plut, member of the Slovene Presidency, advocated the direct and urgent demilitarization and secession of Slovenia from Yugoslavia. In Crnomelj, he again concluded that Yugoslavia is dead and that Slovenia must fight for the present republican borders and a guarantee that all the republics are Yugoslavia's legal heirs, and it is necessary to work out a way of splitting joint property and foreign currency reserves.

Plut also advocated the creation of a national crisis center which would include the president of the Presidency of Slovenia, the member of the SFRY Presidency from Slovenia, the president of the republican Assembly and its Executive Council, and the leaders of political parties and government ministers.

Slovene Trade Unions Leave Federal Organization

LD3010192190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1115 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Ljubljana, 30 Oct (TANJUG)—The Council of the Federation of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (SSSS) has decided "because of the situation which has arisen and relations in the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (SSSJ) that the Free Trade Unions of Slovenia will, until further notice, completely suspend its rights and duties of membership of the Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia."

In a statement to TANJUG, Miha Ravnik, president of the SSSS, explained that this decision was adopted because of the permanent tension and discord over the stances of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Serbia. In fact, the SSSS, despite its goodwill, has not succeeded in establishing a dialogue with the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Serbia on problems which have arisen in connection with the Serbian economic embargo, which has caused material damage to a large number of Slovene enterprises.

Besides this, the Free Trade Unions of Slovenia do not agree with the attitude of the Serbian trade unions via-a-vis workers on strike in Kosovo and consider that the demand to dismiss these workers is against all strike rules, Miha Ravnik stated.

The direct departure of representatives of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Serbia and their attempts to resolve the problems which have arisen in areas inhabited by Serbs in Croatia, but without the Croatian trade unions knowing about it, is a move with which we do not agree and a further reason for this decision, Miha Ravnik said, adding that their decision to freeze relations with the SSSJ is legitimate, because this is guaranteed to them by the very statute of the SSSJ.

In the view of the Miha Ravnik, president of the SSSS, this decision should speed up and have an impact on "the resolution of problems to the benefit of workers and of the economy in a responsible way, in the absence of politicization."

Federal TU Reacts to Decision

LD3010193690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1315 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Oct (TANJUG)—The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia is surprised at the decision of the Slovene trade unions to freeze "until further notice" its cooperation with the federal organisation.

"We learned about the decision of the Slovene trade unions from information media," Grozdana Miljanovic, a member of the Presidium of the Yugoslav Independent Trade Union Council, told journalists today and added that no official explanation has been received from Slovenia so far. The Presidium of the federal trade unions organization will call on the Federation of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia to provide a detailed explanation of reasons for "freezing" the relations, she said, adding that the Slovene trade unions have been very active in the work of all federal trade union bodies.

Commentary Views Serbia's 'Federalist Policy'

AU3110110290 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 23 Oct 90 p 1

[Ljubomir Cucic commentary: "Serbia Continues Alone"]

[Text] If you cannot beat them, leave them alone! This is more or less the way to sum up Anglo-Saxon pragmatism from the point of view of the defeated side in the SFRY Assembly. The transparency of the swindle prepared within the framework of the so-called federal concept of the structure of Yugoslavia was actually confirmed today. After the victory of reason in the federal Assembly—as the events that took place there were described by even a convinced advocate of federalism in the state Presidency—the Serbian leadership is pushing through the republican Assembly decisions which have completely unmasked the essence and aims of its "federalist" policy. Revealing that Yugoslavia has never been the reason for Serbian federalism but that Serbia itself has leaned on Yugoslavia, the truth about this was most succinctly defined by POLITIKA with the headline "Serbia Protects Itself."

In short, the republican Assembly in Belgrade should at today's session adopt measures which "counter the federation's failure to meet its obligations toward Serbia and the federal measures which directly damage Serbia." We are talking about, among other things, the introduction of a tax on goods "imported" from Slovenia. This concerns a move which directly suspends the unity of the economic area in Yugoslavia which, by the way, Belgrade advocated so much as part of a federalist concept. As we said, the game is transparent. Having perceived that the policy of unitary federalism would not be accepted, Serbia is not only not accepting a confederal platform for discussion but taking a step further in actually separating from a common state. The matter could indeed be explained by the desire to consolidate negotiating positions before talks on a new Yugoslavia with the intention of later acquiring what it desires—a privileged economic position—either within or outside Yugoslavia. Whatever happens, it is confirmed that the basic motive behind the struggle for a federal structure in Yugoslavia was and is Serbia's dominant position in it.

With the decisions that it is making today in the republican Assembly, Serbia is making it clear that it is not interested in Yugoslavia if it is not what it is used to being in. It does not accept as an alternative a confederation, as has been proposed, but is taking new steps toward becoming economically and politically independent. In this context, the serious charges about the destruction of Yugoslavia of course acquire a quite different character. This is confirmed by Belgrade's entire policy in the last two or three years: From single-nationalist homogenization through the suspension of Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomy, to fomenting revolt in and around Knin and the formation of a Serbian National Council in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The solo role that Belgrade has started to perform on the economic scene has been proven by the ambitious but disappointing loan for economic recovery, continual attacks on federal prime minister Markovic (as the other half of the "Croatian two-headed eagle"), the economic blockade of Slovenia, and so forth. Perceiving that primarily the economic interests of Slovenia and Croatia lay behind the confederal concept which is being proposed by the northwest and that the restoration of federalism as the basic political interest of Serbia is practically impossible on the model that it itself is proposing, Belgrade is leaning toward the only thing that is left: "If we are not the heads of a federal Yugoslavia then we do not need a confederal Yugoslavia either."

What can the rest of Yugoslavia do in this situation? Quite briefly: Continue to work out the proposed model of cohabitation in this region which is compatible with European processes. This will then show the country and Europe that the culprit for the political crisis in Yugoslavia and the dissonant tones in the cacophony of European relaxation and cooperation is not "Slovene-Croatian secessionism" but Serbian revanchism.

Serbian Opposition Criticizes Federal Presidency

AU3010185290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Oct 90 p 3

["M.G." and "I.R."-signed report: "Objections in Every Paragraph"]

[Text] Belgrade—The speech by Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY Presidency, the text of which was distributed to the Assembly delegates, yesterday received an official reaction from the Serbian opposition.

A fairly lengthy communique, which was endorsed by the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Democratic Forum, and the Serbian National Renewal, and signed by lawyer Milenko Radic, contains objections to the parts of the speech which refer to elections, the currently bad interethnic situation, and the "destructive and unlawful activities of some parties that are financed by the extreme emigres."

In addition to asking the Presidency to name these "destructive and unlawful" parties, so that not all opposition parties are suspected of this, the communique also states that it is not appropriate for the Presidency to produce arbitrary qualifications because on the eve of elections this could be interpreted as tendentious. The statement also demands that the Presidency apologize and retract its assessment.

"The Presidency correctly concludes that the most significant characteristics of the political-security situation in the country are the growing nationalism, separatism, and the deterioration in interethnic and inter-republican relations"—this is how the second part of the opposition's communique begins. It also points out that "nationalism and separatism were not created today," and that the responsibility for the deterioration in interethnic relations should be borne by the organs of authority, "members of one party, the communist party, who have unsuccessfully been performing their duties for the last 50 years."

Serbian opposition parties claim that relations in Yugoslavia could be improved only through the efforts of all citizens and the political parties via which they work. They also observe that, despite the fact that some 100 parties have been registered in Yugoslavia, the Presidency has not yet established that "an occasional meeting with representatives of all parties registered at the federal and republican level" should be its duty.

Borisav Jovic's words that the Presidency "will be responsible" for the further course of events and that "the citizens should be offered some hope," seem to have particularly provoked the opposition. As regards "responsibility," they claim that not only will the Presidency "be responsible," but that it is responsible for the current situation. As regards "hope," this could also be offered to people by anyone who knows how to read palms. The leadership of the country is expected to either take specific actions or "withdraw and give somebody else a chance to help the frightened and disturbed people."

As regards Jovic's appeal to citizens to "approach the election of their future representative with the greatest responsibility," the opposition wonders "which funds the people could take part in the elections with," saying that the "budget of the SFRY for this year envisages $162, $791, and $475 [amounts as published] for the work of sociopolitical organizations."

These funds, regardless of the federal law on political organizations which guarantees equality to all political parties, are used by the Socialist Alliance of Working People, the Veterans' Organization, the Trade Union Federation, the Youth Organization...that is, the organizations that support the ruling party, the opposition points out. In Serbia, all funds (about $2 million) envisaged for sociopolitical organizations are used by the illegal Socialist Alliance of Working People and the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia.

In addition to being deprived of room for conducting their activities (except the Socialist Party of Serbia), Serbian opposition parties are also deprived of the opportunity to control election results. They are also hindered from presenting themselves in the media in the way envisaged by the law. Finally, the communique demands that the Presidency use its energy on the implementation of democratic elections and not "the elections in which parties would appear as decor for the legitimacy of the ruling party."

Opposition Wins Access to Belgrade TV, Radio

AU3010141290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Oct 90 p 3

[E. Ciric report: "The Same Media Yardstick"]

[Excerpts] Belgrade—Belgrade Radio and Television will devote considerable attention to the preelection campaign and election activities, and will grant equal rights and equal time to all parties that are taking part in the elections. The parties will appear primarily on the first television channel and radio stations one and two. Belgrade Television will broadcast reports on parties' promotional activities during its morning programs, and in the evening it will follow the election of delegates to city and communal assemblies. On Sundays at 2000 [1900 GMT], the third channel of Belgrade Television will give the representatives of four parties 15 minutes each to present one of the topics from their election manifesto. [passage omitted]

Every day, except Saturday and Sunday, between 2100-2230 the first television channel will show a program entitled "Parties in Serbia" in which representatives of various parties will speak for half an hour about their program and their candidates. During the remaining hour they will answer journalists' questions about Yugoslavia (confederation or federation), the position of Serbs in Yugoslavia, elections after elections, economic programs, interethnic relations, human rights, and ecology.

The series of programs will also include special features about the candidates for the president of the Republic.

Belgrade Radio, especially the program "Magazine" broadcast between 0930-1100, will devote the last half hour to the preelection campaign. The representatives of different parties will present themselves and will, without a moderator, speak about their election campaign code of conduct, programs, and candidates. The "One More Argument" program, broadcast in the afternoon, will devote 60 minutes to the live promotions of various parties. During the program journalists will ask questions. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Assembly Discusses Future National Setup

AU3010165490 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Delegates of the Assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina have adopted stances on the way to overcome the constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia. The document insists that an agreement should be reached among sovereign republics about the future setup of the country. Here is a report from Sarajevo by Ljubomir Nikolic:

[Nikolic] These stances do not accept the federal and confederate options, but offer the one on an agreement among sovereign republics concerning the future setup of Yugoslavia. A charter of the community should be adopted and on that basis one should start reconstructing Yugoslavia by adopting a new constitution and holding elections for new organs of the joint state.

Bosnia-Hercegovina is in favor of a community with joint offices in the sphere of foreign politics, defense, and security, as well as mechanisms and instruments which should ensure the equality of all subjects in economic operations and an undisturbed functioning of the Yugoslav market, as a basis for Yugoslavia to join European and world integration groups, that is, the international division of labor.

The Assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina is of the opinion that the implementation of the already adopted documents should be postponed until the charter is adopted and that the practice of adopting anti-constitutional documents should be stopped in the future, as well as that disputes should be solved in a peaceful way, by democratic and legal means and without threats.

It is also said in the stances adopted by the Assembly of Bosnia- Hercegovina that if Yugoslavia cannot be preserved by democratic methods, this republic will organize itself as an autonomous, sovereign, and independent state, although this is not a historical interest of its citizens and peoples and nationalities, or of other republics.

One must say, however, that these stances do not obligate the future parliament of Bosnia-Hercegovina which will be constituted after the November elections.

At the end, here is a piece of news concerning a party. Posters of the Croatian Democratic Community featuring a cross and a crescent with a star have been put up in Sarajevo. Speaking at the regular news conference, Stjepan Kljujic, head of the Croatian Democratic Community in Bosnia-Hercegovina, said that what is involved is the form of the cross that used to be a joint symbol of all Christians before the schism of 1054.

Muslim Leader Threatens Bosnian Secession

LD3010190490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1601 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Mostar, 30 Oct (TANJUG)—If the republics of Slovenia and Croatia secede from Yugoslavia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will immediately proclaim its independence, as Alija Izetbegovic, leader of the opposition Democratic Action Party has stated.

Speaking in Mostar yesterday evening, Izetbegovic said that his party, as a representative of the Muslim nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would not agree to remain within any geographically different Yugoslavia.

Izetbegovic expressed the conviction that Yugoslavia would not disintegrate, but would, in order to resolve the deep constitutional-legal crisis, soon become a "modern federation, with many confederate elements."

"I believe possible a Yugoslavia in which the full equality of all its nations, the sovereignty of the republics and respect for human rights and freedoms will be achieved in a democratic political environment," the leader of the Democratic Action Party said.

Investigators To Release Statement on Explosion

LD3110110590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0854 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Text] Dvor na Uni, 31 Oct (TANJUG)—An unidentified perpetrator used either an explosive or an explosive device to blow up a public security station police car around 1:30 last night in front of the station building, in Dvor na Uni's Marshal Tito Square.

The powerful explosion scattered car parts everywhere and woke the whole town. Fortunately, nobody was killed or injured.

Investigating bodies have initiated an investigation and will issue an official press statement.

Gunmen Attack Gospic Officials

LD3110145790 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] We also learned that an incident occurred at 2200 last night in Raducki (Glavace) village, on the Gospic-Gracac road, when shots were fired at a truck from Istratrans, of Labin, and later at officials of Gospic's Internal Affairs Secretariat. The yet unknown offenders apparently used air guns in the attack in which, fortunately, no one was injured.

Barricades were erected last night on three points along the Gospic-Gracac road, but traffic was uneffected as the barricades were quickly removed.

A similar piece of information has been received from Bosanski Novi. Railway traffic on the Una railway line was again disrupted when at 0145 this morning explosives planted by as yet unidentified persons destroyed the section of the railway line in Ravnice village, 10 kilometers from Bosanski Novi, in the direction of Kostajnica. As a result, trains are at a standstill in Bosanski Novi, and there are plans to divert them via Sarajevo and Belgrade.

Sipovac Elected President of Vojvodina Socialists

AU3110084990 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Oct 90 p 14

[Unattributed report: "Sipovac Is President"]

[Text] Novi Sad—At the founding session of the Provincial Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia for Vojvodina which was held yesterday, Nedeljko Sipovac was elected president and Radovan Pankov vice president of the committee.

First Private Daily Newspaper Appears in Rijeka

LD3010160590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0956 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Rijeka, Oct 30 (TANJUG)—RI TELEFAX, Yugoslavia's first privately-published daily newspaper, appeared at newsstands in the northern Adriatic city of Rijeka yesterday.

The founders of the daily, whose initial circulation is 15,000, are the owners of two privately-owned publishing houses in Rijeka—"Verzal" and "Violic."

RI TELEFAX's scope will initially be purely municipal, but it aims to grow into a daily covering the entire northern Adriatic coastal region.

RI TELEFAX will be issued on weekdays, but not Sundays.